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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of national integration policies as a method of conflict resolution. It 
assumes that a nation can be multiethnic and integrative, rather than ethnically homogeneous 
and exclusive. Instead of seeking outright separatism for ethnonational conflicts, it explores 
ways to integrate sizeable ethnic groups through suitable nation-building policies, in this case, 
the Kurds. 
To justify the above hypothesis, this study analyses two theoretical frameworks, first, the 
prototypical national integration theory based on Karl W. Deutsch's work, and second, 
Revolution from Above based on Ellen K. Trimberger's work. This study regards Revolution 
from Above as an effective method for newly established states to consolidate administrative 
capabilities, which are vital to political institutionalisation. Particularly, nation-building through 
Revolution from Above is deemed suitable for redressing the problems posed by arbitrarily 
drawn national borders, as reforms conducted by such governments are designed to compensate 
for the lack of pre-existing national unity, such as provision of national education, welfare, and 
economic development. 
This study then examines two specific cases of nation-building, in Turkey and in Iraq, and in 
particular how they faced the challenge of integrating their substantial Kurdish minorities. 
Turkey is treated as a representative case of nation-building through Revolution from Above, 
and Iraq is treated as an example in which equivalent nation-building measures to the Turkish 
case were absent, owing to the mandate rule by Britain in its earliest period. This empirical 
chapter will be presented in four key phases which are: (1) The Legacy of Ottoman 
Centralisation, (2) State Formation, (3) Political Mobilisation, and (4) Integration or 
Containment? 
Finally, this study will examine the impact of foreign intervention on the relations between 
governments and minorities. The failed national integration that is manifest in totalitarian state-
structure will be discussed, as it may trigger political and military interventions by foreign 
powers. The final chapter examines the two test cases, based on Kurdish nationalists' contacts 
with foreign states and organisations in the 1920s and in the 1990s. 
IX 
Chapter I 
Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to explore conditions under which ethnically and socially 
distinct groups can be brought together through suitable nation-building policies, on 
the assumption that nations can be multi ethnic and inclusive. The case study to 
substantiate the above proposition is based on the problem of Kurdish integration in 
Iraq and Turkey where the same ethnonational conflict has been protracted under two 
contrasting political systems. By viewing nation-building as a method of conflict 
resolution, I intend to study an alternative solution to that of separatism. There may be 
numerous cases of protracted conflict in which separatism can be the only practicable 
solution. In this study, however, I start from the fact that so-called nation-states are 
historical creations and that they exist today as a result of national integration 
processes that often brought together diverse ethnic groups. Because of this 
essentially dynamic nature of a nation, it is not unreasonable to envision that the 
ethnically and socially diverse groups in a given state can be potentially and 
eventually integrated. 
The reason for putting the emphasis on national integration instead of separatism is 
this: not only it is highly impracticable to divide territory strictly according to ethnic 
groups, but such a policy would also increase racial intolerance. People who desire 
~thnic homogeneity may justify endless attempts to divide state territory and support 
ethnic cleansing, which could possibly result in 'over-fragmentation of the state 
systems' (Eti/oni 1995). A state's possession of ethnic homogeneity in itself is not a 
panacea; however, many social and economic problems can be much better dealt with 
if national integration is successful. The benefits of successful national integration are 
many. If there were, for example, feudalism in the society of a certain ethnic group, 
such a social structure problem can also be alterable through national integration, and 
formerly isolated members of the minority group are brought to participate in wider 
economic as well as educational opportunities. Also, if there were a regional gap in 
economic development that overlapped with the ethnic cleavage, such a gap could 
also be modified by improving the region in conjunction with the expansion of a 
nation-wide economy. It must be brought to attention once again that what matters 
most is not the ethnic homogeneity of a state, but how capable the state's political 
system is of integrating the diverse groups in a given territory under equal citizenship. 
Different Approaches to Conceptualising Nations 
There are two major approaches to nations and nationalism, namely, the constructivist 
approach and the perennialist approach. Since this work has been informed by both 
and since both schools' authors examine the same variables (e.g. modernisation), if 
with different emphasis, it is important to situate the view of a nation presented here 
in the wider debate over nationalism. 
Most fundamental to the constructivist approach to nationalism is to see it as the 
outcome of modernisation and certain historic processes. Representative scholars of 
this school are Karl W. Deutsch, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Karl 
Deutsch's pioneering work was his study on social mobilisation in which he clarified 
the factors which would lead to linguistic and political assimilation or differentiation 
(separatism) under the dynamic conditions of a modernising state (Deutsch 1953). 
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More literary than scientific, Anderson's' Imagined Communities' (1991) treated the 
evolution of various nationalisms in a universal perspective, allowing the readers to 
understand the historicity of a nation-state. The following summarises this school's 
approach, which is, 'to pay greater attention to the ways in which nationalisms are 
historically constructed, initially by certain sociopolitical forces with their own 
agenda(s), by means of selective appropriations of elements and interpretations of the 
past within a specific historical conjuncture and in relation to (and competition with) 
many other discourses and practices of identity' (Lockman 1997: 270-1). 
On the other hand, perennialist scholars' view of a nation is that it has always existed 
and that what we see today as nations are the result of an 'awakening' through 
political and historical events. The representative scholars of this school are Elie 
Kedourie, Hans Kohn and Walker Connor. The fundamental characteristic of the 
perennialist approach is to see ethnicity, kinship and culture as perennial components 
of a nation. For example, Kedourie equates the so-called primordial entity with a 
nation (Kedourie 1985); thus preexisting characteristics of a nation such as language 
and religion are seen as unchangeable. Because of their emphasis on those 
characteristics related to ethnicity and kinship, the perennialist scholars do not view 
the modem territorial state as having the potential to integrate primordial groups, but 
rather, see groups based on ethnic and kinship ties as continuing to exist unaffected by 
nation-building. Furthemlore, the perennialist scholars see modernisation as a 
contributing factor in making people more aware of their ethnic differences, and have 
a tendency to put great emphasis on the emotional power of ethnicity (as in Connor 
1087). 
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My above statement that a nation can be integrative belongs to the former _ 
constructivist - approach. I would like to add, at the same time, that even if I take this 
approach I would not regard relatively new nations as being artificial and 
acknowledge that they can have organic roots with a sense of membership shared by 
its citizens. The Revolution from Above, to be discussed below, is representative of 
'deliberate' efforts at nation-building through "top-down' policies in new nations. 
These new nations cannot necessarily be accused of lacking strong popular roots 
simply because nation-building is led by a small elite. As will be discussed, elite-led 
revolutions have often been necessitated due to the social structure in many parts of 
the non-Western world, and can be said to substitute for the mass revolutions or 
national movements that has been more common in the West. 
Approaches to Study of the Kurds 
The existing works on the Kurds consist mainly of three types. The first is historical, 
including anthropological works. The second is made up of political analyses, and the 
third type comprises sections written on the Kurds that appear as part of studies on 
individual countries in which the Kurds reside as a minority. 
Martin Van Bruinessen's "Agha, Shaikh, and State' (First Edition, 1973 and Second 
Edition, 1992) belongs to the pioneering work in Kurdish studies that dealt primarily 
with the social structure of Kurdish society. Bruinessen's work brought previously 
little-known information about the internal structure of the Kurdish society to our 
knowledge, and his insight into the relation between primordial loyalty and the 
modern state contributed not just to the field of anthropology but also to political 
studies. Other pioneering work includes 'People without a Country - The Kurds and 
Kurdistan' edited by Gerald Chaliand (First Edition, 1979). Although the book 
consists of essays by different authors, the work has historic importance in its treating 
the Kurds as a separate nation from as early as the 1970s, and it integrates scattered 
information about the Kurds in different countries with political analysis. The work 
by Derek Kinnane, 'The Kurds and Kurdistan' (1964) consists mostly of historical 
accounts and is deemed to be the general point of reference. Other historic works 
include William Eagleton's 'The Kurdish Republic of 1946' that examined the history 
of the Kurdish state that briefly existed in the Iranian city of Mahabad between 1945 
and 1946. Eagleton's work has a unique position as the only book that gives a full 
account of the Mahabad RepUblic. 
More recent works include Michael M. Gunter's series of political analyses on the 
Kurds. Gunter's sources are extensively based on contemporary press materials such 
as summaries of broadcasts and intelligence briefings, and his work in itself has an 
archival value. David McDowall's 'The Modem History of the Kurds' (1996) is 
written based largely on historic archives from the nineteenth century and is perhaps 
the most comprehensive work as a single book entirely dedicated to the history of the 
Kurds. Kirsci and Winrow's study of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey 'The Kurdish 
Question in Turkey' (1997) also uses an extensive amount of primary sources, 
especially Turkish archival material, and is perhaps one of the most comprehensive 
works that specifically deals with Turkey's Kurdish conflict. 
It is a general tendency, however, that the works focused on the Kurds ignore the 
rationality behind the nation-building policies of the states in which the divided Kurds 
li\e and have a tendency to demonise their governments. Given the appalling 
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treatment of the Kurds by successive regimes, this is understandable. However, the 
treatment of Kemalist policy as simply 'racist' (as in \1cDowall 1996: 192), for 
example, falls short of grasping the true nature of the conflict. The authors who take 
an ostensibly sympathetic view of the Kurds often fail to acknowledge the 
significance of nation-building from the viewpoint of the existing states in which the 
Kurds live. On the other hand, the works focused on these individual countries have a 
tendency to take the state as something self-evident and legitimate from the 
beginning, and treat the Kurds merely as a tribal group resisting modernisation. The 
country-study literature fails to address why the state failed to politically integrate the 
Kurdish people or understand how their nation-building policies contributed to 
delaying the detribalisation of the Kurds compared to other citizens who were more 
successfully integrated. 
In order to redress the gap in existing perspectives, I have aimed to assess the 
rationale behind the strategies of nation-building adopted by Iraq and Turkey, and at 
the same time examine the problems that accompanied those policies by contrasting 
them with the Kurdish perspective. This approach aims to evaluate national 
integration policy without losing the perspective of practicality: it is easy to criticise 
the authoritarian policies of state-building as having curtailed the rights of ethnic 
minorities. However, it is a reality that devolving authority to minorities and regions 
is often an impracticable option under early phases of political development. 
Therefore, it misses the point if we treat those countries' political systems from a 
\\'cstcrn perspecti\'e. This study is focused on examining integrative nation-building 
policies that are deemed practicable even for the relatively young states whose 
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political institutions are often weak and whose depth of political participation is still 
limited. 
Starting Point: 'Imposed Community' 
The state as an international legal entity came into being in the Middle East after the 
First World War. There was, however, a variation with regard to the degree of 
independence enjoyed by the new states. Some states won complete independence 
immediately, while some remained under the trusteeship and mandate system that was 
not unlike a new form of colonialism (Emerson 1960: 309-312). The mandate system, 
to be discussed in Chapter IV, was widely applied in the Middle East. Furthermore, 
often, the state borders had been arbitrarily drawn and had no full legitimacy among 
the local popUlation. The international recognition of state sovereignty, however, 
contributed to formalising the relation between those who ruled and those who were 
ruled more than ever before. State sovereignty enabled the ruling group to instantly 
and legally monopolise the resources for the purpose of nation-building by their own 
design. 
The mandatory power of the 1920s complicated social problems by empowering the 
existing elite for the purpose of conveniently governing the local population through 
it. The elite were often tribal chiefs and feudal landowners. This policy worsened 
social problems by widening the dichotomy between the rich and the poor. In a way, 
by empowering the feudalistic elite, the representatives of the Western democracies 
did the 'opposite' in these territories to what they did in their own country where they 
had destroyed or weakened the feudal or aristocratic classes. As a result of this policy, 
the conservative elements were disproportionally strengthened during the mandatory 
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era, which caused 'disillusion, bitterness and also to the weakening of liberal 
nationalists within the pro-change elite' (Cottam: 19). For this reason, the forn1er 
colonies and mandate territories often inherited at independence highly unequal social 
structures, posing challenges to post-colonial development. 
Although all the existing states are indiscriminately acknowledged to enjoy statehood, 
nation-building in the new states took a considerably different course from their 
European counterparts: in Europe, the coincidence of language and territory had 
already been high in the nineteenth century as a result of centuries of integration. 
Thus many 'nation-states' were already existent by the time of mass politicization and 
democratisation. This was not the case in many other parts of the world. Such self-
generated integration was necessarily obstructed because the people in those areas 
were assigned territory first, then faced the task of creating a national community 
within these boundaries. Therefore, there was no congruence between a nation and a 
state. Myron Weiner identified several patten1s of artificial borders: (1) Countries in 
which a single group is dominant in numbers and authority and there are one or more 
minority groups, (2) Countries in which a single group is dominant in authority but 
not numbers, (3) Countries in which no single group by itself commands a majority 
nor is a single group politically dominant, and (4) Countries of any combination in 
which one or more minorities cut across international boundaries (Weiner in Welch 
Jr.: lS4). The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq fall into the types (1) and (2) respectively, as 
well as (-+). 
For an ethnic group forced into a state not of its own choice, the state s:ystem meant 
nothing but an 'imposed community'. The Kurds are the most prominent such case, as 
the new state borders imposed after the First World War completely cut across the 
area where the Kurdish people lived. Indeed, the Kurdish population constitute the 
fourth largest group in the Middle East, and the largest ethnic group in the Middle 
East denied a state (MacDonald: 236). In this sense, the conventionally-used tenn to 
describe the Kurds, 'minority', is in fact not the correct expression. The historical 
truth was that the Kurds were 'reduced' to the status of a minority. 
To be sure, in 1920 there were many Kurdish notables who sided with the Turkish 
nationalist, Mustafa Kemal; also the Kurdish leaders in Iraq failed to unite among 
themselves when they were presented with an opportunity for independent statehood. 
Furthermore, the transnational Islamic legacy of the Ottoman Empire seems to have 
considerably weakened the political unity of the Kurds. These facts partly explain 
why the Kurds were not fully ready for independent statehood in the 1920s. The real 
problem, however, began after those states became independent, and Kurdish national 
rights became objects of suppressive nation-building policies. 
Defining N ation-buildinglN ational Integration 
The concept of national integration puts priority on creating territorial unity or the 
political integration of the state and in this study, it is used interchangeably with the 
concept of nation-building. Myron Weiner states, 'integration may refer to the process 
of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit 
and the establishment of a national identity. Integration generally presumes the 
existence of an ethnically plural society in which each group is characterised by its 
own language or other self-conscious cultural qualities, but the problem may also 
exist in a political system which is made up of once distinct independent political 
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units with which people identified. National integration thus refers specifically to the 
problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows-or 
eliminates-subordinate parochial parties' (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 180-81). 
National integration is also a way to establish the state's legitimacy. Anthony Birch 
states the political significance of national integration: 'our concern is with the way in 
which ethnic and cultural groups have become wholly or partially merged into 
national societies so as to support the political organisation of the national state. 
National integration is a process common to virtually all national states, for only a 
handful of them are ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Integration is the only 
secure basis of political authority' (Birch: 36). Gellner's definition of nationalism 
describes the above aspect of a nation, that one has to be a member of the national 
community which s/he regards legitimate. Gellner defined, '(Nationalism is) a 
principle that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1). 
Myron Weiner categorises national integration policy into two basic types: (1) The 
assimilationist type, in which the distinctive cultural traits of minority communities 
are eliminated through assimilation into that of the dominant cultural group and (2) 
The policy of 'unity in diversity', 'ethnic arithmetic' or 'integrative pluralism', in 
which national loyalties are established without eliminating subordinate cultures 
(Weiner in Welch Jr.: 185). It is often the assimilationist policy that becomes 
dominant in the nation-building strategy of relatively new states, in their hasty 
attempts to secure territorial integrity. However, one need not assume that securing 
territorial integrity requires all sub-national identities to be eliminated. What matters 
most is political unity, and as long as it remains viable, cultural pluralism is possible, 
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as we witness In the successfully integrated countries that have democratic 
government capable of accommodating the needs of an ethnically plural population. 
In short, successful nation-building allows us to have integrative pluralism. 
In the following section, the path of successful national integration or prototypical 
national integration, pioneered in the 'old states', is compared with that of Revolution 
from Above, typical of many 'new states'. There are of course other paths of nation-
building adopted in the Third World, for example, through rentier monarchy, 
Communism, or the pluralist- consociationalism as conceptualised by Lijphart (World 
Politics, Jan. 1969); however, Revolution from Above seems most applicable to the 
cases of Turkish and Iraqi nation-building. In this study, a model of Revolution from 
Above is employed to understand the strategy of state builders. The prototypical 
model of successful integration is developed as a model of the desired, ultimate 
outcome, and Revolution from Above is seen as a method to ultimately reach such an 
outcome, but also is critically evaluated in order to assess the steps needed to close the 
gap between means and end. 
Part 1. Prototypical National Integration 
A Nation as a Community 
In order to explain the process of integrating culturally and socially distinct groups 
into a politically united state, I would like to develop a general model of the 
experience of early nation-builders, identifying several phases or aspects of 
prototypical integration based on Karl W. Deutsch's theory of social mobilisation and 
11 
political assimilation (1953). An integrated nation is defined by Deutsch as: . an 
alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to 
regional centres and leading social groups by channels of social communication and 
economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly \\ith the centre' 
(Deutsch 1953: 101). In his work, Deutsch demonstrated the crucial importance of 
'social communication' for the establishment of a sense of community among the 
people in a given territory. Deutsch's concept of communication is sometimes 
misunderstood as superficially referring to telecommunication (as by Hobsbawm 
1990: 3). However, it encompasses a wider meaning of communication, including 
economic activities, geographic mobility, literacy, the spread of education, and 
broadened political participation. 
Why a Nation can be Integrative: The Relation between Communication and 
Common Culture 
We normally assume a nation is characterised by the common features shared by its 
members, such as religion, culture, and language, which I would like to denote as 
'ingredients' of a nation for the convenience of explanation. However, without our 
ability to share these ingredients, we will never learn how we are common or not. The 
perennialist view of a nation as being in permanent existence overlooks this very 
mechanism that anything we perceive as common is shared as a result of 
communication. Indeed, it is communication which shapes commonality. Deutsch 
states, 'To explain a nation as the result of shared experiences presupposes already 
this ability to share experience, which is the very thing that cannot be taken for 
granted' (Deutsch 1953: 19). 
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Thus what are conventionally seen as common, pennanent and self-evident 
characteristics of a given society involve, in fact, communication. Our perception of 
common culture is being reinforced through our constant exposure to it, which means 
communication and culture have a mutually reinforcing nature. The reinforcement of 
culture through communication makes culture appear pennanent, but essentially, 
culture is subject to change depending on our priorities in life. For example, a 
person's habitual language is likely to change if s/he emigrates to a different country. 
This example illustrates the fact that a person's language is in fact constantly 
reinforced through its everyday use. Similarly, religious practice may be weakened or 
strengthened depending on the value attached to it in people's lives. Thus the things 
we usually perceive as stable characteristics have in fact a dynamic nature and can 
persist only for so long as they are continuously used and valued. If we lose our 
capability to do so, a culture's significance will be reduced and replaced by an 
alternative one that assumes a greater priority in people's lives. 
This means a community is sustainable only through continuation of communication. 
Accordingly, a common culture or a community can be conceptualised as something 
dynamic, not as something perennial or automatically sustainable on its own. The 
definition of common culture by Deutsch expresses this dynamism in a 
comprehensive way. A common culture is defined as: 'a common set of stable, 
habitual preferences and priorities in men's attention and behaviour as well as in their 
thoughts and feelings'. Then he goes on to point out that many of these 'preferences' 
may make it easier for men to communicate within the same culture (i.e., the same set 
of priorities in life), and that communication facilitates a sharing of common culture. 
Hence there is a reinforcing feedback relationship between a community and a 
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common culture (Deutsch 1953: 88-9), implying that changing priorities in men's 
lives will create a new culture. The possession of a common language is certainly a 
crucial element for a politically united nationhood. However, the means of 
communication that enable people to communicate effectively are in fact more 
important, such as the readiness of a physical, economical and technical environment 
that facilitates people's transactions and communication. Therefore, people's 
capability for efficient communication is actually more important than the mere 
possession of commonality itself. 
A Nation is Not an Ethnic Group 
The above mechanism can be applied to the communication that takes place within 
any given ethnic group: if the ethnic group is capable of having only a limited level of 
internal communication, even if this group is clearly distinguishable from 
neighbouring peoples in physical and linguistic features, it is unlikely to achieve a 
political unity that goes beyond its immediate surroundings, such as village and tribal 
unit. Because their capability to share the commonality is limited, ethnicity and even a 
common language themselves alone will not automatically facilitate political unity of 
an ethnic group. The ethnic group whose members live isolated from each other may 
have a largely sel f-contained fonn of civilisation that involves few contacts with even 
their closest neighbours, such as the people in the next village, or a different tribe. 
Thus it can happen that people from remarkably close geographical areas share no 
fraternal political feeling. 
We should remember that commonness of ethnicity and even language in themselves 
arc not automatic uni fying factors. Hence, an ethnic or linguistic group and a nation 
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are not equivalent. As regards this point, A.D. Smith raises illustrative examples of 
Latin American states and of Arab states. In the fomler case, etlmic diversity is not a 
po li tically divisive issue, and in the latter case, possession of common language is not 
a sufficient factor for political unity. Smith points out that despite the fact that Latin 
American society is multi-etlmic, Latin American states are not faced with serious 
separatist movements. On the other hand , the Arabic language, despite its uni versality 
among Arab people, in itself does not politically unite the Arab people now living in 
some twenty different states. Smith states 'what these examples illustrate is not on ly 
the variability of effects that identical cu ltural factors may produce, but the need to 
examine them in relation to the sense of historical unity (or lack of it) among a given 
population, and the pal1icu lar historical configuration of that community' (Smith 
1981: 49-5 1). 
Furthel1110re, peoples who speak d i fferent languages can have a single nation-state 
(multi- lingual state). Referring to the Swiss example, Deutsch points out ' what counts 
is not the presence or absence of any single facto r, but merely the presence of 
sufficient commun ication that faci litates enough comp lementarity to produce the 
overall resu lt. The Swiss may speak fou r different languages and still act as one 
people, for each of them has enough habits, preferences, symbols, memories, pattems 
of land holding and socia l strati fication , events in hi story, and personal associations, 
all of which together permit him to communicate more effec tively with other Swiss 
than w ith the speakers of his own language ' (Deutsch 1953: 97, quoring Max Huber) . 
Possession of common language and bilinguali sm are certain ly essential elements of 
communicative efficiency. It must be noted, however, that such complementarity is 
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not necessarily an automatically unifying factor. It can be divisive as well. Effective 
communication is not viable unless complementarity is valued. Deutsch gave the 
example of the negative reaction towards the rise of Zionism by some Jewish groups 
in Western Europe and said 'In this case, Zionism drew attention to a cultural 
distinction which these groups felt to be disadvantageous ... Only if nationality is 
valued; if it is seen as a winning card in the social game for prestige, wealth, or 
whatever else may be the things culturally valued at that time and place ... only then 
does it seem probable that consciousness of nationality \vill strengthen its 
development' (Deutsch 1953: 178). For the same reason, it is highly unlikely the 
Scots would have adopted the English language and eventually the British nationality 
were it not for the factors that facilitated economic integration of the United 
Kingdom. Benedict Anderson wrote that the linguistic assimilation and increased 
convertibility of different languages can take place in a non-conflicting way, 
describing it as a 'gradual, unselfconscious, pragmatic, not to say haphazard 
development' (Anderson: 45). In Scotland's case, already in the early seventeenth 
century there was an 'immediate access to print-English, provided minimum literacy 
existed, ... Anglicization was essentially a byproduct' (Anderson: 85-6). 
These examples show that even though the presence of common factors is essential 
for communicative efficiency, for the people to politically unite, such commonality 
must, first of all, be valued through political, economic and social contexts. 
Conversely, wherever such value is existent in the society, peoples from different 
cultural and even linguistic backgrounds can form a unified state. This underlines the 
fact that cthnicity and language in themselves alone do not create a politically united 
nation, but instead, nations can be constructed around the community that is deemed 
valuable, and that in turn will enhance people's communicative efficiency thereby 
facilitating bilingualism and linguistic assimilation. 
The Making of an Integrative Nation: Political Mobilisation and Socialisation 
Thus the crucial factor that distinguishes one community from another is the degree of 
communication and its continuity, sustainability and the value attached to it. Due to 
the limited scope of communication, in a non-industrialised society, the sphere of 
community is mostly confined to the locality. As Gellner describes it, 'the basic circle 
in agrarian society is locked, is complete, and it is difficult to see how one could break 
out of it' (Gellner 1997: 19). However, in an industrialised society, the scope of 
communication will invariably become greater, and this facilitates drastic changes in 
men's preferences and priorities in life, in other words, a configuration of common 
culture. 
Industrialisation and the need for intense division of labour through an expanded 
economy socially mobilises the mass of people out of their small local communities 
and brings them to work and live with others from different origins; this so-called 
'uprooting process' will unavoidably speed up the socialisation of previously 
unconnected peoples. This communication is specifically conceptualised as 'social 
communication', that takes place among a 'group of individuals connected by an 
intense di vision of labour, and separated from other societies by a marked drop in this 
intensity' (Deutsch 1953: 87). As this process continues, people are reorganised into 
sc\cral classes, \\hich may be described as a 'horizontal' alignment alongside 
'vertical' ethno-linguistic cleavages or which potentially cross-cut and dilute ethnic-
linguistic clea\'ages. This \\as the result \\<hen European states went through the 
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Industrial Revolution. The impact of the Industrial Revolution can be summarised as 
follows: (1) A demographic shift ... Industrialisation required a large number of 
workers concentrated in cities to work in the factories, (2) The creation of new wealth 
by new groups, and (3) The emergence of a number of new social classes ... the 
entrepreneurial classes as new rich, the new middle class of managers and civil 
servants, professionals, and the proletariat of industrial workers (Snow and Brown: 
106-7). Thus, economic modernisation generated middle and working classes that cut 
across 'vertical' ethno-linguistic cleavages. This meant that the social structure 
change facilitated the dilution of preexisting ethnic or sectarian differences and 
European society's structure became more suitable for absorbing culturally diverse 
groups. 
In the above process, bilingualism, linguistic assimilation, or both, are facilitated as 
long as they are associated with the above-mentioned social winning card, or the 
actual advantage in adopting such change. In other words, adopting a new language 
may be indispensable to social mobility in the new division of labour. If 
industrialisation turns out to be successful, the peoples originally drawn from different 
parts of the country would increase their complementarity through their participation 
to the same economic process. When this process results in creating a middle class, 
such a class will become politically powerful enough to counter the existing 
aristocracy and other oligarchical groups, and become a potential force for 
integration. 
Thus economic and social structure changes, in fact, facilitate a political change and 
integration of di\'crse groups into a nation that dilutes preexisting sectarian division. 
In other words, a political change is facilitated by, and is a byproduct ot~ the above 
mentioned socioeconomic change, epitomised in the political development after the 
Industrial Revolution. The link between industrialisation and political change is 
summarised in the following paragraph: 'The emergence of these new classes as 
challenger to the old social order provided the major social dimension of change. For 
the old, conservative elite, the new classes were an unwanted intrusion on their 
positions, and they resisted the movement to a more egalitarian order. Where they 
were successful (in Holy Alliance countries such as Austria and Russia) the price was 
less economic modernisation. Where they failed, economic modernisation and 
redistribution of social status occurred' (Snow and Bro\vn: 107). Both the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire were loosely integrated since delayed 
modernisation retarded an integrartive division of labour and limited social mobility 
for minority groups in the periphery. The two empires' failure in political integration 
was manifest in the existence of a number of potential successor states in their 
territories, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (the 
Austro-Hungary Empire) and some fifteen republics, including Arn1enia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, and Georgia out of the former Soviet Union territory that succeeded 
the Russian Empire. 
The above transformation is crucial in making the nation integrative, where people 
wi II become part of the common economic process. In the prototypical national 
integration, a nation allows coexistence of multiple identities so long as there is an 
o\'t.~rriding political unity that is deemed more valuable than subnational units. As a 
result of successful industrialisation, the class stratification would dilute ethnic 
divisions and in tum, the more powerful the middle class, the more \'iable the prospect 
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for democracy. In short, democracy is part of the larger results of national integration 
that tolerates multiple identities. Thus an economically sound nation has a greater 
chance to be multi-ethnic and democratic. As Nathan Glazer points out, because of its 
trans-ethnic nature, class-based politics is in many ways more compatible with 
political stability or integration. Glazer suggests people will become more rational by 
focusing on economic interest. This will prevent isolation, exploitation or 
discrimination against any element of the population on communal grounds. He lists 
reasons why it is safer to focus less on ethnicity: (1) Greater emotional weight is 
attached to ethnic connections than to a class, (2) The fact that people can change 
their class position, or be expected to change, rather more easily than they change 
their ethnicity, (3) A class in a minority position may hope to become a majority by 
modifying its politics so as to include those close to it in class position, and (.:+) Class-
based politics permits slicing the pie and rational discussions as to who will get how 
much under which circumstances (Glazer in Elazer: 51-2). 
In this process of creating a new integrative national community, the possession of 
print language is crucial in giving fixity to the language of a nation. Benedict 
Anderson summarises three distinct ways print language contributed to national 
conSCIOusness. In Europe's case, 'First and foremost, they created unified fields of 
cxchange and communications below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. 
Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it 
difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation became 
capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. Second, print-capitalism 
ga\'e a ncw fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that traditional 
imagc of antiquity so ccntral to the subjecti\'c idea of the nation. Third, print-
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capitalism created languages-of-power different from older administrative 
vernaculars' (Anderson: 47-48). Print capitalism accompanied economIC 
modernisation and was inseparable from it. 
The Variable Outcomes of Modernisation: National Assimilation or Ethnic 
Differentiation 
Industrialisation and modernisation do not, of course, inevitably or automatically lead 
to political integration; indeed the opposite is possible. They do invariably lead to a 
marked increase of communication, part controllable, part not. The processes of 
urbanisation, greater geographic mobility, mechanisation, and the increase of literacy 
are collectively conceptualised as 'social mobilisation'. As the people are socially 
mobilised, greater communication makes it obvious more than ever how they are 
similar or different. Thus, if social mobilisation outpaces 'assimilation', or more 
specifically, the process of assimilating people to the dominant language and culture 
(Deutsch 1953: 117-8), the social mobilisation will make salient the people's ethnic 
differences and may result in differentiation or even disintegration of a society 
(Deutsch 1961). This is typical in new states where exceptionally rapid modernisation 
stimulated from contact with the West may well exceed the normally slower process 
of linguistic assimilation. Walker Connor specifically focused on this differentiation 
in his article 'Ethnonationalism' (1987). Connor basically stressed only one side of 
Deutsch's conceptualisation by stating greater communication leads different groups 
to become aware of what makes them distinct rather than what they have in common. 
Connor seems to overemphasise the emotional power of ethnicity without paying due 
attention to the condition under \\'hich such an emotional power is actiyated or 
Ill! t igatcd. Because of the slow speed of assimilation, ditTerentiation triggered as a 
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result of social mobilisation has a potential to cause ethnic, religious and other 
sectarian conflict, especially when these factors and class inequality overlap, and such 
ethnic differentiation could potentially reverse the national integration. Gabriel Ben 
Dor points out that differentiation is accelerated by insecurity from rapid changes in 
society. 'These transformations have occurred in societies undergoing rapid change, 
creating insecurity and thereby encouraging people to go back into their relatively 
safe shells at the expense of larger political communities' (Ben Dor 1999: 7). Thus, 
people are competing more in the larger society for scarce resources than before 
social mobilisation. Similarly, when geographic mobility is greater than the expansion 
of economy, inter-ethnic competition might emerge in a rapidly urbanised society. 
Thus the different ethnic groups compete for employment and other economic 
resources. This contributes to 'modernise ethnocentrism' (Geertz in Welch lr.: 215). 
Social Reinforcement Learning: Prolonged Ethnic Differentiation 
In the following section, I discuss one of the most serious obstacles to national 
integration, that of overlapping cleavage. Overlapping cleavage happens when a 
certain ethnic group is over-represented in certain strata, such as low-income groups. 
What is particularly obstructive to national integration is the fact that overlapping 
cleavages can persist for a considerably long time. This mechanism can be explained 
in the following; Deutsch conceptualised the phenomenon of overlapping cleavages 
with the phrase 'social reinforcement learning'. He points out that the following 
factors make people sharply aware of their unequal circumstance: 'stratified rewards, 
insecurity, density of settlement. high volume of transactions, equalisation of 
aspiration, impersonality. and competitiveness' (Deutsch 1979: 71). The prolonging 
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of these conditions contributes to conditioning people's reaction towards others, 
which Deutsch compares to the reaction of Pavlov's dog to certain signals. 'While 
Pavlov's dogs can be taught to give a physical reaction to a ball or a buzzer, simply 
because it happens to be associated with food ... You could subject popUlations to 
Pavlovian conditioning by combining visual signals about race with other perception 
of competition, insecurity, threat, fear, social distance, or whatever was salient to 
them' (Deutsch 1979: 71). In other words, let us say, the factor 'crime' starts to be 
associated with a certain ethnic group. People would associate the group 
automatically with a feeling of insecurity by merely seeing them. Social conflict can 
be aggravated by the ethnic factor, such as Kurd workers attacking the wealthier 
Turcomans, as will be discussed in the series of riots that have occurred after the Iraqi 
revolution of 1958. Because factors such as ethnicity and religion represent the most 
visible signals, unless political equalisation measures are taken, these divisions may 
persist in the society over a very long period of time. 
Ethnic differentiation is an alarming phase of modernisation from which protracted 
ethnonational conflict can develop. If a state fails to provide reasonably equal access 
to tangible rewards such as greater employment opportunity and provision of welfare, 
particularly, the ethnic group whose culture is different from that of the governing 
group, is most likely to be alienated from nation-building. Alternatively it may be that 
the modenlising state often sees such a minority group simply as a feudal group 
needing to be destroyed. 
An ethnically differentiated population may deny the state's legitimacy: 'at bottom, 
the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilisation is most of 
all a matter of its capabilities and the manner in which they are used ... that is, 
essentially a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its popUlation. If it pro\'es 
persistently incapable or unresponsive, some or many of its subjects will cease to 
identify themselves with it psychologically; it will be reduced to ruling by force 
where it can no longer rule by display, example, and persuasion' (Deutsch 1961). As 
Myron Weiner puts it, the problem of national integration is basically 'the problem of 
linking government with the governed', and if the gap between them persists, this 
creates a condition linked to internal war, which we customarily speak of as 
'disintegration' (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 180-181). The decisive factor that detennines 
assimilation or differentiation of a modernising society thus seems to be the 
government's responsiveness and is dependent on how successfully the state handles 
the volatile phase of social mobilisation and ensures a reasonable level of social 
equality. The state must also take political measures to prevent inter-ethnic 
competition in a rapidly modernising society from leading to inter-ethnic conflict. 
If inequality persists, neither bilingualism nor linguistic assimilation are seen as a 
'social winning card' by the alienated population. As a result, a condition is created in 
which linguistic pluralism is directly linked with separatism. 'If the non-assimilated 
group forms a large part of the population, it follows that it cannot be assimilated, that 
national predominance relations will be challenged and may even be reversed' 
(Deutsch 1979: 283). Gellner also points out 'If they (a minority) can distinguish 
themselves culturally from their exploiters and oppressors, it is very much to their 
advantage to hive off politically, when the opportunity arises, and to modernise under 
their OWI1 flag, in their 0\\,11 sovereign territory' (Gellner 1997: 35). 
In Azar and Burton's summarisation, that 'the source of protracted social conflict is 
the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, 
and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, 
social recognition of identity, and effective participation that determine conditions of 
security and identity and other such developmental requirements' (Azar and Burton 
1986: 29). The ultimate truth, as Deutsch describes it, is that the motives of the 
assimilating population and those seeking separation are the same in the sense that 
they are both seeking a greater share of wealth and opportunities: 'The motives for 
this secessionist nationalism are thus to a significant extent the same motives that 
would lead, under different circumstances, to national assimilation' (Deutsch 1979: 
22). 
Interim Summary 
We have seen that a nation is not merely an ethnic group, but the community of 
people that is linked by intense communication. When the socially mobilised 
population start to become beneficiaries of industrialisation, they will be ready to 
submerge preexistent sectarian identities in favour of an emerging new common 
identity, and that is when people's priorities in life will change, hence creating a new 
culture and thus a new community of people - an integrative nation. 
Part 1. Revolution fron1 Above 
The Revolution from Above is a type of moden1isation typical in newly developing 
slates conceptualised by E.K. Trimberg.cr from her comparative study of four cases of 
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modernisation in Egypt, Japan, Peru and Turkey. It denotes the whole process of 
economic, social and political change in modernising states facilitated by the policies 
designed by military bureaucrats who have taken over the government by extra-
parliamentary measures. The following section will examine whether these elite-led 
nation-building strategies are capable of redressing the problems posed by arbitrary 
state borders and how far these strategies can be expected to eventually facilitate the 
organic growth of a national community. 
What distinguishes Revolution from Above from other revolutions is: (1) The fact that 
the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organised and led by military 
and often civil bureaucrats from within the state apparatus of the old regime, (2) Little 
or no mass participation is required in the revolutionary takeover and in the initiation 
of change, (3) The extralegal takeover of power and the initiation of change is 
accompanied by very little violence, (4) The initiation of change is undertaken in a 
pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology, and (5) 
Military bureaucrats who lead a Revolution from Above - as opposed to a mere coup 
d'etat - destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy. The deliberate 
attempt at class destruction is an important feature of the Revolution from Above, 
though there are variations (Trimberger: 3). 
The Revolution from Above, as is evident from the above characteristics, is basically 
a 'top-down' revolution, essentially aimed at nation-building in relatively younger 
states. From a historical perspective, it can be said that the states that have gone 
through prototypical national integration or nation-building . from below' were 
uncommon. In nineteenth century Europe, the social change resulting from 
industrialisation came basically as a 'bottom-up' phenomenon. However, in most of 
Asia and in African countries, it had to be the 'other way round'. Because of the 
abrupt beginning of the current international state system, often, the new states had 
little choice but to adopt modernisation programmes directed by elite bureaucrats. 
Many of these new states were states only in the territorial sense, not already-
integrated nation-states. The 'revolution' was led by a handful of elites because no 
politically significant stratum existed that was equivalent to the powerful middle class 
that appeared in European states after the Industrial Revolution. In this respect, 
Revolution from Above is a highly universal phenomenon in the less developed 
world. 
Survival and Stabilisation of the System 
A strong central goven1ment is essential for the survival of a new state. Hence, it 
must typically be the first priority of state-builders. The citizens of such a new state 
often have little experience in political participation, and often political institutions 
are weak or nonexistent. Thus, it is essential for the state to complete the task of 
centre-building for the purpose of its own survival. In this process, some form of 
authoritarianism often becomes a matter of necessity in order to preserve political 
instability in the early phase of state formation. The new regime may not be able to 
broaden political participation for a certain, perhaps a long, period of time, as long as 
the legitimacy of government is under threat by competing social forces, often those 
loyal to the old regime. Where there are no strong political institutions, political 
opposition poses the direct threat of counter-revolution. Under these circumstances, 
\ery often, the single party system becomes almost a matter of inevitability (Foltz: 
303). Trimberger conceptualises this authoritarian phase as 'preemption of the organs 
and symbols of the old regime' (Trimberger: 14). 
The opposite scenario to this case is a decentralised state. In multi-ethnic societies, it 
might be thought that de-centralised government, according autonomy to minorities in 
particular regions, might be most suitable. However, devolving measures and 
federalism are not likely to be effective unless a strong government authority is first 
established at the national level. Without this, decentralisation will lead to the 
disintegration of a state. D.L. Horowitz suggests that for regional autonomy or federal 
structure to work, the central government needs to retain ultimate control over the 
powers of regional governments (Horowitz: 624). 
Once the centre is built, state authorities attempt to penetrate into the 'periphery'. The 
representative measures in this second phase are, for example, the provision of 
education and welfare, creation of bureaucratic organisations, and improvement of 
infrastructure in general, such as roads, public transport and sanitation. By 
demonstrating that the state is capable of doing these tasks successfully, the 
government's legitimacy would, for the first time, be recognised by its citizens. 
According to Almond and Powell, this phase of rural penetration signifies the 
beginning a state building. They state: 
'State building occurs when the political elite creates new structures and 
organisations designed to "penetrate" the society in order to regulate behaviour in it 
and draw a larger volume of resources from it. State building is commonly associated 
with significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political 
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system, with the development of a centralised and penetrative bureaucracy related to 
the increase in these capabilities and with the development of attitudes of obedience 
and compliance in the population which are associated with the emergence of such a 
bureaucracy' (Almond and Powell: 35) 
The Role of the Military in Revolution from Above 
The military has a pivotal role in Revolution from Above. Firstly, the institution 
facilitates political socialisation, and secondly, it creates political leadership, 
substituting for the middle class, which in developing countries is often too weak to 
assume this role. 
In developing countries, often, political socialisation of the rural population takes 
place faster in a military institution than in other organisations in a society, such as 
corporate bodies. As a result of universal conscription, military institutions reflect 
broad social composition. Under Revolution from Above, the military officer corps 
are expected to become instructors of nation-building through which a new salaried 
middle class is fOlmed. This new class is recruited from the lower middle class and 
often peasantry, hence it is populist in orientation as well. Because of this, military 
revolution in the modem Middle East was something of a substitute for mass 
revolution (Baer in Gerber: 2). In other words, the military in Revolution from Above 
substitutes for the role assumed by the European bourgeoisie in the eighteenth 
century. in which they destroyed the aristocracy and other oligarchic groups in order 
to facilitate more equal national integration and economic growth to expand the power 
base of a more democratic go\'emment. 
Institutionalising Mass Political Participation 
Then how can the new government bridge the gap between state and citizen? In order 
to avoid fragmentation of a state, the government needs to encourage political 
participation through political institutions (Huntington: 397). And if the state fails to 
accommodate broadened political participation, this will result in a situation of 
praetorianism (Huntington: 192-3). Praetorianism is 'the absence of effective political 
institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action' 
including that of ethnic groups (Huntington: 196). In the case of authoritarian 
Revolution from Above, often, political institutions are not well established, so the 
sheer expansion of political consciousness/activism may very well trigger a counter-
revolution or the fragmentation of the state. If a government seeks to counter 
fragmentation and opposition through repression, it puts its citizens' civil liberties at 
risk and is unlikely to acquire the legitimacy or support to govern effectively. Ideally, 
the population should be organised into a nation-wide political party or parties in 
order to establish the direct state-citizen link. Powell's study found that the most 
successful case of such peasant mobilisation through a national party was found in 
Italy where the Communist party and later the Christian Democratic party 
successfully organised peasants at the national level. However, such political 
mobilisation cannot be successful without utilising the preexisting organisational 
framework, Communist and Christian organisations in this case (Powell 1970). In the 
Middle East, modernising regimes attempting Revolution from Above have typically 
started with a period of single party rule and only later permitted the pluralisation of 
the party system. It would have been ideal if the Kurdish peasants were organised into 
a nationwide party as well as in peasant unions whose membership is shared by both 
Kurds and Arabs or Kurds and Turks, for example. Instead, the Baath party is 
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dominated by Sunni Arabs, whereas Turkish political parties, even after the 
pluralisation of the party system, do not advocate Kurdish national rights. Birch points 
out that institutional arrangements can be successful if 'the regions or minorities are 
represented by national parties, but (it can be) disintegrative if they are represented by 
regional or communal parties' (Birch: 42). Thus by not accommodating Kurdish 
rights through the national institution the two states risk encouraging communal 
parties, hence increasing the chances for separatism. 
In conclusion, institution building and economIC development should progress, 
ideally, simultaneously. A nation must eventually be substantiated by citizens of the 
state and not by the government. This will be discussed in a later section. 
Flaws in Revolution from Above 
State formation through Revolution from Above, however, is not free from problems. 
The following is a list of typical problems that accompany this type of nation-
building. 
1. Weak State-citizen Links 
A prevalent phenomenon in Revolution from Above is its weak state-citizen link due 
to the new regime's initial lack of a mass power-base. The new regime may 
concentrate its effort on creation of an educated middle class so that they will 
constitute a viable support base for the new authority. However, the creation of a 
politically significant middle class is a slow process, as it needs a significant enough 
expansion of education and economic opportunity to facilitate such social structure 
change. In order to establish itself and carry out essential development programmes in 
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the 'periphery', the new regime may be forced to make some compromise with the 
existing old elites who often have control over the means of production. They may be 
the local notables, heads of aristocratic families, tribal chiefs or the feudal landlords. 
The weakness of the state-citizen link implies that these traditional elites may 
effectively create a barrier between the two. They have real influence over the mass of 
people in their locality, and they can tum them against the government at will. 
Utilising this local authority, they can often extract favourable terms from the new 
government. Reliance on intermediaries is, in a way, unavoidable in Revolution from 
Above, from the fact that it is not a mass revolution. Paul Brass quotes India's 
example: 'The struggle between the centre and the localities may take the form of 
conflict between elites at the centre allying with forces in the localities opposed to the 
locally dominant elites or of conflict between the civilian bureaucratic apparatus or 
local political party organisations and local notables' (Brass: 273). He also remarks 
that 'Elites who seek to gain control over the state or who have succeeded in doing so 
must either suppress and control central and local rivals or establish collaborative 
alliances with other elites' (Brass: 275). Thus even though Trimberger's theory 
envisions the Revolution from Above as destroying the aristocracy, the destruction 
could be confined to their political power. Their traditional monopoly of functions in 
the locality may remain and the conflict between the state and local elite persist on an 
informal basis. 
Middle East Manifestations of the Weak State-Citizen Link 
With regard to the nature of relation between central government and local notables, 
there are some characteristics that stand out in the Middle Eastern cases. 
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A. Tribe and State 
The first characteristic is the long history of coexistence of tribes and states. In the 
Middle East, tribes and states coexisted for centuries without merging and established 
a reciprocal symbiosis. In other words, local elites' dealing with 'central' authority 
has never been a new phenomenon, rather it constituted an active part of tribal life. 
Richard Tapper argues that, 'In the Middle East, groups referred to as tribes have 
never, in historical times, been isolated groups of "primitives", remote from contact 
with states or their agents; rather, tribes and states have created and maintained each 
other in a single system, though one of inherent instability. If the rulers of the Middle 
East have been preoccupied by a tribal problem, however, the tribes could be said to 
have had a perennial "state problem'" (Tapper in Khoury and Kostiner: 51-2). Under 
this 'tribe-state symbiosis', tribal leaders chose in a rational calculating way to serve 
the state most favourable to them. This was not mere opportunism but was a matter of 
necessity and survival of the tribe. The symbiosis was also beneficial to the state 
because it could preempt tribal rebellions. Because of this reciprocal coexistence, the 
states (empires), unlike in Europe, made no special effort to formally integrate the 
tribes until the relatively recent past. For centuries there was no need for such 
Ottoman 'subjects' to identify with the state. 
B. Land Ownership 
Another outstanding characteristic of the Middle East is the great inequality in the 
fOlm of land ownership. The degree of concentration of private land is varied, but it is 
indisputable that national integration in the two states (Iraq and Turkey) has suffered 
heavily from this. The concentration of private estates originated from failures of land 
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registration policies of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. The literate 
notables took advantage of their knowledge and registered the tribal-communal land 
in their own name. This is evident in both today's Iraq and Turkey. However, the 
impact seemed to have been more severe in the Iraqi area. It is said that 'In Iraq, the 
impact of state policy on landownership was far-reaching. When Midhat Pasha, the 
Ottoman Governor in Iraq (1869-1871) implemented the Land Law of 1858, almost 
an entire class of landlords was created out of tribal shaikhs and townspeople who 
were in a favourable position vis-a-vis the government' (Issawi 1966, 166-69 as in 
Harik 1972: 354). The concentration of wealth in the hands of notables changed the 
face of society. Instead of creating a mass of independent agrarian proprietors, as the 
law had originally intended, the land registration aggravated the division between the 
rich and the poor, and created a class of powerful notables obstructing the access of 
the state to its potential citizens. 
C. Uneven Development and the Survival of Intermediaries 
As the state goes through modernisation, it often experiences uneven development, 
which leaves some regions of the state marginalised or deprived and hence the 
inhabitants of such region are more likely to become dependent on traditional leaders. 
It strengthens the relative importance of the role of local notables as a substitute to the 
state-citizen link. Even though such minority groups' social structure may be feudal 
and unequal, its members will look more to their own leaders than to a state. For this 
reason, the old-feudal social structure is more likely to persist among the alienated 
groups. In such a case, the alienated ethnic group often suffers its own lack of social 
homogeneity, such as a sharp division between the rich and the poor, and is 
vulnerable to the so-called divide-and-rule policy by state elites. When socio-
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economic divisions cut across ethnicity, this creates cross-cutting cleavage which, in 
theory, should dilute conflict. However, in developing states with enormous gaps 
between rich and poor, class fonnation facilitates fragmentation instead of national 
integration. Thus social mobilisation can be linked with complex ethnonational and 
social conflict, and this is the feature evident in both the Turkish and Iraqi cases of 
Kurdish conflict. This 'state-elite (local notable), relation persists over a long period 
of time as opposed to the 'centre-citizen' link that is equivalent to integrative nation-
building. 
The relation between the state and notables is viable as long as there is a reciprocity 
between the two. This means that unless the state becomes capable of integrating the 
people through greater economic mobility and political participation, old elite 
continue to dominate regional administration, directly affecting the local people. To 
make the matter more complex, the state authority may promote an identity alien to 
certain groups. This is when the government is run by a group whose culture and 
language is different from those groups. In such a case, the intermediaries also play 
the role of cultural gate-keeper. So long as the central government remains weak and 
un-responsive, the relative importance of the intermediaries will not diminish. 
Delayed, dependent economic development also obstructed the integration of the 
state. The gradual subjugation of the Ottoman economy to European products kept the 
manufacturing industry weak, and furthermore, those who made profits from trades 
failed to reinvest in the enterprise. 'Rather than stimulating the economy and leading 
to prosperity, the domestic market and export trade superimposed a modern system of 
commercial transactions on a primitive system of production. The capital created by 
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the price of crops was shared by the merchant and the landlord and failed to revert to 
productive enterprises in agriculture or industry. The city manufacturers (of goods) 
[sic] such as textiles, declined, and those which survived, such as soap, tobacco, and 
to a certain extent silk, did not offer great investment opportunities' (Harik 1972: 
359). 
This uneven economIC structure laid the groundwork for traditionally powerful 
families to create an economic base even under the contemporary economy, by their 
becoming moneylenders and real estate brokers. The wealth, often by inheritance, 
allowed them to become even more influential on a new social basis. Ghomeny's 
study on the poverty in the Middle East treats this subject extensively. He writes, 
'they (the notables) granted land to influential family heads, senior officials, and 
religious leaders in exchange for their political support. By virtue of their official and 
social status, the new class of landlords were able to accumulate more land, either free 
of charge or at low prices, with tax concessions' (EI-Ghonemy: 32). Thus the 
traditional elite continue to be influential under the framework of a modem economy. 
In such a case, the economic projects formulated at the national level often feed into 
preexisting patterns of rivalry (Hopkins: 10-11). An important feature is that they are 
not only economically influential but also have cultural significance: 'even where 
there has been considerable migration into towns and cities, traditional loyalties to 
rural kinship and tribal groupings remain. Investment in land and property is valued 
more than putting funds into productive enterprises, as there is a physical acquisition 
that can be used for the benefit of the immediate family and more distant relations ... 
For this reason most businesses in the Middle East are family-owned and run, and , 
rely on internal sources of finance' (Wilson 1995: 14-5). 
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All of the above factors, consequentially contributed to weaken the emergence of the 
so-called civil society in the Middle East. As pointed out by Black and Brown, it 
deprived the Middle Eastern society at large of 'a corporate, autonomous, 
intermediary social structure operating independent of government and playing a 
cushioning role between the state and individuals' (Black and Brown: 200). 
2. Military Regimes and Assimilationist Policies 
Even today, the Kurds are often described as 'more' tribal than the Arabs (Bengio 
1999: 155). Why is it so? Because the nation-building resources have been 
monopolised by the non-Kurdish ruling groups for the past eight decades. If the same 
quality of nation-building resources had been available to the Kurds, the Kurdish 
people could be less reliant on tribal society today. This continuing strength of 
tribalism among the Kurds may, in turn, manifest the inadequacy of both the Iraqi and 
the Turkish national integration policies. Despite its potential contribution to the 
integrative socialisation, however, the military often pursues an assimilationist policy 
and imposes an exclusively nationalist ideology. This seems particularly to be the 
case when the officers are acutely aware that the new state lacks national unity. 
The assimilationist policy attempts to forcibly match people with the territory, notably 
through linguistic assimilation. As a result of the regime's control over the media and 
education, the print language will become available only in the ruling group's 
language, and the minority's language and cultural development will be obstructed. 
The language of the state is the language of education, employment, printing and the 
media, so the dominant group more readily feels an advantage, and its preexisting 
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sectarian identities may soon weaken. However, an ethnic minority group whose 
language is different from the dominant group tends to be systematically and 
involuntarily alienated from the socialisation needed to promote its identification \\"ith 
the state. Jobs, especially in the state sector, are contingent on command of the 
official language, as is access to other public resources and the justice system. This 
causes a bifurcation between official and unofficial languages, and speakers of the 
minority language will suffer obstacles to greater social mobility. This is evident in 
the case of Turkey's Kurds. Thus the social communication needed for national 
integration is more likely to take place primarily among the population that belong to 
the ruling ethnic group. 
The relative advantage of the Iraqi education system was that it at least recognised the 
existence of the Kurdish language. Although education's priority was Arabic, Iraqi 
policy at least allowed Kurdish to be used publicly in regional offices and in schools, 
if on a limited scale, and contributed to increasing bilingualism between Kurdish and 
Arabic. In the same way, Kurdish students taught in a bilingual environment could 
proceed into higher academic institutions where Arabic is used. This is not to suggest 
the dominant language may always supersede the minority's language. Instead, it is to 
suggest that bilingualism is mutually reciprocal. 
3. High State Autonomy and Totalitarianism 
Failed national integration has become more or less a 'permanent' phenomenon over 
the past decades from the state's failure to accommodate political participation. 
Especially in a country like Iraq, the state structure evolved into that of 
totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, by definition, is distinguished from authoritarianism 
by the extent of control by the state over its populace. While authoritarianism allows 
some pluralism, totalitarianism creates party and mass organisation which is based on 
ideology, is designed to control the political orientation of the populace through the 
use of propaganda and terror, and temporarily, at least achieves a higher level of 
institutionalisation and penetration of society, but at the cost of stifling civil society 
(Macridis 1986: 126-7). The Iraqi Baath regime since 1968 can be described as 
typically totalitarian. 
Totalitarian states are only capable of pursuing an assimilationist policy and are 
perhaps the most formidable obstacle to multi-ethnic integration. The authorities of 
these states are not constrained by the need to integrate diverse groups, but rather, 
they choose to eliminate them with force. In the Iraqi case, the state structure has 
evolved into its current shape over the past eight decades, and it is extremely difficult 
to modify it through either internal or external pressures. When the state monopolises 
a commodity such as oil, it can 'afford' to be less concerned about its legitimacy, as 
the Iraqi Baath government's case shows. In its earliest days the Iraqi state was 
fragmented by the lack of a strong state centre. After the 1958 revolution, and 
especially after the nationalisation of the oil industry, greater allocation of funds to the 
development programme was made possible through oil revenue. By the 1970s, 
however, the Iraqi regime became virtually autonomous from any other social forces 
and became capable of suppressing all political opposition. In contrast, it appears that 
a state that has more diverse economic resources has more potential to create a 
politically influential middle class, as is arguably, so in Turkey. 
Conditions under which Revolution from Above can Stimulate Successful National 
Integration 
We have seen that state formation through Revolution from Above has advantages in 
centralising the state's power but also has a potential to create long lasting obstacles 
to national integration. The measures to broaden the elite-led revolution into a wider 
integrative nationhood, as in the prototypical model, can be summarised as follows 
from the above arguments: 
(I) Once state institutions are established, broaden political participation, (2) 
Eliminate regional gaps in economIC development, (3) Ensure means of social 
mobility such as bilingual education and employment in the state sector in order to 
assist a minority group's social participation, and (4) Avoid the imposing of 
assimilationist policy in order not to alienate minority groups. 
Failed Nation-building and Foreign Intervention 
Problems from failed nation-building such as ethnic cleansing and refugee exodus 
have increasingly been dealt with by various forms of intervention by external 
powers, either by the United Nations, by the hegemonic states, or by non-
govcn1mental organisations. As I used the description 'various forms of intervention' 
to convey the fact that the tem1 encompasses broad meaning, the concept needs some 
clarification. 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse identified the two basic types of intervention in their 
study of the concept of humanitarian intervention (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
1996). According to the two authors, essentially, there are 'coercive' and 'nOI1-
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coercive' interventions: the former is implemented \vithout the consent of the 
government of the state in which interventions are carried out (such as military 
intervention and economic sanction), and the latter is done with the consent of the 
government (such as the UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief 
operations) (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 115). Referring to the Kurdish refugee 
crisis of 1991, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse state that this case produced both 
coercive and non-coercive forms of intervention; while the Allied states forcibly 
created the safe haven for returning refugees against the wish of the Iraqi government, 
the UN continued to work with the Iraqi government by negotiating the terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding, to be discussed in Chapter IV. Both types of 
interventions were carried out for humanitarian purposes. However, the 
'humanitarian' nature of forcible intervention is put in doubt because there is no clear 
legal definition of humanitarianism, and even though the sufferings of persecuted 
people are considerably relieved as a result of such forcible intervention, the authors 
imply its long-term effect is questionable noting that: 'whether a failure to address the 
underlying political conditions which stimulated the humanitarian concern in the first 
place means, paradoxically, that the situation in the end is worse than it would have 
been without the intervention remains to be seen' (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 75). 
Others have a more critical view. Mohammed Ayoob attempted to categorise types of 
intervention into 'politically motivated' and 'politically innocent' in his article in 
1995. Ho\\c\cr, Ayoob concluded there was no such thing as humanitarian 
intervention, and therefore all forms of intervention were political (Ayoob in Weiss: 
13-30). Ayoob takes a particularly critical \·iew toward forcible intervention. He states 
'when political interests of a great po\\·er are the major reason for humanitarian 
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intervention, the latter loses its legitimacy in the eyes of most people. Such actions 
tend to create the greatest unease in Third World capitals' (Ayoob in Weiss: 23). This 
observation applies almost exactly to the political problem which arose from the 
continuous military action by the Allied states against Iraq after the Gulf War. 
Quoting Michael Mandelbaum, Ayoob even warns that the so-called 'humanitarian' 
intervention may aggravate existing political problems, and that the truly responsible 
intervention, in fact, requires establishment of a working government by the external 
powers: 'Unless the UN and/or the intervening powers are willing to undertake and 
complete those tasks (guaranteeing the borders of countries under challenge and 
constructing an apparatus of government in places where it is absent), humanitarian 
intervention could either reward aggression, as in Bosnia, or leave the political 
situation more confused and internal conflict more intractable than was the case 
before the intervention, as in Somalia' (Mandelbaum 1994 quoted in Ayoob: 23-4). 
Thus, essentially all interventions are politically motivated or at least have political 
consequences. Then what does the act of intervention mean to nation-building? From 
the perspective of applying national integration techniques as a method of conflict 
resolution, it appears highly desirable that interventions facilitate nation-building. In 
the ideal world, all interventions by the external bodies should contribute to reconcile 
the relationships between the persecuted group and the government and should 
facilitate policies which would integrate such groups into the national community. In 
reality, however, interventions often only serve the political interests of great powers. 
Or, when such ostensible political motives are absent, interventions may be restricted 
by the policies of the host government, and indirectly serve the host government's 
political interests. In either case, the welfare of persecuted minorities is sacrificed. 
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Considering the above-mentioned reality of external interventions, the best possible 
strategy for improving national integration through external intervention seems to 
require minimising their negative political impact through constant negotiations 
among local political parties, while military protection provided by the external 
bodies should be fully taken advantage of for humanitarian relief operations. In this 
respect, the self-government run by the Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War presents a test 
case as to whether external interventions are actually contributing to promote 
successful national integration of Iraq. 
Summary 
The essence of multi-ethnic integration lies in its dynamism, and that is what makes 
nations integrable and inclusive. What is specific about Revolution from Above is the 
significance of policy factors orchestrated by state bureaucrats, rather than an 
autonomous civil society. The state has an important role in building institutions and 
facilitating political socialisation. Because of its monopolised form of power, 
however, the state can alienate, rather than integrate minorities by pursuing 
assimilationist policies. Furthermore, if the state structure develops into a totalitarian 
form, it creates formidable problems which are very difficult to modify. 
A nation is not an ethnic group. Even a common language in itself is not a politically 
unifying factor. We now know that 'communication' in the meaning described above 
is the key to uniting ethnically, religiously, and even at times linguistically diverse 
peoples into a national entity. Countries like Belgium, Canada and Switzerland have 
shown even speakers of more than one language can coexist in one state. Given this 
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empirical evidence, it seems viable to believe the same mechanism applies even to 
cases of protracted ethnonational conflict, in which people are divided according to 
sectarian groups based on one's ethnicity or religion. If they desire it, the 
distinctiveness of subnational groups should be preserved. However, as Deutsch 
states, there is no reason to believe such subnational divisions are permanent, and a 
greater emphasis should be put on improvement of our living conditions to create an 
integrative nation: 'We can do much to change economic and social conditions, and 
we can find the strength to change our habits. We may venture to believe that man's 
mind is greater than the collection of habits and preferences which it has accumulated 
at anyone time, no matter how deeply ingrained they may seem at the moment. Too 
often men have viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident, or 
accepted them submissively as fate. In fact, they are neither accident nor fate, but the 
outcome of a discoverable process; and as soon as we begin to make this process 
visible, we are beginning to change it' (Deutsch 1953: 164). 
Methodology and Plan of the Study 
In this study I analyse nation-building in the cases of Iraq and Turkey using published 
sources to assess the following variables that determine the outcome of national 
integration. First, what were the 'ingredients' of a nation, such as the religious and 
ethnic composition of the population, and its social structure? Second, what was the 
nation-building strategy? How did the regime succeed in building state institutions? 
Third, how effccti \'e \\ere language and education policies as vehicles of social 
communication? Fourth, what was the degree and the outcome of social mobilisation? 
Fi t1h, \\ere there regional gaps? Sixth, how successful was political integration? Did 
the n:gime succeed in broadening political participation? Seventh, was nation-
building through Revolution from Above substantiated by the emergence of an 
organic civil stratum, or a civil society that is capable of acting independently of the 
state? In order to assess the degree of success in national integration from the 
perspective of the minority group, I have included the views of the Kurds from both 
published and unpublished sources. The latter include both historic and contemporary 
archives and information obtained from interviews. 
Chapter II is primarily concerned with the ongm of the Kurdish people and its 
geopolitical environment. It deals firstly with its internal structure, secondly its 
relation with the Ottoman Empire up to the nineteenth century, and thirdly the historic 
factors that contributed to weakening the political unity of the Kurds, which became 
evident in the weakness of early Kurdish nationalist organisations. 
Chapter III deals with the record of nation-building policies in Iraq and Turkey and 
their attempts to integrate the Kurds within their boundaries. Turkey is treated as a 
representative case of nation-building through Revolution from Above under Ataturk 
that later evolved in a pluralist direction. Iraq is treated as a case that failed to create a 
strong state-centre (equivalent to the Ataturk revolution) because of the experience of 
mandatory rule during state formation, and also as a case that evolved to a 
'totalitarian' state as an outcome of the Revolution from Above, because of the 
government's control over the oil-based economy. This chapter will be presented in 
four major phases, that of: (l) 'The Legacy of Ottoman centralisation'. to provide 
infom1ation about the preexistent social structure of the area wherein these two states 
were created, (2) 'State Formation', to examine the new governments' policies and 
the resistance to them, (3) 'Political Mobilisation', to assess the impact of social and 
political mobilisation resulting from modernisation after statehood, and (-+) 
'Integration or Containment?', to assess the two states' increased capability to either 
integrate or contain/repress Kurdish nationalism up to the 1990s. 
Chapter IV deals with the impact of foreign intervention on this ethnonational conflict 
and the role of international organisation in redressing the problems posed by failed 
national integration. It shows that foreign interventions are based on the interest of 
intervening powers, instead of a persecuted minority on whose name intervention is 
carried out, with negative consequences for nation-building and the welfare of ethnic 
'minorities'. It will compare two separate cases of intervention, during the First World 
War and in the Gulf War. 
Chapter II 
The Kurds as a Nation 
Introduction 
This chapter presents general information about Kurdish society while highlighting 
the weakness of pan-Kurdish political unity up until the time immediately before the 
First World War. The Kurds are often stereotyped by reference to the divisive features 
within Kurdish society, such as tribalism, distinct dialects, a feudalistic social 
structure and religious diversity. Seemingly, those features are posing key obstacles to 
pan-Kurdish unity. However, having internal division is by no means a specifically 
Kurdish phenomenon: even nations that are thought to be highly homogeneous, such 
as Japan, have gone through a long history of internal warfare before coming into 
their current shape. As discussed in the theoretical framework, merely having all of 
the potential 'ingredients' of a nation in itself is not enough for the establishment of a 
politically united nation. The ability to share experiences is crucially important. 
Therefore, rather than the differences themselves, it is necessary to look at the 
historical process that the Kurds have gone through which explains why they have 
failed to bridge their internal divisions. To better understand the Kurds' behaviour 
during the First World War, Foreign Office archives were consulted. 
Geopolitical Location 
The etymology of the name 'Kurd' is thought to stand for 'a people', or derives 
possibly from the Persian word' gord' that means a 'hero' or a 'warrior' (MacDonald, 
quoting Limbert: 23.+). The oldest recorded evidence of the existence of the Kurds 
dates from 2000 B.C. In a Sumerian inscription, it appears as a country named 
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'Kardaka' (Arfa: 3). Also, there were names for the Kurds such as Karda, Garda, 
Qurti, and Guti used by various peoples who invaded the region. The Kurds were also 
known as the Medes that conquered the Assyrian Empire in 612 B.C. The Europeans 
started to use the name 'Kurd' from around the seventh century A.D. The most 
important festivity of the Kurds is Newruz, which is based on the legend that derives 
from the Medes' conquest of Nineveh, the capital of the Assyrian Empire. Newruz, 
meaning the New Year, is celebrated on 21 March by the kindling of fires on hillsides. 
It celebrates the victory of a smith named Kawa over the tyrannical king Zaehak who 
lived on human sacrifices he had been forcing upon the people. According to the 
legend, after Kawa's hammer killed Zaehak the Kurds began to prosper. 
Since before the nation-state era, the region where the Kurds live has been denoted as 
'Kurdistan' or the 'country of the Kurds'. Even though the term does not appear in 
today's official documents, Kurdistan is still widely used to denote the area, which 
consists of high mountains and hinterland. The Kurds now live in the area that 
consists of today's eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, northwestern 
Iran, part of the former Soviet Union, and around Armenia. Historically, the area had 
been exposed to various invaders: the Selucids, Parthians, Sassanians, Armenians, 
Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols, and the Ottomans. Among them, the 
Seljuks in the twelfth century used the name 'Kurdistan' for the first time, when its 
Sultan created a province of that name (Kinnane: 21). Because Kurdistan stretches 
from the high mountains to fertile plain suitable for agriculture, the Kurdish economy 
has been traditionally based on a mixture of animal husbandry and cultivation. This 
semi-nomadic civilisation produced expressions to denote the two distinct groups 
among the population. One is 'dundok-khwar (eater of wheat cake of the plain), and 
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the other is 'doshab-khwar (eater of grape syrup of the hills)' (Hay: 40). 
The Kurdish population in each country where they live is estimated to be: 6,500,000 
in Iran, 4,400,000 in Iraq, 1,100,000 in Syria, 14,300,000 in Turkey, and 500, 000 in 
the fonner Soviet Union, and 1,700,000 elsewhere totaling 28,500,000 (Washington 
Kurdish Institute, WKI). The size of the Kurdish population generates controversy, as 
governments of the Middle Eastern countries have a tendency to minimise the figure. 
For example, Turkey counts only those Kurds who do not speak Turkish at all as 
Kurds (Dewdney 1972 and McDowall 1996). One estimate suggests the percentage of 
the Kurdish population against the entire population of each country is: Iran (10 per 
cent), Iraq (23 per cent), Syria (8 per cent), and Turkey (22 per cent), and it is 
expected to increase (WKI). By 2020, the percentage of the Kurds is estimated to be: 
Iran (12 per cent), Iraq (24.5 per cent), Syria (9.8 per cent), and Turkey (36.9 per cent) 
(lzady 1992: 119). 
Linguistic Diversity 
Kurdish is an Indo-European language and is categorised in the northwestern or 
southwestern group of Persian. Due to the widely scattered settlement and tribal 
structure of the society, many different dialects developed which are sometimes 
'mutually unintelligible or very partially understandable' (Bruinessen 1992: 21). 
Furthen110re, Kurdish is incomprehensible to Arabic and Turkish speakers. Howe\'er, 
because of the Kurds' diversity of dialects, either Persian, Turkish or Arabic was used 
as a medium among the Kurdish tribes who spoke different Kurdish dialects. It was 
said at the time of the British occupation in the 1920s that the sole medium of 
communication among the tribes in Sulaimani ya was Persian, and a British officer 
persuaded them to use Kurdish instead (Hay: 36-7). Sulaiman and Blau (p. 15.+) 
comment that the 'constant resort to languages other than Kurdish does reflect the 
high status of these (Arabic, Turkish and Persian) languages'. 
Martin van Bruinessen categorised the major Kurdish dialects into three groups: (1) 
The Kurmanji group - the northern and northwestern dialects (spoken in northern Iraq 
close to Turkey and southeast Turkey), (2) The Sorani group - the southern dialects 
(northern Iraq close to Iran), and (3) The southeastern dialects (along the eastern 
border of Iraq) which are closer to modem Persian than the other two. Besides those 
three groups, two other dialect groups, Zaza and Gurani are spoken in Kurdistan. Zaza 
is spoken by a large number of tribes in today's eastern Turkey, and has three distinct 
sub-groups, that of greater Dersim, Siverek and Modki. It is said that the native 
speakers of Zaza learn to speak Kurmanji Kurdish rather easily, whereas Zaza proves 
to be extremely difficult for the native Kurmanji speakers. Gurani-speaking areas only 
exist today as enclaves throughout Turkey. 
Kurdish literature has been mostly orally inherited except for a few representative 
works that have been written and passed down from earlier generations to this day. 
Obstructed by the frequent use of non-Kurdish languages as a medium, it seemed to 
han? been a revolutionary step for Kurdish writers to produce their literary works in 
Kurdish. The first Kurdish poet who expressed Kurdish national feeling and the 
distinctiveness of the Kurds as a nation was Ahmad Khani \vho lived in the sixteenth 
century. Khani's 'Mam u Zine' is considered by the Kurds as equivalent to how the 
work or Homer is revered by the Greeks, according to Sulaiman and Blau. 'By using 
Kurdish as the medium of his poetry, Khani was fully aware of its role as an identity 
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maker of his own people. He was also aware of how revolutionary a vision this new 
departure was' (Sulaiman and Blau: 155). Ahmad Khani played a pioneering role in 
expressing the Kurdish identity in Kurdish. However, his view was not universally 
shared by his fellow Kurds of the same period. Even in a later century, the Kurdish 
poet Hajji Qadir Koyi (d. 1894) still lamented the 'neglect of the Kurdish by the 
Kurds' (Sulaiman and Blau: 156). Koyi wrote, 'Do not say: The Kurdish language 
does not attain the purity of Persian. It possesses an eloquence that reaches unequalled 
heights, but lack of solidarity among Kurds, has debased its value and price' 
(Sulaiman and Blau: 156). Thus, the status of the Kurdish language was 10\\'. and it 
was not able to foster the Kurdish national identity, even during the nineteenth 
century. 
The dissemination of Kurdish as a common medium of the Kurdish people was 
obstructed by its impracticality in transcription. Kurdish did not have its own 
alphabet, and inscription had to rely mostly on the Arabic alphabet. The British officer 
W. R. Hay points out that the lack of suitable vowel script in Arabic made the 
transcription of Kurdish 'extremely awkward', and this was one of the reasons that 
Kurdish was rarely written. Hay also pointed to the impact of the Ottoman Empire's 
Pan-Turanism policy of the time, saying that they 'did their best to suppress the 
Kurdish' (Hay: 37). Today, Kurdish is written in three different alphabets: The Arabic 
alphabet in Iraq, Syria and Iran, and although the publication of Kurdish is prohibited, 
a modified \'ersion of the Latin alphabet is used among the Kurds in Turkey, and the 
Cyri Ihc alphabet is used among the Kurds in the former Soviet Union. Kurdish lacks 
the 'print culture' seen by Benedict Anderson as a basis of national consciousness. 
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Social Structure 
Historically, Kurdish society was characterised by its stratification into landless 
peasants and militarily superior tribesmen who treated peasants as their assets. 
However, an important feature was this division was not necessarily permanent: there 
was a mobility among different 'castes', and change of position between peasants and 
tribesmen was not impossible (Bruinessen 1992: 120-121). 
Traditionally the Kurds' semi-nomadic economy had been sustained through the 
unique division of labour between two distinct groups among the population, that of 
tribally-organised nomads and the sedentary cultivators. Bruinessen showed that, 
because of this stratification, Kurdish culture is a cross-fertilization of at least two 
originally different cultures, and over time it developed a distinctive structure that can 
almost be described as 'two-caste' (Bruinessen 1992: 105). The most obvious 
characteristics of the relation between nomads and cultivators is said to be the latter's 
total subjection to the former. The discriminatory terms such as 'guran' and 'misken' 
exist to denote the peasants who were treated as sheer property, comparable to slaves. 
The non-tribal Kurds were usually landless, and are not tribally-organised, hence 
lacked the capacity of self-defense. According to Bruinessen, these peasant Kurds 
have been treated merely as a 'productive asset', and are 'not unlike a flock of sheep' 
(Bruinessen 1992: 105). 
Despite the above-described social division, the 'crossing of castes' became 
comlllonly noticeable from the late Ottoman era. Bruinessen (p. 121) pointed out 
Ottoman law-books contained frequent \vamings against peasants to assume Sipahi 
(cavalrymen - as in Chapter III) status and possess a fief. This was owing to the fact 
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that structure of the Kurdish society was configured mainly by political, rather than 
genealogical factors. 'Kurds do not remember their genealogies as scrupulously as 
many other tribal peoples do, so that for kinsmen further remote than, say, second 
cousins one does not bother to trace the exact relationship. Actual political allegiance 
to a lineage becomes more important than real kinship' (Bruinessen 1992: 51). \Vith 
regard to the above-mentioned political allegiance, Barfield also underlined genealogy 
was not a decisive factor. Instead, he referred to mediating skills as being the most 
important quality for Kurdish tribal leaders to possess. 'Leaders gained their positions 
by displaying special skills in mediating problems within the tribe or successfully 
organising raids and wars. It was an achieved status not automatically inherited by a 
man's sons, for there were always potential rivals ready to seize any opportunity to 
replace an incumbent or his heir. Leadership rarely remained for long in a single 
lineage' (Barfield: 162). 
The above information suggests that the Kurds have a good chance to become a 
politically united nation because a man's position in the Kurdish society is not 
determined by his genealogy. Depending on the impacts of political and economic 
changes, the Kurds' social division may be amenable. However, if such impacts were 
weak or absent, it is likely that feudalistic division within the Kurdish society would 
remain unaltered. 
Leadership 
Leadership in Kurdish society can be characterised by both tribal and Islamic origins, 
especially that based on Sufi orders. The most prominent of these are, the agha, 
mullah and shaikh. 
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First of all, every village has an agha. Generally, the title agha encompasses broad 
meaning, denoting the leader of a tribe, lineage, a village, a family, or even a 
confederation of tribes. It is known that the Kurdish tenninology does not distinguish 
these (Bruinessen 1992: 80), and all are simply called agha, and in modem times the 
meaning of 'landlord' is attached to an agha (Gerber: 112). Presumably the process of 
sedentarisation and acquisition of large tracts of land by aghas in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century contributed to the additional meaning (Gerber: 111-112). An agha 
is responsible for politically representing the village, taking care of visitors and 
dealing with officials. He usually leads a sedentary life, possesses a magnificent guest 
house and deals with outsiders. An agha possesses a considerable number of villages, 
and every sub-chief is the client of the agha (Hay: 84). 
For a long time, aghas exercised arbitrary and absolute authority in Kurdish society. 
Even though they have started to become obsolete in recent years, their personal and 
patriarchal influence seems to have remained strong. Kinnane comments on this 
transfonnation: 'On the whole the system was acceptable to the peasants when the 
agha ruled more than the state. The coming of the gendannerie and the advent of 
motor transport, bringing remote villages into contact with the big towns with their 
opportunities for employment, have subverted the function of the agha. But loyalty to 
tribal leaders remained very strong ... the agha or shaikh may be feared and hated but 
his followers continued to submit to his authority and leadership' (Kinnane: 14-5). 
An agha is assisted by a mullah. A mullah has a role in religious functions, such as 
education as \\ell as acting as an advisor to the agha. Hay wrote that nearly every 
good tribal chief he knew had' good old mulla' behind him (Hay: 39). He also \\Tote 
that a mullah provided the 'sole source of education' in the village. Thus a mullah was 
the village's 'best educated man' (Bruinessen 1992: 209) and was capable of dealing 
with both religious and secular matters. 
A shaikh in Kurdish society means a holy and venerated man, and denotes particularly 
the leader of a Sufi order, especially that of the Qadri and Naqshbandi, the two sects 
that flourish in Kurdistan. The former was founded in the eleventh century and the 
latter in the fourteenth century. A shaikh is not the same as the Arabic shaikh, which 
applies to a tribal chief. The shaikh's role has become more political in recent times. 
The Ottoman campaign in the nineteenth century initiated structural change in 
Kurdish society. Because the chiefs of the emirates (detailed later) were defeated, 
each tribe became the maximum organised unit of Kurdish society. In this leadership 
vacuum, shaikhs strengthened their influence over the community through their 
mediating power and became spokesmen for proto-Kurdish nationalism. Describing 
shaikhs' increased influence, Bernard Lewis described those Kurdish provinces after 
the Ottoman campaign as 'Dervish dynasties' (Lewis 1968: 409). 
Sectarian Division 
Even if a shaikh can unite more than one tIibe through his mediating power, because 
the Sufi order itself is divided between two competing rival sects, a shaikh in one Sufi 
sect is not capable of winning the followers in a tribe of the rival sect. The rivalry 
between the Naqshbandi and Qadri branches of the Sufi order is well known. All 
major Kurdish rebellions in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, to be discussed 
in Chapter Ill, sufTered either tribal or religious division, including such cases as the 
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Shaikh Ubeydullah rebellion in 1880, the Shaikh ~1ahmoud rebellion in 1920 and 
Shaikh Said rebellion in 1925. For example, a British officer records Shaikh 
Mahmoud's unpopularity among the Kurdish tribes neighbouring Mahmoud's area of 
influence in Sulaimaniya. Sir A.T. Wilson, fonnerly an acting Civil Commissioner in 
Mesopotamia said that the Kurdish tribes outside Sulaimaniya area preferred not to 
come under Shaikh Mahmoud's rule and that 'he had been continuously in revolt 
against Turkish rule, though it was whispered that the people in Sulaimaniya had 
suffered more from the tyranny of their own chiefs and the Sayids than from the 
Turkish officials' (Wilson 1931: 130-133). Because the British authority happened to 
give Shaikh Mahmoud a large area to administer, this brought him immediately into 
conflict with other Kurdish tribes (O'Ballance 1996: 19). It seems to be the case that 
Kurdish tribal leaders in general were often not suited to governing an area beyond 
their own locality because of tribal and sectarian division. 
The persistent sectarianism among Kurdish tribes has been a continuous feature in the 
nation's history. Even though the leaders spoke up for Kurdish nationalism, they 
failed to mobilise the Kurds that belonged to rival tribes or rival religious orders. The 
tribal division is still fierce today. For example, an aid worker who had been to 
northern Iraq in 1994 said the Kurds did not trust the aid mission that had contacted 
the ri val tribe. For many ordinary Kurds who have no specific political adherence, this 
internal rivalry was 'as much of a traumatising factor as the government oppression' 
(Qassemlou 1970 as in Khasan and Nehme: 132). 
The Pre Nation-state Era: Coexistence of Tribes and States 
The following section analyses the wider organised units of the Kurds such as the 
tribal confederacy (emirate) and the Kurds' relation with the Sunni Ottoman Empire, 
which had an important political impact on events in the early twentieth century, in 
which the Kurds ultimately failed to achieve an independent Kurdish state. 
From the Seventh to the Sixteenth Century 
The history of the Kurds in the pre-nation state era has two important phases: The first 
phase starts from the Kurds' conversion to Islam in the seventh century, and the 
second from the Kurds' inclusion into the Sunni-Ottoman sphere of influence in the 
sixteenth century. 
The Kurds' conversion to Islam was accomplished in the seventh century when the 
Arab army occupied three cities in today's northern Iraq: Arbil, Mosul and Nisibin. 
By this Islamic conquest, the Kurds' pre-Islamic ancient religious practice such as 
Zoroastrianism was weakened considerably. It was not totally eliminated, however, 
and some established a hybrid religious sect between a pre-Islamic cult and Islam. An 
important feature of this Islamic Arab conquest was that the Kurds were undeniably 
integrated into the Islamic world but the Arabs did not actually attempt to colonise the 
Kurdish region, and neither did they show any interest in controlling the Kurds. The 
conversion to Islam was done in a way that tolerated preexisting Kurdish culture, and 
ever since, the Kurdish leaders were allies of the Arab Muslim army (Arfa: 6). 
Bet\\'t?cn the tenth and ele\'enth centuries, several Kurdish emirates emerged out of 
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tribal confederacies. The rulers of these emirates acknowledged the Abbasid 
Caliphate. These emirates usually consisted of a number of tribes. The representative 
Kurdish dynasties include: Aqqonyunlu, Qaraqoyunlu, Ayyubi, Botan, Bitlis and 
Bradost. The most famous one was the Ayyubis which produced Salah ed Din who 
reigned over the Middle East between 1169 and 1250, although Salah ed Din himself 
was estimated not to have had a sense of Kurdish identity. The chiefs of tribal 
confederacies had lesser chieftains under them as vassals and such confederations had 
basically a feudal character (Arfa: 16). After enduring the Mongol invasion between 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Kurdish culture flourished in what is 
today's eastern Turkey, in the area of Bitlis, Hakkari and Botan. In 1596, the ruler of 
Bitlis, Prince SharafKhan Ibn Shams aI-Din Bidlisi (d. 1604), wrote 'Sharafname', a 
history of the Kurdish emirates. The language he used, though, was Persian. 
(Sulaiman and Blau: 154) 
The cycle of rising and falling of these dynastic emirates was repeated over the 
centuries. It was said that each Kurdish emirate 'might last about a century before 
succumbing to the attacks of an imperial power, rival Kurds or the two in alliance' 
(Kinnane: 22). One hundred years was a considerable length of time. However, the 
persistence of intra-Kurdish fighting obstructed the emergence of a stable pan-
Kurdish state. It was a common practice of rival Kurdish emirates to ally with foreign 
powers. Thus even if these emirates could be called 'proto Kurdish states' and their 
ethnic composition was unmistakably Kurdish, often, 'it was easier for a Kurdish 
prince to be vassal to a foreign overlord than to give up his struggle with a rival Kurd' 
(K ' 77) Tl1us, there \vas no impetus for the Kurds to 'unite as the Kurds' lI1nane: -- . 
during this era. 
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One factor that historically contributed to the Kurds' failure to develop pan-Kurdish 
political unity also derives from the unique fact in the Middle East that for centuries 
tribes and states coexisted in a reciprocal manner, as briefly mentioned in the theory 
chapter. Thus there was no need for states (or empires) to rigidly rule the tribes, nor 
did the tribes have the need to unite against foreign powers. In short, the Kurds were 
in an environment whose primary loyalty centred around the tribe and there was not 
much practical need to be loyal to any other authority than their own tribe. A British 
political officer, W.R. Hay, described the lack of political solidarity among the Kurds 
in the Arbil division between 1918 and 1920: 'They are a collection of tribes without 
any cohesion, and showing little desire for cohesion. They prefer to live in their 
mountain fastness and pay homage to whatever government may be in power, as long 
as it exercises little more than a nominal authority. The day that the Kurds awake to a 
national consciousness and combine, the Turkish, Persian, and Arab states would 
crumble to dust before them' (Hay 1921: 35). 
Barfield points out that the long coexistence of large empires and small tribes within a 
common territory is almost exclusively a Middle Eastern phenomenon: 'Only in the 
Middle East did tribal peoples remain a permanent presence, both on the frontiers of 
the region and within the boundaries of every state. In other areas of sedentary 
civilisation tribalism was long on the wane, limited to marginal areas of little 
significance' (Barfield: 153). How could this unique coexistence have continued, for 
centuries? How could the small tribes retain their cultural and political autonomy 
without being absorbed into the hierarchical structure of the empires? 
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One obvious reason is the geopolitical factor: even for a large powerful empire it was 
difficult from a practical standpoint to extend its authority into the rugged 
mountainous region. Thus the large empires needed to secure, to a great degree, the 
cooperation of the local leaders which in tum accorded such leaders a recognition of 
their authority. In other words, the recognition of power by an external authority was 
constituted an active part of tribal life. Indeed, it is emphasised that 'Kurdistan' s 
political history of the past five centuries ... shows how the important developments 
among the tribes were always in response to developments at the state level' 
(Bruinessen 1992: 134). 
Another reason, less evident than the former, is the very fact that the lack of political 
unity among the tribes themselves contributed to obstructing the stabilisation and/or 
formalisation of a hierarchical relationship between tribes and empires, and hence the 
development of wide-scale political integration: '(T)heir lack of formal political 
organization made it difficult (for the empires) to use their leaders as efficient tools of 
indirect rule because they could only persuade their followers, not command them' 
(Barfield: 179). 
As mentioned earlier, the leadership was an achieved, rather than inherited, status. 
What does this imply about the Kurdish tribes' internal and external relations? In 
short, this dynamism in tribal leadership had, as a consequence, obstructed the 
development of a stable, large-scale hierarchical organisation. It also did not help to 
stabi lise the Kurdish tribes' relations with external powers. Referring to the Middle 
Eastern tribe-state synlbiosis Barfield states: 'Empires that dealt with these types of 
tribes tended to work around them - to control them in areas of vital interest and 
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engage In punitive military campaigns periodically - but in general to leave them 
alone (a policy still considered wise today) ... and supra-tribal political organisation 
was often the product of religious leadership' (Barfield: 1 79). His reference to the 
importance of religious organisation highlights the fact that such organisation was 
politically crucial and, historically, it was the most effective instrument to provide a 
broader organisational framework. This explains why in later decades the Kurdish sufi 
shaikhs would play an important role in the nationalist movement. Until secular 
Kurdish nationalism gained currency among the masses, the nationalist movement 
would rely on the shaikhs' spiritual power which had crucial impact on the masses. 
Finally, the relation between availability of material resources and relative size of a 
political organisation seems to explain why historically the Kurdish dynasties, to be 
mentioned below, have been relatively short-lived and less stable compared to their 
Turkish and Persian counterparts. According to Barfield's anthropological study, there 
arc two major patterns of the Middle Eastern peoples: the Arab-Kurd type and Turco-
Persian type. The former applies to the organisational pattern of a people who live in 
an area with scarce resources (thus making mediating power of crucial prerequisite for 
a leadership), and the latter to those in fertile region, thereby enabling them to 
construct a large scale dynasty (through a network of gifts and patronage). 
From the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century 
The events in the sixteenth century caused a major change in the position of the 
Kurds. The struggle for regional ascendancy between the two major powers, the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires, had created some forn1 of balance of power in the 
region. The area inhabited by the Kurds became a natural frontier between the two 
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empIres. As a result of the Battle of Chaldiran (1514) the Kurds, who were 
predominantly Sunni Muslims, were persuaded to act on the side of the Ottoman 
Empire. About three-fifths of the Kurds were said to be Sunni Muslims and one-tenth 
Shias. As a result, most of the Kurdish region came under the strong influence of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Kurds in today's Turkey, Syria and much of northern Iraq are 
Sunni, while Kurds in the eastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan (known as Fali Kurds) and in 
Iran are mostly Shias. The Ottoman and Persian empires formally demarcated their 
frontier in 1639. The Ottoman rulers recognised sixteen autonomous Kurdish emirates 
and many smaller fiefdoms. The Persian rulers also had client Kurdish chiefs and 
tribes. By the nineteenth century there were nine major Kurdish emirates and many 
lesser ones, two within the Persian sphere of influence and the rest within the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Inclusion in the Sunni Ottoman Empire meant the beginning of active religious 
persecution of those Kurds who belonged to heterodox Islam and non-Islamic 
religions. There are Kurds who belong to Christianity and Zoroastrianism. Among 
Muslim Kurds, too, there are followers of several heterodox sects. According to 
Bruinessen there are three major heterodox Islamic sects followed by the Kurds: (1) 
the Alevis in Anatolia, (2) the Ahl-e Haqq in southern and southeastern Kurdistan 
(North East Iraq), and (3) the Yezidis in the mountains around Mosul. (Bruinessen 
1992: 24) Ahl-e Haqq means 'People of Truth' and was branded by both Shia and 
Smu1i Muslims as heresies (Hosseini in Kreyenbroek and Allison: 111). Yezidism is 
known to occur only among Kurds since its instruction is conducted in the Kurmanji 
dialect of Kurdish. Yezidism is said to have originated from an extremist Sunni sect. 
The di ffcrentiation between thL' Yl'/idi Kurds and Sunni Kurds was knO\\'n to be 
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remarkable. The Yezidi Kurds were persecuted by the Ottoman authority and their 
Sunni Kurdish neighbours and insulated themselves mostly in the Sinjar mountains 
that lie between northern Iraq and Syria. 
Interim Summary 
The isolated and scattered geographical environment made the Kurds' internal 
communication poor, and interaction among the tribes was weak or even hostile, 
resulting in constant tribal wars. There was little chance for the Kurds to develop pan-
Kurdish political unity. Furthermore, historically, the surrounding empires found it 
most practical to rule Kurdistan through the Kurdish leaders, hence Kurdish national 
rights itself rarely became the object of political struggle. Because of their long 
isolation from neighbouring peoples, Kurdishness at an individual level was always 
evident. However, political unity was very weak. This seemingly paradoxical 
phenomenon can be explained by reference to nation-building theory, which warns 
that an ethnic group by itself does not automatically evolve into a politically united 
nation. Perhaps the Kurds are one of the most prominent cases: they are distinct from 
their neighbours, occupy a sizable area and speak the branches of the Kurdish 
language, yet they failed to politically unite. 
It is also important that Islamic conversion was done without changing the social and 
cultural features of the Kurds. The Islamic religion thereafter constituted an important 
part of the Kurdish culture. On the other hand, for the Kurds who belonged to non-
Islamic or Islamic heterodox religions, it was natural for them to differentiate 
themselves from the Sunni Kurds who actively persecuted them. Kurdish unity \\'as 
further obstructed by the subsequent pan-Islamic policy taken by the Ottoman Sultan 
in the late nineteenth century. The pan-Islamic policy was effective because it was 
easy for the Kurds to associate themselves with Islamic religion. 
The Birth of Nationalism and Competing Identities 
The years leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are highly important in the 
sense that they determined the factors decisive to delineating today's state borders. 
The prominent examples are that of Balkan nations that won independence after 
centuries of Ottoman rule. The less obvious case, however, is the Kurds. Despite the 
fact that the Kurds had long constituted a linguistically distinct group from their 
neighbouring peoples, their tribal rivalry and predominantly Muslim composition 
seem to have deterred a comparable the growth of explicitly Kurdish secular 
nationalism. In this transitional period, a number of competing identities, such as the 
new secular nationalism (both Kurdish and Turkish), Ottomanism, and pan-Islamism 
would affect the Kurdish identity. The following section gives an account of the 
important events that took place before, during and after the First World War. It firstly 
explains the state of the early Kurdish nationalist movement and their weakness of 
popular base as the result of Islamic and tribal factors. 
Early Kurdish Nationalist Organisations 
Most of the early Kurdish nationalists belonged to aristocratic families who resided in 
Istanbul. They were originally from the Kurdish region but became exiles after the 
Kurdish emirates were defeated by the Ottoman campaign in the middle of the 
nineteenth century (as in Chapter Ill). The Kurdish intellectuals were greatly 
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influenced by the same political events that affected the Turkish intellectuals of the 
time. The intellectuals, however, did not exercise significant influence over the mass 
of the rural population. The rural community was still deeply Islamic and was 
dominated by religious leaders, who often actively supported the Ottoman Sultan. 
This seemed to be particularly the case as during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, repeated wars with Russia and separatist movements by Balkan nations 
provided fertile ground for the revival of conservative Islamic ideologies that 
consequentially contributed to the blurring of Kurdish identity. Sultan Abdul Hamid 
II's (r. 1876-1909) resort to pan-Islamism is the most well-known case. 
As a consequence, the aims of early Kurdish political movements were strongly 
Ottoman and less specifically Kurdish (McDowall 1996: 89). Turkish intellectuals of 
the same period opposed Abdul Hamid II's despotism, and Kurdish nationalists were 
their great sympathisers. One group was growing influential after 1906. A faction of 
Ottoman anny officers led by Talaat Bey had established a group called the Ottoman 
Freedom Society in order to restore the 1876 Constitution (Macfie 1994: 25). This 
would later come to be known widely as the Committee for Union and Progress 
(CUP). 
The Badr Khans were a powerful Kurdish family who reigned over today's eastern 
Turkey until they were defeated by the Ottomans under Sultan Abdulmejid in 1840. In 
1889, Badr Khan's family members were caught by the authorities for their 
involvement in anti-government acti\'ities. However, those who escaped overseas 
commenced the publication of 'Kurdistan', which was a bilingual journal (in 
Kurmanji Kurdish and Turkish). 'Kurdistan' supported the causes of both the CUP 
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and Kurdish nationalism. The Badr Khans had a family member who was actively 
Islamist as well, and this signifies the powerful influence of Islam at that time. Osman 
Pasha, an Islamist son of Abdulrahman Badr Khan, suppressed the Armenians and 
was disowned by his father in 1900 (Ramsaur Jr. 1965: 63). 
Abdallah J awadat and Ishaq Sukuti were other Kurdish-Ottoman reformists. Both 
worked with the nucleus members of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) 
and organised the opposition movement to Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1889. Jawadat and 
Sukuti were students of Military Medical School in Istanbul. Later, they served in 
Ottoman embassies abroad. Other nationalists, the Nihris (Shamdinans) had a 
federalist ideal that advocated greater autonomy for the Kurds within the Ottoman 
Empire. The most active member of the Nihri family was Shaikh Abdul Qadir who 
was a son of Shaikh Ubeydullah who led the anti-government rebellion in 1880. 
Abdul Qadir was known to be an enthusiastic supporter of the CUP. He was arrested 
in 1896, and his family was exiled, but they were allowed to come back to Istanbul 
after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. To the detriment of those who shared the 
reformist ideal, the Badr Khans and the Nihris were frequently rivals, and they did not 
cooperate with each other. 
The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 led by the CUP had a considerable effect in 
liberating the political climate. It restored the constitution suspended by Abdul Hamid 
II and stood for political modernisation. Many more Kurdish political organizations 
\"ere !on11ed after this, some by urban intelligentsia, some by army officers and some 
by aristocratic notables. However, those organisations had weak roots with the 
masses. In particular, the political organisations founded by urban intelligentsia \\ere 
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small, and their attempts to reach the tribesmen were thwarted by aghas, who saw 
their authority threatened, while those led by aghas were never free from tribal strife 
(O'Ballance 1996: 9). 
One such early nationalist organization, 'Taali we Terakii Kurdistan' (Recovery and 
Progress of Kurdistan), published a journal in Turkish called 'Kurdish Mutual Aid and 
Progress'. Emin Ali Badr Khan (the leader of the Badr Khan family mentioned 
earlier), General Sherif Pasha, and Shaikh Abdul Qadir (of the Nihri family) were 
founding members. These nationalists supported the Young Turk regime, and in their 
journal discussed subjects such as problems of Kurdish culture, the language and 
national unity (Kendal: 27). As mentioned earlier, the use of Turkish instead of 
Kurdish implies the low status of Kurdish as a language of pUblication. Moreover, 
Bruinessen comments that 'these aristocrats shared the Ottomanist ideals of the Young 
Turk movement but not its liberal ideas. Their attitude towards the common Kurdish 
people was extremely paternalistic '" the society remained an exclusively upper-class 
concern' (Bruinessen 1992: 275-278). There was also an organisation called the 
'Kurdish Committee for the Diffusion of Learning'. The activities of these 
organisations, however, were obstructed by personal rivalries between the Badr Khan 
and Nihri families. It is known that Kurdish nationalist organisations were formed 
outside Istanbul, too. Branches of the Kurdish Club (Kurt Kulupleri) were established 
in Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Mus, Erzurm, and in Mosul. The Kurdish Club, too were more 
Ottoman-refoffilist than specifically Kurdish nationalists. They were influenced by the 
Young Turks (Kendal: 25), and included fervent CUP supporters (McDowall 1996: 
123). 
Islamic Reaction to the Young Turks 
For the majority of the religious rural population, the Young Turk revolution had a 
different meaning. It effectively violated the sacredness of the Sultan Caliph. The 
Young Turks themselves were Muslims. However, their action against Sultan Caliph's 
authority was met with considerable hostility. The revolution seemed to have 
hardened Islamic sentiment in traditional areas. The following British records depict 
such a reaction to the Young Turk revolution among the Kurds in rural areas. 
'Mersina, January 21,1911 ... a few evenings ago a 'mollah' from the top of 
a minaret in Adana proclaimed death to the' giaours', which, he said, comprised such 
Turks who, by their ideas of reform in the Turkish Empire, abandoned the old 
conservative spirit prescribed by the Koran. As a result the 'mollah' was imprisoned' 
(F037111244/3430, 22 January 1911). 
The following words are from the song heard in the town where the above incident 
took place: 
'They (Young Turks) bound Sultan Hamid, and gave him thirty times thirty 
strokes: He was delivered into the hands of the Young Turks. 0 Hurriet (Liberty)! 
Why did'st thou this? Why madest thou Sultan Hamid a scandal and the religion of 
Islam of no account?' (F037111244/3430, 22 January 1911). 
Islamic revival among the Kurds spurred by The Young Turk regIme 
threatened the security of Armenians, as Christian-Muslim conflict pushed the Kurds 
to an Islamic identity rather than secular nationalist. The British recorded that the 
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Young Turk regime 'tolerated' such songs cited above, possibly because the regime 
was 'unwilling to give the Kurds any provocation at present' (F037111244 4~79). 
Another report said, 'Yesterday it was noticed in the neighbourhood of the Armenian 
mission in Adana on several doors of Armenian houses which had not been burnt 
during the last massacre a red paint mark in the shape of a cross' (F03711124.f,J'+30, 
22 January 1911). 
Even after the Young Turk revolution, Ottoman society as a whole including the 
Kurdish community remained deeply Islamic. This can be observed from the fact that 
the Young Turks did not disband the infamous Hamidiye Cavalry that used to act as a 
spearhead of Abdul Hamid II's pan-Islamic policy. The regiment was retained simply 
by changing its name to 'Ashiret Alaylari (tribal regiments)' (Arfa: 25). After all, as 
Bernard Lewis points out, the Young Turks continued to use Islam for the purpose of 
winning sympathy (Lewis 1993: 137-8). 
Turkish Ethnonationalism 
The rise of Turkish ethnonationalism among Turkish intellectuals impacted the Kurds 
in two important ways. Although Lewis comments that it was basically confined to 
intellectuals (Lewis 1968: 351), it was unmistakable, firstly, that the Young Turks 
became increasingly intolerant of non-Turkish political activities from this era. 
Second ly, the Turkish nationalists had an overwhelming strength in championing the 
Islamic cause as 'their own' cause, and their use of Islamic ideology had a 
containment effect on Kurdish nationalism. Archival evidence implied that the Kurds 
wcrc generally susceptibk to Turkish-Islan1ic influence. For example, a 1910's 
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British document suggests: 'The Kurds, except those of Maku, (north Persia) do not 
appear to be susceptible to foreign political influences other than that of Turkey' 
(F03711953, 14 February 1910 Smart to Barclay). This overlapping nature of Turkish 
nationalism and Islamic cause is estimated to have contained the spread of Kurdish 
nationalism considerably. 
While mobilising the Kurds by Islamic propaganda, the Young Turk regIme 
strengthened the ban on Kurdish political societies and suppressed Kurdish 
ethnonationalism. The ethnonational Turkish movement slowly became a systematic 
political activity, represented by a theoretician such as Ziya Goklap. Bernard Lewis 
points out that the first of Turanist publications started in December 1908 when the 
Turkish Society was founded in Istanbul and began to publish a jounal (Lewis 1968: 
349-351). The reason why the Young Turks threw themselves into the Turkish ultra-
nationalist line cannot be separated from international events. Those were the 
heightening of political Zionism and escalation of the secessionist movements among 
minorities, including the Muslim minorities (such as Albanians, Kurds and Arabs). 
After the Kurdish organisation 'Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan' was closed 
down, it was succeeded by the Kurdish students union called Heva (Hope) in 1912. 
Jamil Pasha from Diyarbakir, who used to serve the Ottoman establishment, took the 
leading role in founding Heva. Most other members were also the sons of urban 
Kurdish notables, and their contacts with the common Kurds remained superficial. In 
its attempt to appease Kurdish nationalism, however, the Young Turk regime briefly 
adopted a policy which was more tolerant on the Kurds (Kendal: 28). Heva \\'as 
legalised again, and between 1913 and 1914 it published a Turkish-Kurdish bilingual 
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journal. With the outbreak of the war in 1914, however, Heva members were drafted 
into the Ottoman anny and the organisation was dispersed. 
Summary 
As a whole, pre-First World War Kurdish nationalist activities were all short-lived and 
confined to elite circles. The organisational weakness of Kurdish nationalists seems to 
have been inevitable, partly from the Ottoman society's Islamic nature, and partly 
from their aristocratic roots and internal rivalry. As the First World War would 
increasingly appear as a war between the Islamic state and the Christian states, 
Kurdish nationalism was submerged in the Islamic context of the war. This would 
leave the Kurds singularly unprepared at the end of the World War I to take advantage 
of the opportunity to found their own national state. 
Chapter III 
Nation-building of Turkey and Iraq 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the history of the Kurds in the context of the nation-building of 
Turkey and Iraq and explores alternative methods of politically integrating a sizable 
ethnic group. Neither of the two states has resolved the Kurdish conflict even after 
eight decades of state fonnation, indicating serious shortcomings in their national 
integration policies. In order to guarantee territorial integrity, the governments of both 
states have either actively implemented a cultural assimilationist policy (Turkey) or 
imposed totalitarian policies through violence (Iraq). It is hoped that this analysis of 
the nation-building process of both states may allow more insights into the 
requirements of successful national integration as a method of the resolution of 
protracted ethnonational conflict. The following sections will focus on the relation 
between the two states' national integration policies, these policies' effect on the 
Kurds and how Kurdish national rights may be achieved within the context of Iraqi 
and Turkish national integration. The ideal course of political development is these 
two states' transition from authoritarian state fonnation through Revolution from 
Above to the prototypical national integration which would allow cultural pluralism, 
in which Kurdish national rights would be fully protected within the systems of these 
states. However, the two states' nation-building continues to manifest the problems 
associated with Revolution from Above discussed earlier. The analysis is presented in 
four phases, to match the processes of nation-building against the theoretical 
framework: (1) The Legacy of Ottoman Centralisation, (2) State Fonnation, (3) 
Political 1\ lobilisation, and (4) 'Integration or Containment '?'. 
- , 
1. The Legacy of Ottoman Centralisation 
Introduction 
This first section aIms to sketch important outcomes of the Ottoman Empire's 
centralisation that took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in order to 
explain changes in the social composition of the areas that have become today's 
Turkey and Iraq. The Ottoman centralisation campaign considerably changed the 
social structure of the area, and the impact of the campaign is worth including in the 
nation-building chapter, even if these two states did not fonnally exist until the 1920s. 
There is a continuity in the social structure, and it is a major factor that would affect 
the outcome of national integration in later decades. 
Turkey 
Decentralised Structure 
The territory that was later to become today's Turkish Republic (hereafter, Turkey) 
was composed from the mid-sixteenth to the late nineteenth century of a number of 
semi-independent units known as millets. The millets, a type of religious community, 
were the basic units of de-centralised Ottoman administration which allowed various 
communities considerable internal autonomy. The most dominant millet was that of 
the Muslims, including the Turkish, Arab and Kurdish peoples. Other sizable ethnic 
and religious groups were the Annenians, the Jews, the Caucasians, and the Greeks. 
I'he area populated by the Kurds heavily overlapped \\"ith that of the Annenians; 
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however, the millet system guaranteed the internal autonomy of each group and 
allowed for their coexistence. 
What seems to be particularly important is the fact that even among the Muslim 
millet, the Kurds enjoyed a great degree of autonomy. One might have assumed that 
membership in the same Muslim millet might have contributed to submerging the 
ethnic differences between the Turkish and the Kurdish peoples, and consequentially 
to integrate them. However, the Ottoman Empire regarded the tribally organised 
Turcoman and Kurdish groups as 'boz millet' and 'kara millet' respectively and they 
enjoyed a special degree of autonomy (Karpat 1973: 38). Therefore, even under an 
Empire based on Sunni Islam that was supposed not to make distinctions among the 
Muslims, the Kurds maintained a great degree of autonomy and were not incorporated 
into the rest of the Turkish Muslim population within the Ottoman Empire. The 
Empire needed the Sunni Kurds' cooperation for the defence of the eastern border, 
thus the two maintained reciprocal relations for centuries. 
External Threat and Internal Decay 
The partnership between the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire, however, changed 
considerably in the nineteenth century. The independent Kurdish principalities were 
militarily crushed by the Ottoman authorities during their centralisation campaign, 
and the era of Kurdish autonomy came to an end by the mid-nineteenth century. 
The change was necessitated for the following reasons: firstly, the Ottoman Empire 
was forced to refonn and centralise its internal structure in order to cope with the 
increased European threat. From the eighteenth century on\\'ards, the expanding 
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European economy slowly enervated the Ottoman Empire's strength. The Ottoman 
Empire's industry was weakened and subjugated by the influx of European goods. 
Europe's economic expansion was linked with separatism among the Balkan nations 
and the dominance of Christians over commerce and industry at the expense of 
Muslims. 
Secondly, there were domestic problems that undermined the empire's strength. In 
fact the Ottoman Empire's administration was already decaying well before the 
above-mentioned European expansion. One of the important causes was the financial 
deficit. The fief system known as the Timar had long lost its key function as the pillar 
of the Ottoman feudal system. The Timar was introduced in the sixteenth century. The 
system granted land to the cavalryman known as Sipahis in return for military service; 
thus they were bound to the state. The prominent feature of this feudal system was the 
direct linkage between the state and its local forces. The land was distributed to 
soldiers and officials for the purpose of administering authority. In Harik's 
judgement, 'significantly, it (the Timar) prevented the rise of a stable rural aristocracy 
until the nineteenth century' (Harik 1972: 339). 
As its central authority was weakened through the course of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire lost its control over the remote provinces, 
and tax farmers increased their holdings and security of tenure. They won a virtual 
autonomy at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Lewis 1968: 446). The direct 
link between the state and its local forces was slowly undermined by tax-farming. 
through \vhich the state revenues were skimmed off by intermediaries. As a result of 
this change, the power of local notables \\'ho constituted such intem1ediaries was 
considerably strengthened (Karpat 1973: 32). From this strata of tax farmers emerged 
a group of landed notables who were called Ayan. The Ayan began to exercise 
autonomous power in local administration, and they effectively replaced the state's 
authority in rural areas. It was said the rule by the Ayan was almost indistinguishable 
from a quasi-state; 'in some areas, especially in Rumelia (a European province of the 
Ottoman Empire), some of the Ayan maintained their own private armies, levied 
taxes, and dispensed justice' (Lewis 1968: 447). 
On the other hand, a large part of Anatolia had come to be dominated by Derebeys. 
Derebeys were a kind of feudal vassal princes ruling over autonomous and hereditary 
principalities (Lewis 1968: 447), and they, too, had interrupted state revenue in the 
same way as the Ayan. Derebeys ruled the vast area of Anatolia. It was said that by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the whole of Anatolia was in the hands 
of various Derebey families. Their power reached its peak during this time, and the 
Ottoman government was made to acknowledge their status publicly, with great 
reluctance. In Constantinople (Istanbul), an official conference on the Ayan and 
Derebeys was held in 1808, in which their power was recognised by the government 
(Lewis 1968: 447-8). 
Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government's authority 
was not functioning in vast provincial areas, which was the case in both the Balkans 
and in Anatolia. Kurdistan, which lay further afield, was another area in which the 
government was not even able to appoint a tax farmer. There was no indication that 
the Kurds had been paying a tax to the Ottoman government. Thus from the 
go\'cmment's point of vic\\', Kurdistan was the least integrated area of the empire's 
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territory, even less than the area dominated by the Ayan and Derebeys. 
Centralisation Campaign 
Attempts at centralisation had been made by several generations of Sultans. The 
earliest attempt was by Sultan Selim III (ruled 1789-1807). Although Selim still did 
not have enough power to militarily subjugate the Derebeys and Ayans, he initiated 
important reforms which were to be continued by his successors. Particularly, Selim 
Ill's attempt to reform the armed forces was the first step of the Ottoman Empire's 
centralisation. Selim III was known to have been in frequent contact with the 
European monarchs, and this allowed him to introduce modem equipment and 
military training techniques from Europe. Control over the armed forces was a serious 
agenda, as by Selim Ill's era, the J annisary corps known as Yeni Ceri had been 
growing autonomous and posing a political threat to the Sultan. Selim Ill's attempt to 
directly control the armed forces was fiercely opposed by the Yeni Ceris, who feared 
the loss of their political power. Furthermore, Selim Ill's modernisation programme 
was met by opposition from the conservative religious hierarchy. Selim III was 
assassinated in 1808 without seeing the completion of his attempted reforms. 
The two Sultans who succeeded Selim III, Mahmud II (ruled 1808-1839) and 
Abdulmejid I (ruled 1839-1861), continued their predecessor's centralisation 
programme. It was during Mahmud II's era that the armed autonomous groups were 
defeated: firstly the Ayan and Derebeys (in 1826) and secondly the Yeni Ceris (also in 
1826) and Kurds (throughout 1830-40s). For the campaign in Kurdistan, Nlahmud II 
appointed Rashid Muhammad Ali. who was known for his outstanding military skill. 
Rashid Muhammad Ali launched attacks from southeastern Anatolia into northern 
:v1esopotamia, and by this campaign the autonomous Kurdish emirates \\"ere all 
defeated. The prominent Kurdish families defeated by this campaign were the Badr 
Khans, the Botans and the Bradosts, as recounted in Chapter II. The Badr Khan 
family had resisted the government's offensive until as late as 1847. Some of these 
notable Kurdish families were sent into exile in Constantinople and thereafter led an 
Ottomanised aristocratic life. Some were appointed governors in Kurdistan, as even 
after the successful campaign the Ottoman government still found it more convenient 
to rule Kurdistan through Kurdish governors (Bruinessen 1992: 176). 
During the above campaign in the provinces, the state continued internal reforms. 
Education, which used to be provided at the responsibility of each millet, was slowly 
modified to include a more secular curriculum. This was done through establishing 
various vocational schools. This step, however, seems to have been confined to urban 
areas. It was said that public education under the Ottoman Empire was 'quite small 
and frail until well into the twentieth century' (Frey: 34). Thus the limited degree of 
secular education introduced at this time did not have a significant impact on the lives 
of the rural population. Education in late nineteenth century Ottoman society was still 
predominantly dependent on clerics and was also funded by religious foundations, 
known as Waqfs. As a result, the curriculum consisted almost entirely of religious 
instruction, and its method was basically a 'memorising of Koran through oral 
citation' (Frey: 34). This Koranic education had influenced the Ottoman political 
arena as well. It created the elite intellectuals called the Medrese hierarchy (Frey: 3.+). 
and this elite class opposed expansion of secular schools, seeing them as a threat to 
Islamic values. Thus, secular reforms were not simply religious matters, but affected 
the political balance between 'traditional' and 'modernising' forces. 
The above-mentioned efforts toward secularisation, as a whole, had a historic 
significance, however, because they undermined for the first time the traditional 
administrative principle of the Ottoman Empire, namely, the autonomy enjoyed by 
various religious and ethnic groups (Karpat 1973: 84). While in reality, centralisation 
and secularisation did not completely eliminate the pre-existing political structure, 
they challenged and posed a threat to it for the first time. Well into the Ataturk period 
and beyond, the above-mentioned Medrese-trained intellectuals would constitute an 
important core of the Turkish elite and continue to oppose secular policies. 
A New Landed Class 
Through the above-mentioned military campatgn, Mahmud II succeeded in 
confiscating the Timar land in 1831. However, as a whole, attempts to assert central 
control over land turned out to be ineffective, and the state authority was required to 
enact land registration law twice during the nineteenth century alone (1831 and 1858). 
Throughout the nineteenth century, privately owned land known as 'mulk' in the 
hands of the new notability had been increasing dramatically, and the state was 
incapable of controlling this. Indeed, the state authority was partially responsible for 
the concentration of land ownership. Lewis summarised the contributing factors: (1) 
Increased sale of state (miri) land by the government to meet deficits in the treasury, 
.. md (2) The sale and auction of a special kind of lease conferring very extensive rights 
and powers on the purchaser (Le\vis 1968: 448). The old autonomous groups 
successfully reestablished themselves as a land owning class by utilising the liberal 
land lease system. As a result. across Turkish speaking Anatolia the regime of the new 
land owning class was established, in which the former Ayan and Oerebeys 
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practically regained their power. 
The positive aspect of land registration was that it stimulated commercial agriculture 
to some extent. A demographic study suggested that 'during these decades in the 
nineteenth century commercial agriculture had taken root in West, Central and South 
Anatolia, and the mobility of Turkish/Muslim labourers was well established' 
(Akgunduz: 107). With increased demand for commercial crops from the European 
market, Ottoman agriculture went through a major transfonnation. 'Commercial and 
financial developments, including the increase of agricultural exports, brought a flow 
of ready money and created a class of persons with sufficient cash to bid for leases, 
buy estates, and lend money on land' (Lewis 1968: 450). This expansion of 
commercial agriculture was mostly confined to the Turkish speaking area. There was 
no indication that Kurdistan was involved in this development. Needless to say, 
regions of the fonner Kurdish emirates were still resisting centralisation during this 
period and remained unaffected by economic expansion which, in Turkish speaking 
areas, had contributed to labour mobility. 
In its second attempt to control land ownership, the government issued a Land 
Registration Law in 1858. Tapu, which was a conditional allocation of state land to 
individuals, was introduced by this law. Also, this law explicitly prohibited the 
acquisition of a whole populated village by an individual. This provision appears to 
reflect the alarm of the authorities at the increasing number of large estates (Lewis: 
-+-+9-450) The land registration law, however, failed to achieve its original target. 
Instead, it created a new land owning class out of rural notables and religious shaikhs 
who happened to be literate and therefore could register the land owned by a tribe as 
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'their own' property, at the expense of the vast majority of peasants and tribesmen. 
Also, the law stipulated Tapu could be transferred to other individuals by sale without 
any conditions, and hence in reality did not differ significantly from private property 
(Batatu: 53-5). Although the Arab provinces, including Iraq, \yere more severely 
affected by this change, creating a considerable feudalistic class (Karpat in Polk and 
Chambers: 94), Kurdish shaikhs and aghas were also involved in this process, and it 
was described, 'the actual tillers of the land only realised what had happened when it 
was much too late' (Bruin essen 1992: 183). 
The strengthening of an oligarchic landowning class posed a considerable challenge 
to national integration, as it would become extremely difficult for the state to carry 
out effective land reforms in later centuries. It also had a negative effect on the 
evolution of Kurdish nationalism, as it created inten1al division among the Kurds. The 
dichotomy between pro-government land-owing Kurds and non-land-owing Kurds 
made the Kurds as a whole more vulnerable to the government's divide-and-rule 
policy. 
Ottomanism 
During the same time as the above-mentioned centralisation attempts, the government 
tried to promote a sense of loyalty to the Ottoman state among its subjects through 
propagating the secular concept of citizenship, known as Ottomanism. The first 
attempt was made when the government tried to tame Balkan separatism by decreeing 
the Imperial Rescript of Gulhane, which declared the equality of all its Ottoman 
citi/cns (1839). Bernard Lewis found that the word Vatan or fatherland, only 
appcarcd in the Ottoman press for the first time around the year 1840 (Lcwis 1968: 
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335). Ottomanism included measures such as removal of the dress code on non-
Muslims, appointment of non-Muslims to governmental councils and opening of 
secular schools equally to both Muslims and non-Muslims (Davison in Haddad: 39). 
Because the introduction of Ottomanism coincided with the military campaign in 
Kurdistan (1840s), it can be assumed that the proclamation of equality of citizenship 
did not have any significant immediate impact on winning the loyalty of the Kurds. 
The Kurds resisted centralisation fiercely, and the concept of territorial patriotism had 
weak roots in the mass population. As a whole, Ottomanism even ended up 
'alienating the majority of Muslims' (Macfie 1998: 238). Military service, 
unsurprisingly, caused fear and anxiety among many people (Davison in Haddad: 28). 
Since loyalty could not be guaranteed, military service was said to have 'remained 
confined to Muslims, and mostly to Turks' (Karpat 1973: 101), and the areas exempt 
from conscription included the Kurdish areas (Karpat 1973: 101). Even later under the 
CUP had little desire to undertake conscription of minorities into the national army. 
They 'took steps to enable the non-Muslims and incidentally Muslims to buy their 
way out by paying a special tax to avoid military service' (Macfie 1998: 61). 
Abdul Hamid II's Era (1876-1909) 
Abdul Hamid II's era is most known for his pan-Islamic policy, and the Kurds were 
greatly affected by it. Abdul Hamid II's era is characterised by both modernisation 
and autocracy. It was during his era that the Ottoman Empire's communication and 
railroad networks had greatly expanded, and secular education, especially that of the 
training of military officers, continued to expand. Abdul Hamid II \\as conscious of 
the need to compete with Europe. \\'hile introducing \\'estern technologies, Abdul 
Hamid II suspended parliament and censored the press. Abdul Hamid II's era is also 
known to have had critical financial problems as well. In 1881, the Ottoman Empire 
became unable to repay their debts from abroad, which led to bankruptcy. This forced 
approximately one-quarter of the public revenue under direct foreign control, further 
stimulating nationalist sentiment (Harris: 47). 
Abdul Hamid II's pan-Islamic policy was a reaction to the failure of Ottomanism and 
the rise of ethnic nationalism among the Christian minorities while at the same time, 
accelerating this tendency. As early as the early 1820s, the Annenian community 
began to look to Czarist Russia as a better alternative to the Ottoman Empire when the 
Russians invaded the Caucasus (Harris: 46). Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Armenian nationalist organisations burgeoned. The Greeks and Albanians too became 
increasingly intolerant of the Islamic policies of the empire. On the other hand, the 
economic division between Muslim and non-Muslim populations became highly 
visible and became the target of Muslim-nationalist resentment. The non-Muslim 
communities benefited from the increasing European economic, cultural and political 
expansion, and this helped to create a prevailing anti-European mood by the 1870s 
(Kushner 1977: 4). This also strengthened not only pan-Islamism but placed an 
emphasis on Turkishness. The evidence of this trend is given by Kemal Karpat's 
study on the change of classification in the population census: in 1831 and 1841, the 
population was classified according to religious groupings, while after 1870 and 1871, 
it was classified by religious, linguistic, and ethnic affiliations (Karpat 1973: 92). At 
the same time 'vestiges of the l'vl illet system were wiped out and the principle of 
provincial - vilayet - representation was enforced by 1908'. Autonomy of non-Turkish 
groups became the subject of tighter control. 
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In reaction, traditional leaders of minority groups, such as the patriarchs and their 
supporters, including the wealthy merchant class, sought to preserve existing 
privileges against state penetration (Macfie 1998: 60). This was the case for the 
Kurds, too, among whom there was an anti-Ottoman rebellion in the late nineteenth 
century. 
Their rebellion was led by a Kurdish leader, Shaikh Ubeydullah, and it lasted from 
1872 to 1882. Ubeydullah's rebellion can be seen as the Kurds' resistance against 
centralisation by both the Persian and the Ottoman empires. Ubeydullah was a 
Naqshbandi Shaikh, and he originally rebelled against the Persian government's 
taxation attempts. Ubeydullah then sought assistance from the Ottoman Sultan, and 
even cooperated with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. However, he refused to be 
ruled by the Ottoman government as well. It is known that Ubeydullah contacted the 
British consul in 1879, claiming that the distinctiveness of the Kurds was based on the 
'great political and religious tradition of Islam' (Kinnane: 24). In 1882, Ubeydullah's 
forces were encircled by both the Ottoman and the Persian armies, and he was 
arrested. 
Abdul Hamid II was continuously threatened with waves of separatism in various 
Ottoman provinces that yet remained in the Empire (Davison in Haddad: 50). In order 
to counter this move, the Islamic regiment known as Hamidiye Cavalry was 
established in 1890. A number of Kurdish tribes in Erzem1 were recruited for this and 
in fact were recruited specifically from the Kurds and used for anti-Christian 
operations that resulted in a number of the Armenian massacres. The Armenians were 
especially repressed around Eastern Turkey between 1894 and 1896. A similar 
attempt - to use Islam as a unifying ideology - was made in Constantinople and 
Baghdad when Abdul Hamid II established tribal schools in those cities in 1892. 
Through this institution Abdul Hamid attempted to win the Arabs' and Kurds' loyalty 
to the empire (Kinnane: 24). The Hamidiye Cavalry turned out to be successful from 
Ottoman government's perspective. Because of the Kurds' geographical proximity to 
Russia, they were ready to fight the Armenians supported by Russia. It was said the 
Kurdish tribal chiefs in the Hamidiye regiment were well paid and decorated with 
honours, and Abdul Hamid II was seen as a 'benefactor' (Kendal: 25). 
Thus the Hamidiye mobilisation could not be entirely attributed to the mere success of 
Islamic propaganda. The Kurds who lived in the contested area had been experiencing 
a number of Russian invasions during the Russo-Turkish war. Because of this, they 
wanted to participate in such anti-Christian operations. There have been isolated cases 
in which the Kurds tried to protect their Armenian neighbours (as in the Noel report, 
F037114192). However, the broader picture was that a considerable number of the 
Kurdish tribes had participated in the anti-Armenian operation. The Ottoman 
government deported the Armenian population from eastern Anatolia where they had 
resided for centuries. Similarly, World War I had broken out in the above anti-
Christian context. The religious difference between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Allied states, particularly Russia, gave rise to the revival of Islamism after an era of 
secular reforms. Of little wonder, the Kurds were greatly affected by this Sultan's 
Islamic portrayal of the war. The Ottoman govenunent presented the First World War 
as 'ai-jihad', or the Islamic holy war, and as a consequence the war boosted the 
government's legitimacy (Kinnane: 25). 
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Summary 
The overall impact of Ottoman modernisation on the Kurds can be summarised as 
follows: First, the Kurdish land-owing class was created out of aghas and shaikhs, and 
the emergence of this class contributed to weaken the Kurds' political unity as a 
whole. As recounted in Chapter II, these aghas and shaikhs thwarted young Kurdish 
nationalists. Second, although it was incorporated into the Ottoman state, the Kurdish 
area was still less integrated into the state compared to the Turkish-speaking sector 
where some labour mobility was established by the mid-nineteenth century. This 
delay in economic modernisation of Kurdistan appears to have created a regional gap 
between the Turkish and Kurdish sectors of Turkey that is visible even to this day. 
Furthermore, the Young Turk regime did not make serious efforts to recruit the 
minorities and tribal popUlation into the Ottoman army, which meant the Kurds' 
integration to the Ottoman state was further delayed. Third, the only effective policy 
that mobilised the Kurds and evoked their loyalty to the Ottoman state was pan-
Islamic policy. This meant that the Kurds were strongly influenced by Islamic 
propaganda on the eve of the First World War, and this nullifying of Kurdish 
nationalism seems to have assisted the Ottoman state's cause considerably, at the 
expense of the Kurdish state. 
Iraq 
. Iraq' in the Nineteenth Century 
~ lesopotamia was govclned by Mamluks between 1704 and 1831. These Mamluks 
originated from Georgia and were slaves trained to be officials under the Islamic 
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system who in time took governing power. The Mamluk regime was an autocratic one 
and facilitated little participation by the local population (J\;larr 1985: 21). Although 
the Ottoman administration replaced the Mamluks in 1831, the region was still 
loosely bound to Constantinople and government control was only nominal. The three 
vilayets; Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, were under token control of the central 
authority. Major cities and adjacent regions of the 'future Iraqi state' (hereafter, Iraq) 
were governed by powerful local families and tribal chiefs within regionally confined 
spheres of influence. It has been said that the 'rural area was composed of a series of 
largely independent chiefdoms with overlapping spheres of control and influence' 
(Sluglett 1976: 1-2). The cities and tribal countryside coexisted without being 
integrated. The Sunni ulama families reigned in Baghdad, whereas once outside the 
city, the Shia Arab and Bedouin tribes dominated. In the north, Mosul was ruled by 
the powerful Jalili tribe (Kurdish) along with Ottoman Jannisaries. The cities formed 
state-like 'enclaves', through which Muslim traders and Jewish and Armenian 
merchants traveled to Anatolia, Persia, and the Gulf region (Hourani, in Polk and 
Chambers: 51). 
Ottoman Campaign 
The history of modem Iraq began with the impingement on it of the Ottoman 
campaign in the late nineteenth century. The expedition to Mesopotamia was part of a 
simultaneous campaign in Turkey by which Ayan, Derebeys and the Kurds were 
defeated. As happened in Turkey, all the important Kurdish strongholds, such as 
Mosul, Kirkuk, and Arbil, were defeated and captued by the mid-nineteenth century. 
S.H. Longrigg records that the campaign was carried out effectiYely as the Ottoman 
officials recruited able officers from the local Kurds who successfully brought those 
cities under Ottoman control (Longrigg 1925: 285). Mosul fell to such a Kurd officer 
appointed by the governor of Baghdad, Ali Ridha in 1835. After capturing Diyarbakir, 
this general, Rashid Muhammad Pasha, pushed to the south from Anatolia, supported 
by the Ottoman garrisons in Mosul and Baghdad. In 1837 Jabal Sinjar, and in 1838 
Amadiyyah, Aqrah and Dohuk, all Kurdish towns, fell to the Ottomans. 
Emergence of Quasi -feudal Class 
The military campaigns contributed to the sedentarisation of the Kurdish tribes. The 
defeated tribes were forced to settle, and in many cases the tribal chiefs turned into 
landlords through the same land-registration process as in Anatolia. The Land 
Registration Law of 1858 came into effect slightly later in Iraq, during the reign of 
Midhat Pasha (1869-1872). The Ottoman authority intended to prohibit excessive land 
holdings, but it was too weak to do so. 'The Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace, 
registered whole groups of villages in the name of the notables of Mosul, Erbil, 
Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya' (Warriner: 108). 
The following paragraph describes the above process' impact on Kurdish society: 
'Rather than becoming the owners of lands that they had traditionally cultivated (as 
the 1858 land code had intended), many Kurdish peasants became sharecroppers or 
hired labourers on land owned by others. The local shaikhs, often Kurdish, were 
among those who reaped the benefits from these changes. They increased their 
individual landownership 'from gifts, sale or usurpation' (Bruinessen 1992: 318). In 
short, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 disrupted the traditional pattern of the nomadic 
economy and 'helped to usher in a new system of village stratification where effective 
economic power was wielded by either powerful local shaikhs or by urban-based 
absentee landlords' (Kazemi, in Kazemi and Waterbury: 115). 
The urban areas, too, were affected. The campaIgn ended up creating a new 
Ottomanised elite known as the effendis. '(T)he effendis formed a great part of the 
social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the main bridge between 
Turk and Arab. The effendis, barely literate, but persistent Turkish speakers, were too 
frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service' (Longrigg 1953: 36) 
The meaning of effendis slightly changed over time as the educational system began 
to take root in the late nineteenth century: it came to denote, especially in Iraq, 'a 
Westernised land-owner, generally living in the city in which his sons (or perhaps he 
himself) held positions within the administration or were in some way close to the 
ruling circles' (Eppel in IJMES, May 1998: 228-9). 
Thus, all over the country, the north and south, urban and rural sectors of Iraq were 
affected by the same process, which ended up disproportionately empowering the 
local notables at the expense of the vast majority. Those tribal chiefs gained political 
power on a new basis; 'the Ottoman rule remained tenuous, and the real power fell to 
the aghas and begs of the constituent tribes and the chiefs of the mystic paths. Into the 
same hands passed also the bulk of the land in this area' (Batatu: 76). This 
centralisation drive was everywhere obstructed. Longrigg states 'there straggled now 
on both sides of the Mosul frontier a regime of fragmented tribal life and feudal 
authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively, sometimes nominally, by the 
agencies of the Turkish government' (Longrigg 1953: 14-15). As was the case in 
Anatolia, the Ottoman government often relied on local notables to govern the region, 
and its rule remained indirect. Combined with their economic power of the notables 
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derived from land, the above changes in the nineteenth century established in Iraq a 
quasi-feudal system. 
'The military confederations and principalities were destroyed. In their place 
arose a multitude of antagonistic tribes and tribal sections ... the groundwork for the 
economic growth of the shaikhs and aghas was laid ... in utter disregard of the 
prescriptive right of rank and file tribesmen or nontribal cultivators' (Batatu: 77-78). 
Having gone through Mamluk's exploitative rule and the Ottoman rule that followed, 
Iraq was considerably impoverished by the late nineteenth century. There was 
universal poverty and a constant threat to security (Longrigg 1953: 30). The only 
noticeable economic developments that took place in the nineteenth century were the 
introduction of steamships on the Tigris, the construction of a railway by the 
Germans, and increased demand for Iraqi crops which was facilitated by the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Theobald and lawad: 195-6). These developments, 
however, seem to have had no impact on the welfare of the population. There was no 
significant local industry, and almost nothing was mechanised (Longrigg 1953: 33-4). 
Summary 
As a result of the Ottoman centralisation, the shaikhly families, tribal chiefs, and 
urban elites emerged as the oligarchic class in Iraq during this era and this included 
many Kurdish notables. Although this new class cut across the Arab-Kurdish ethnic 
clea\'age, such a small oligarchy could have no positive impact on integrating the 
country; quite the contrary. It is vital for national integration to have a reasonable 
level of social equality if every member is to have a sense of being part of a 
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community. However, the sharp dichotomy created between the rich and the poor 
during the nineteenth century excluded the vast majority of the population from what 
is supposed to be a 'national community' and obstructed social refonns attempted by 
. . 
succeSSIve regImes. 
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2. State Formation 
Introduction 
This section treats the impact of state formation. It will compare the costs and benefits 
of national integration through Revolution from Above (in Turkey) with the absence 
of a strong state (in Iraq) due to mandatory rule by Britain. As seen in the theoretical 
framework, a certain degree of political intervention through authoritarianism 
becomes almost inevitable in the early phase of state formation through Revolution 
from Above. Turkey's Kemalist regime was representative of such a case, and 
Mustafa Kemal exercised almost unchallengeable political power during his 
presidency. The cost was that the Kurds as well as supporters of the old regime saw 
the state as an imposition by an alien regime and the new Kemalist government as a 
threat. As such, the government's suppression of the Kurdish revolts during this 
period needs to be analysed in the overall context of state formation. By contrast, in 
Iraq, the state was a mere amalgam of the three former Ottoman provinces, no centre 
of power equivalent to that of Kemalist Turkey existed and the population remained 
divided along sectarian lines. Furthermore, the monarchy relied heavily on oligarchic 
groups which seem to have further aggravated the division within the society. 
Although periodisation for the analysis is based on the same historic event (state 
fomlation), it must be noted that in terms of overall strength of state infrastructure, 
Turkey was in a far more advanced position than Iraq, as the basic state institutions of 
independent Turkey were derived directly from the remnants of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy. 
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Turkey 
'Turk' as an Ideal Citizenship 
The most symbolic aspect of Turkey's nation-building was the adoption of the new 
identity 'Turk', which was promoted by the government with the famous phrase 
'Happy are those who call themselves Turks'. 'Turk' was a deliberately adopted 
identity, for as Bernard Lewis showed, to call Turkish speaking people 'Turk' had 
historically been a strangely European phenomenon. It even had a slightly derogatory 
meaning, and its usage was confined to denoting illiterate peasants in Anatolia (Lewis 
1968: 1-2). The popularity of more ethnonational 'Turanism' had been confined to 
intellectuals who were conscious of their Turkish origin, and the Turanist ideologues 
did not become a socially significant force since the majority of the Ottoman citizens 
still identified themselves as Muslims. Ataturk's concept of Turk departed both from 
the empire's Islamic past and from the ethnonational concept of being Turkish in two 
ways. He confined 'Turk' to people living inside the territory of the Turkish Republic; 
and under the Turkish constitution every person bound to the Turkish state through 
the bond of citizenship was a Turk. Thus, Turk was a synonym to Turkish citizenship, 
and strictly speaking was not based on ethnicity, however, it was strongly associated 
with the Turkish-speaking people. Moreover, the Kemalist regime propagated the new 
identity by imposing a monolingual policy and banned the use of non-Turkish 
languages. The regime tried to strengthen the territorial integrity of a state through a 
policy that was intended to create linguistic homogeneity. In reality, approximately 22 
per cent of the entire population was Kurdish (as in Chapter II). They also happened 
to be conct?ntrated in southeast Anatolia. The government's monolingual policy 
heralded the beginning of an era of cultural suppression for the Kurds, and caused 
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great inefficiency in education, to be discussed below. 
Secularisation and Centre-building: A Strong State 
In coming to power, Mustafa Kemal succeeded In completely secularising the 
political system. This process was in fact a culmination of the reforms that had been 
continuing since the eighteenth century. Mustafa Kemal's reforms \vould not have 
been possible without his predecessors' attempts and gradual achievements. It must 
also be noted that secularisation had a political, rather than a religious, impact. The 
Kemalist regime was faced with a need to curb the political power of the Islamic elite 
who supported the old Sultanate regime. Mustafa Kemal himself was not opposed to 
Islam purely as a religion, as evident in his frequent emphasis on his belief in the 
Islamic faith (Macfie 1994: 137). All he wanted was to exclude the Islamic elite from 
the political arena. 
Kemalist Reforms 
As his popular title 'Ghazi' (warrior) showed, Mustafa Kemal's popularity rested on 
his successful military career and his leadership of the war of independence especially 
after he had defeated the occupying Greek army in 1922 . However, Kemal' s 
secularising reforms, which were initiated after the foundation of the republic, were 
met with great hostility by the majority of Muslim citizens. Zurcher explained that all 
these reforms were implemented in two phases: the first wave \Vas secularisation of 
the state institutions, and the second wave was secularisation over areas which 
directly affected society, such as family law (Zurcher: 180). Also, the regime's 
attempt to forge a strong administrative centre triggered a series of major Kurdish 
rebellions. 
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Following the deposition of the Sultanate in November 1922, the Caliphate was 
abolished in March 1924. This was followed by the law of Unification of Education in 
March 1924. By this law, all curriculae were to be taught in Turkish and at state-
designed schools. The usage of non-Turkish languages in schools and local offices 
was completely banned. This measure effectively prohibited the Kurdish language 
from being used for instruction. Kirsci and Winrow state that the closure of religious 
schools 'may have also indirectly led to the closure of such schools where the 
language of instruction was Kurdish' (Kirsci and Winrow 1997: -1-5). Although it was 
said the effectiveness of the education reform was still 'urban-biased' (Macfie 199-1-: 
146), this reform undoubtedly accelerated Turkification of the entire education 
system. The introduction of monolingual policy made a contrast to the Iraqi case: in 
Iraq, the Kurdish language was at least officially recognised as one of the languages 
of the state, owing to the prerequisite required for Iraq's entry to the League of 
Nations. For Turkey, the language policy was a purely domestic concern. 
In September 1925, religious shrines and dervish convents were closed. Mustafa 
Kemal equated civilisation with Western civilisation. He was also known to have 
harboured strong hostility to tribal shaikhs and Sufi instructors for promoting 
superstitious beliefs (Macfie 1994: 137-8). In the same year, the use of the Fez, the 
hat symbolic of the Ottoman past, was banned. Sufi orders were officially banned in 
1926 as being unscientific. Following this move, the Gregorian calendar and the 
Swiss penal code were introduced. It must be noted, however, that in practice it was 
extremely difficult to completely eliminate the strong Sufi network in which the 
Kurds were heavily represented. After 1926, the Sufi network went underground and 
began operating through private schools, foundations, and Koranic courses. 
Among the new reforms, the introduction of the Latin alphabet (Romanicisation) in 
1928 had a profound effect on the Kurds in Turkey. This meant that the common 
script used by the Kurds in Syria, Iran, and Iraq, which was the Arabic alphabet, was 
removed from their everyday lives (Arfa: 38). For the new government, on the other 
hand, Romanicisation constituted the pillar of the language reform. The Kemalist 
regime also attempted to 'Turkify' Turkish by eliminating the vocabularies derived 
from Arabic and Persian. In principle, the Romanicisation in itself alone could have 
had a potential benefit for the Kurds, as it was more suited for transcribing Kurdish. 
This was not a feasible scenario, however, as the use of the Kurdish language had 
been banned. By abolishing Arabic letters, Turkey succeeded firstly in obliterating its 
Islamic-Ottoman past from public life, and secondly in cutting the potential trans-state 
bond between Turkish Kurds and Kurds elsewhere based on shared printed 
publications. 
How Mustafa Kemal managed to carry out all those radical reforms can be explained 
by Frey's reference to the relatively low percentage of the educated elite in the entire 
population: 'the bifurcation in Turkish society between the educated elite and 
uneducated masses actually provided Mustafa Kemal with a rather convenient 
"hal fway house" in the reshaping of the country. He could, to a large extent afford to 
forgc:t about the submerged masses and concentrate on solidifying his hold over the 
dominant intellectual groups' (Frey: "+1). This was, however, only the first phase of 
Kemalist refonl1s. To quote Frey again, the second phase of the reforms lay in the far 
more complex task of actually \\"idening political participation: 'modernising the ill-
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educated masses of the society and of involving them in the political process ... was 
an incredibly complex and delicate, even dangerous, assignment. But the fact that the 
process had been able to be divided into two stages, rather than compounded by being 
telescoped into one, may partially account for the relative Turkish success compared 
with most other "emergent" nations' (Frey: 42-3). Although Frey did not directly 
mention Revolution from Above, he attributed the Kemalists' success essentially to 
their accomplishment in centre-building. 
Regional Gap 
The Kemalist revolution may have indeed paved the way for broader political 
participation through modernisation and authoritarian nation-building policies. There 
was, however, limits to it as well. It was primarily an urban-biased revolution. The 
population in the countryside of Anatolia was still deeply religious, and these 
conservative people constituted the bulk of the peasants controlled by village aghas. 
Feroz Ahmad stated that despite the nation-wide campaign for increased literacy, the 
education project in village areas largely failed. This was a clear contrast to the 
dramatic increase in literacy in the urbanised part of the country, which rose from 8 
per cent in 1928 to 30 per cent in 1935 (Ahmad 1993: 83). Ahmad also pointed out 
that a political factor contributed to create this regional gap. In his words, 'the idea of 
awakening the peasants by teaching them to read and write, teaching them about 
health care and efficient agriculture, in short giving them a new sense of self-reliance 
and confidence, was dangerous in the opinion of the conservatives ... (after World 
War II) providing to the peasants (an education) made them an easy target for 
"undesirable ideologies" (code words for socialism or communism) and incited class 
conflict' (Ahmad 1993: 83). The loss of the revolution's radical impetus was evident 
in the party programme of the Republican People's Party that dropped its strong anti-
capitalist tone by 1935. It simply emphasised equality before the law and advocated 
rejection of class conflict (Ozbundun: 88). 
Taking these political factors into consideration, it was reasonable to estimate that the 
Kurdish peasants in southeast Anatolia were put in the least desirable environment to 
benefit from the new reforms, especially in the area of education. Firstly, education 
was monolingual, and their first language, Kurdish, was never to be used even for the 
purpose of learning Turkish. As Hassanpour stated 'little would benefit from the 
education taught in the language they did not understand' (Hassanpour 1996). This 
'non-education' of the Kurds continued to be a serious problem throughout the 
following decades, to be discussed below. Secondly, because of the deeply religious 
and conservative culture surrounding the rural peasants, acquisition of knowledge 
through secular institutions was not encouraged. 
On the other hand, many of the educated and secular-minded Kurds trained in the 
Ottoman army were alienated by the Kemalists' nation-building policy. 
Representative of them was Ihsan Nuri, a former Ottoman officer who served 
throughout the First W orId War. The following section will include accounts of the 
major Kurdish revolts between the years 1924 and 1937, in which the tribal leaders 
and educated nationalists like Nuri jointly opposed the Kemalists' nation-building 
policies. 
Major Resistance to the State 
The most conventional explanation for the Kurdish rebellions throughout the 1920s 
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and 30s was that they resulted from the abolition of the Caliphate, as it removed the 
important religious symbol which bound the two (the Kurdish and Turkish) 
communities together (Zurcher: 178). The Caliphate may have indeed constituted an 
important bond, but deeper examination of the Kurdish revolts during this period 
reveals that they were not entirely religious. Even though Islamic organisations and 
religious rhetoric were used in the Kurds' opposition to the government's policy, the 
seemingly religious rebellions were in fact organised in conjunction with the secular -
nationalist group. It is also important to note that because nationwide discontent 
towards the regime's policies during the same time period was led by the Islamists, 
the Kurds were identified with this reaction against secularisation. Yet while the 
Kemalist regime identified the Kurds as reactionary and backward, in fact, the Kurds' 
demands were in defense of Kurdish national rights. These two simultaneous 
oppositions (the Kurds and Islamists) were not readily comparable, one based on 
national and another on religious claims. However, because the Turkish government 
saw them collectively as a threat, there was also a need to analyse the government's 
authoritarian measures from the perspective of the regime's need for consolidating the 
state's central administration. Thus it appears historically inaccurate to state that in 
1924, 'Kurdish' schools and publications were forbidden. This would give the 
impression that 'only' the Kurds were suppressed by the government. However, this 
was not the case. The Kurds happened to constitute part of the opposition that 
threatened the new government. Therefore, examples of Islamic opposition need to be 
recounted first before examining the Kurdish rebellions. 
The Islamic elite had always been powerful in Turkey. The :v1edrese-trained 
intellectuals, mentioned earlier. constituted an important part of the overall educated 
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elite. In fact, the conflict between the secular and Islamic elite had been a marked 
feature of political competition since the nineteenth century, as secular education 
threatened their very intellectual base. 'Muslim youth who after 1860 attended the 
state schools where science was being taught, conceived the idea that Islamic teaching 
was an obstacle to progress and truth .... So the Medrese graduates clearly perceived 
the growing system of nonreligious, Westernised education as a threat to their Islamic 
conception of the proper path for the Ottoman Empire' (Halide Elib in Frey: 34). 
The depth of Islamic dissent could be seen in incidents such as the following, which 
took place in a town in western Turkey. In December 1930, a Dervish monk of the 
Naqshbandi order in a town near Izmir, called for the restoration of Islamic law and 
the Caliphate. An anny officer, identified as an agent of the state, was captured and 
was executed by the monk (Ahmad 1993: 60-1). Ahmad indicated incidents like this 
were not isolated. He stated that 'the refonns undertaken in the second half of the 
1920s had not taken root and that the state's secular approach to religion and to 
ideology in general had proved a failure. The mass of the people, even in the more 
advanced parts of the country, did not identify with the new state' (Ahmad 1993: 60-
1 ) 
There was opposition even from within the Kemal's Republican Peoples Party. In 
November 1924, the Progressive Republican Party was established from among the 
members of the Grand National Assembly opposed to Mustafa Kemal. They stood for 
limiting state intervention in the economy and increasing freedom of religion, thus 
expressing reservations concerning the statism and the secularism advocated by the 
RPP (Tachau 1994: 587). 
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At this time, the new government had been threatened by a Communist-inclined 
group called the Green Anny as well. In short, the Kemalists faced three opponents 
simultaneously: the Islamists, the communists, and the Kurds. The outbreak of the 
major Kurdish revolt led by Shaikh Said (1925) thus gave justification to the 
government to impose emergency rule and hunt down all the opposition altogether 
and with the harshest and most indiscriminate methods. 
Kurdish Rebellions 1924-1937 
The Kurds reacted to the new Turkish Republic by staging almost continuous revolts 
throughout the 1920s and 30s. The major ones were the Shaikh Said rebellion (1925), 
the revolt in the Mount Ararat by the Jelali tribe (1930) and the revolt in Dersim by 
Saiyd Reza (1937). However, the main characteristic of these Kurdish revolts was that 
despite their relative success in widely mobilising participants, the rebellion could not 
be sustained owing to the Kurds' internal divisions, notably, tribal and religious 
rivalries. 
The first rebellion was launched by the former Ottoman officer, Ihsan Nuri who 
mobilised the Kurdish garrison in August 1924 at Beytussebap in eastern Turkey in an 
abortive uprising. Shortly after this move, a Kurdish nationalist group called Azadi 
(Freedom) was organised and sought the cooperation of the powerful Kurdish leader, 
Shaikh Said. Kurdish officers who were disillusioned by the Kemalist policies 
participated in Azadi. These officers also felt betrayed by the Treaty of Lausanne's 
silence on Kurdish autonomy, which had been agreed between the Allies and the 
Kemalists earlier. The key agendas of the Azadi members were: the Turkish state's 
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language policy, denial of the existence of Kurdistan (removal of the geographical 
names), manipulation of intra-Kurdish tribal conflict, and discrimination against the 
Kurdish officers in the Army (Bruinessen 1992: 280-1). 
The Kurdish officers were well aware of the need to cooperate with the shaikh in 
order to mobilise large numbers of participants. The secular concept of Kurdish 
nationalism did not have much influence over the majority of Kurdish people of that 
time. Azadi held its first congress in 1924 in which Shaikh Said was invited. Shaikh 
Said was a son of the chief of the Naqshbandi order and was known to be particularly 
influential among the Zaza-speaking Kurdish tribes in eastern Turkey, in the region 
between Lake Van and the western Euphrates. Shaikh Said's Tekke (dervish 
monastery) was frequented by Kurds and even Turks from all over the country, and 
the shaikh was much respected as a religious chief (Arfa: 34). Therefore, the shaikh's 
cooperation with Azadi was deemed essential; the dervish order was the only 
organisation that transcended tribal differences (Zurcher: 178). 
In February 1925, the revolt broke out prematurely, owing to a clash between the 
Turkish army and the tribes under Shaikh Said's influence. Shaikh Said proclaimed a 
Jihad (Islamic holy war) against the 'Godless Turkish administration'. He called on 
the government to reinstate the Sultan-Caliph and also called also on Turkish Muslims 
to join his revolt. The revolt spread rapidly, and the rebels' original number of seven 
thousand increased to more than ten thousand with the addition of several local tribes 
(Arfa: 36). 
Sectarian Division 
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Although almost all of eastern and central Anatolia had been affected by the Shaikh 
Said revolt, the rebellion did not last long. Since Shaikh Said's key role in the revolt 
was to mobilise different Kurdish tribes through the dervish network, it also meant the 
revolt was to suffer from religious sectarianism. The Alevi Kurds, for example, kept 
aloof towards the Naqshbandi rebels. It was said 'the Alevis either remained neutral 
or actively assisted the government forces ... Moreover, some Kurdish Sunni tribes, 
such as Reman, Penchinaran, and Reshkotan, that had promised to join the rebellion 
remained aloof, gave only token support, or joined the Turks when the uprising 
began' (Olson 1989:96 quoted in Kazemi: 109). Thus the Kurdish tribes belonging to 
orthodox Sunni Islam aligned with the Turks instead of the tribes mobilised by a 
Naqshbandi network. Also, most of the participants were motivated by either religious 
or tribal reasons, rather than by Kurdish national rights. Because of their sectarian 
motivation, some of the rebel-occupied areas were simply taken over by banditry and 
reduced to a state of sheer violence (Zurcher: 178). 
The incident hardened the government's suppressive policy towards the oppositions. 
The government used this crisis to implement the Law on the Maintenance of Order in 
March 1925. This law had allowed the government to proceed more vigorously than 
ever in enforcing its policies (Arfa: 38). The Kemalist government attributed the 
revolt to an alleged backwardness of the Kurds. The Turkish Foreign Minister of the 
time was known to have stated: 'in the Kurdish case, their cultural level is so low, 
their mentality so backward, that they cannot be in the general Turkish politics. They 
arc economically unfit for the competition \vith the more advanced and cultured 
Turks' (F0371112255, as in rv1cDowall1996: 200). 
The government suppressed the rebellion with aerial bombardment, and by adopting a 
military solution, ignored the cause of the problem: the question of Kurdish national 
rights. Shaikh Said was captured on 27 April 1925, and many leaders involved in the 
rebellion were executed. It is pointed out that Kurdish nationalism was the crucial 
point that alarmed the state authorities. As Bruinessen stated, the Shaikh Said 
rebellion was distinct from the late nineteenth century's major revolt by the Kurd 
leader, Shaikh Ubeydullah (1880), who rebelled against encroachment of the central 
authority. Bruinessen pointed to the fact that the revolt was prepared by a secular 
organisation, Azadi, which qualified it to be considered a national rebellion 
(Bruinessen 1992: 280-282). 
Another major Kurdish revolt broke out in 1928. It took place on the slopes of Mount 
Ararat (Agri Dagh) and was staged by Jelali tribes. This too had been planned by both 
Islamic and secular organisations. The organisers of the Mount Ararat revolt included 
former officers of the Turkish Army who hoped to bring the case of Turkish 
suppression of the Kurds to the League of Nations. They distributed the following 
manifesto in Turkish Kurdistan, Iraq, Syria, Beirut, Paris, and to the League of 
Nations: 
. Brother Kurds, you must be worthy to become a great nation, How can you 
allow the noble Kurdish nation to liv'e as slaves under the bondage of the Turks, while 
all other nations have won their independence? A large free territory between Iran and 
Iraq had been promised to us. Unite in the struggle we have started to liberate our 
brothers from the Turkish yoke, in order to liberate these lands which have belonged 
to us for many centuries' (Turkischer Post. 29 July 1930, as in Arfa: '+1). 
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Hasan Arfa noted that the Mount Ararat revolt facilitated trans-border cooperation 
between the Kurds for the first time, even among those not related to one another by 
local or personal interests (Arfa: 42). This meant the revolt clearly had an element of 
secular nationalism not motivated by tribal or religious adherence. It took two years 
for the government to completely suppress the revolt, and in fact, it only did so with 
assistance from the Iranian government. It was requested that Iran cede the territory 
on the eastern slopes of Mount Ararat so that the area occupied by the Kurds could be 
encircled (McDowall 1996: 15). On 23 January 1932, the two states signed an 
agreement by which Turkey gained certain Iranian territories around Mount Ararat, 
and Iran received other territories around Lake Van (Kendal: 56). This Turkish-
Iranian treaty became a precursor to the similarly anti-Kurdish Saadbad Pact to be 
signed in July 1937 by Iraq, Iran and Turkey. 
In 1937, another major Kurdish revolt broke out in the Dersim area in central 
Anatolia, led by Saiyd Reza. Saiyd Reza, an Alevi shaikh, was a powerful leader who 
enjoyed wide authority among the Kurdish tribes in eastern Turkey. The revolt also 
drew considerable sympathy from the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. On 11 August, the 
Iraqi newspaper 'Rabitah-el-Arabiyah' published a declaration by two Kurdish 
political leaders asking the Iraqi Government and the representatives of foreign 
powers in Baghdad to intervene against the Turkish policy of extermination of the 
Kurds and alleged inhuman treatment of the Kurds by the Turkish government (Arfa: 
. .u-4). In the end, in 1937, Saiyd Reza was lured with promises of a negotiated 
settlement and \\as captured and killed with his followers. 
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After the 1930s, Kurdish rebellions in Turkey had ceased because of a thorough 
suppression of them by the government and the strengthening of border security that 
cut off mutual support among the Kurds in neighbouring states. From this era, the 
Kurds' cross-border movements became increasingly difficult. Afterwards, for 
decades the Turkish Kurds would have to pursue political activity without reference to 
their specific ethnicity. 
Propagation of Kemalism 
After the years of the Kurdish rebellions, the policies of Kemalism or Ataturkism, 
were vehemently promulgated from the 1930s onward. This was intended to eliminate 
alleged religious fanaticism and backwardness. This era also saw an increase of 
xenophobic measures such as the Law on Settlement, that limited new immigrants 
into Turkey only to those whose ethnic origin was Turkish (Akgunduz: 112). Turkish 
villages were renamed too. For example, Dersim that meant 'silver gate' in Kurdish 
was changed to Tunceli, which roughly means in Turkish 'I will destroy you with an 
iron hand' (SRWA: Aug. 1991). 
The well-known SIX principles of Kemalism were: republicanism, rationalism, 
populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionary refonnism. In 1937, these were 
incorporated into the Turkish constitution's Article 2. The principles of populism and 
nationalism were politically instrumental in two ways. These principles laid the basis 
for greater political participation, but also served to neutralise any move that could be 
interpreted as 'divisive' to the unity of the Turkish state. Without directly attacking 
Kurdish nationalism, Kemalism denied the rights of any nation other than that of the 
Turks. Arfa stated that in response to these measures, it was from this era that the 
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Kurdish movement became 'entirely nationalistic as well and completely lost its 
religious characteristics' (Arfa: 38). 
Other Opposition to the Republican People's Party 
Despite the Kemalist triumph, oppositions to the Kemalist regime persisted. Among 
others, the following party appears to have represented the voice of the moderate 
majority. There was a short-lived opposition to the Republican People's Party (RPP) 
in the 1930s, which was called the Liberal Republican Party (LRP). This party never 
cast doubt on the legitimacy of the RPP government but opposed its authoritarianism. 
The LRP was founded on 12 August 1930 and was differentiated from the RPP in the 
following points: (1) a negative attitude to statism and an emphasis on private 
enterprise, and (2) more explicit insistence on political individualism, individual 
rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of ideas, and freedom of assembly, popular 
control over administration, women's rights and direct elections (Frey: 340). 
However, the relationship between the RPP and the LRP deteriorated rapidly, and the 
LRP was dissolved in December 1930, only four months after its foundation. The 
RPP accused the LRP of utilising religious and social reactionaries (Frey: 3.+ 1). The 
LRP was basically a precursor of the Democrat Party that would be established in the 
1940s. Although it was short-lived, the LRP's claims were highly indicative of the 
Democrat Party's platfom1 which would enjoy high popularity after Turkey's 
transition to the multiparty system. 
Summary 
The centre-building of the Turkish state seems to have been largely successful. The 
state established its legitimacy without being fatally threatened by the opposition 
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forces. However, the Kemalists' policy alienated the Kurds completely, and that 
included both the secular as well as traditional leaders of the Kurds. Prominent 
figures, such as Ihsan Nuri, could have been the Kemalists' allies for the regime was 
threatened by an Islamic elite, and the support of Kurdish intellectuals trained in 
secular institutions would have assisted the regime's goal of Turkish nation-building 
on the European nation-state model. Turkey's early integration policies could have 
been made more acceptable for the Kurds simply by allowing, at least, the use of the 
Kurdish alongside Turkish in the schools. A prominent Kurdish writer in Turkey, 
Yasar Kemal, commented on this aspect: 'During the War of Independence we fought 
shoulder to shoulder. We established this state together. Should a man cut out the 
tongue of his brother?' (as in Meiselas: 366). The Kemalists' failure in integrating the 
Kurds through bilingualism left the mass of illiterate Kurds even more strongly under 
the influence of their feudal leaders. 
The Kurdish experience in the early Turkish Republic showed that the imposition of 
new national identity by sheer force would not promote integration of an ethnic 
minority. Integration of a minority group needs to be substantiated by various social 
and economic measures. When the government banned the Kurdish language, the 
only alternative was to learn all subjects in Turkish, a language the majority of the 
Kurds did not use or understand. In doing this it fatally circumscribed their prospects 
for the socio-economic mobility and political access on which their integration 
depended. 
Iraq 
Compared to Turkey, which inherited the Ottoman government apparatus, Iraq was a 
fragmented state from the beginning. It was a mere amalgam of the three former 
Ottoman vilayets, bound together by the decision of the British government. Unlike 
Turkey, it was heavily affected by the policy of the Mandatory power, Britain, at the 
phase of state formation. After 1926, Iraq's key role in British thinking was firstly as 
a bulwark against Communism, and secondly, against radical Arab nationalism. The 
demarcation of the Iraqi-Turkish border in 1926 revived the British-Turkish alliance 
against the Soviet Union as in the pre-WWI period when the Ottoman Empire and 
Britain allied against Russia. Internally, Britain was firmly committed to propping up 
the pro-British Hashimite monarchy. As a result, veterans of the Arab Revolt who 
followed Faysal from Syria came to dominate the political elite of Iraq. They were 
joined by the lando wing tribal chiefs, that included many wealthy Kurds and Shia 
Arabs as well. 
A State of Minorities 
The state consisted of three sizable groups; the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the 
Kurds. Iraq's ruling group, the Sunni Arabs, were a minority of the population. The 
Arab popUlation constituted approximately 75 to 80 per cent of the total population, of 
whom 70 per cent were estimated to be Shia Muslims. The census gave no details of 
the membership of the two main branches of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia, but the 
Shia Arab in Iraq fonned the clear majority and were estimated to be more numerous 
than those in any other Arab country (Lawless 1972). The smaller groups ethnic and 
religious minorities included many groups of Christians (the Greek Orthodox 
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community, Assyrians, Annenians and Syrian Jacobites), the Jews, Sabians, 
Turcomans, and Yezidi Kurds who, though of Kurdish stock, had traditionally 
differentiated themselves from the Sunni Kurds. The Turcomans were found 
concentrated in the towns between Baghdad and Mosul and were in general wealthy 
Sunni Muslims which contributed to the Turcomans' over-representation in the 
government compared to their numbers (Marr 1985: 9). 
The integration of Iraq faced serious obstacles from the very beginning. First of all, 
the state encompassed the above mentioned three sizable groups arbitrarily thrown 
together in a single state and who also had weak mutual contacts prior to state 
formation. Secondly, King Faysal, who was a foreigner brought in by the British, 
lacked local support. Third, from the beginning politics was centred on the 
independence struggle and political debates were concentrated on the terms of the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which appeared to have diverted attention from the national 
integration of the ethnically and religiously plural state. And fourth, all the key state 
institutions were created from scratch, including the Constituent Assembly and the 
army. As a result, the state was very weak, and no significant nation-building 
measures equivalent to that of the Kemalist Turkey were undertaken. 
Elite-biased Integration 
The incorporation of the societal elite into the Iraqi state was accomplished through 
the monarchy's cooptation of the oligarchic class made up of Kurdish and Arab tribal 
shaikhs and aghas. These Kurds in the oligarchy, also called' \\ inisteral Kurds', \\ere 
not representatin? of the Kurdish people as a whole: they were Kurds by descent alone 
and not by identity (Dann 1978). 
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The Landed -class 
It needs to be explained why Arab and Kurdish shaikhs constituted a significant part 
of Iraq's landowing class. As mentioned, this was partly a consequence of the 
Ottoman land registration. In addition, British tribal policy, adopted from India, was 
particularly favourable to local oligarchic groups. Described as a 'combination of 
convenience and economy' (Hemphill in Kelidar: 75 - 77), it meant indirect rule 
through local notables and tribal chiefs, a policy which suited the political and 
economic needs of Britain after the First World War when she was in a severe 
financial crisis. The tribal shaikhs' military power had been waning over time, but 
their political and economic power remained intact. Hanna Batatu recounted that, 
among other things, the economic power of tribal shaikhs increased their political 
power, and this was derived from implementation of the land settlement policy 
implemented in the 1930s (Batatu: 108). 
The Land Settlement Law of 1932 was introduced by Britain owing to the complex 
claims to land sparked by the growth of interest in commercial agriculture. Under this 
law, a new form of tenure (Lazmah) was granted to all individuals who used their land 
for over fifteen years, and it was stipulated that the sale of the land outside the tribe 
required government approval. When this law was implemented, however, it was 
manipulated by urban investors and tribal shaikhs who succeeded in securing legal 
titles, and as a result, ordinary tribesmen were reduced to the status of sharecropping 
tenants (Man 1985: 62-3). Many tribesmen were already in a deplorable condition 
owing to the impact of the Ottoman Land Registration Law of 1858, and the new 
193:2 land registration law ended up aggravating their condition further. 
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The concentration of land ownership remained considerably high throughout the 
monarchical era. Prior to the 1958 revolution, it was recorded that 2 per cent of 
landowners possessed 68 per cent of all arable land, whilst 70 per cent of the 
population owned 3.3 per cent of the land (Theobald and Jawad in Niblock: 197). The 
condition of the tribesmen, now reduced to unskilled cultivators, deteriorated further 
as a result of the introduction of the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of 
Cultivators in 1934, which stipulated that the cultivators who were indebted to a farm 
owner could not leave his employment until the debts were paid off (Sluglett 1976: 
251, Theobald and Jawad, Ibid.). The landowners were also very lightly taxed but 
continued to exploit the cultivators at the same old rates (Batatu: 105). 
Among the 49 leading land owning families (excluding the two in the south), who 
owned between them more than 300,000 dunums, at one dunuml 0.618 acre), 11 were 
identified as Kurdish, of which two were described as 'Arabised' (Batatu: 58). Thus, 
in pre-revolutionary Iraq, approximately one out of five large-scale landowners was 
Kurdish. 
The increased economIC and political power of the shaikhship, deriving from 
profitable commercial agriculture and exploitation of their tribesmen, facilitated a 
demographic revolution in the late 1930s when the mass of destitute peasants began 
migrating to the cities. The migration was particularly phenomenal from the poverty-
stricken southeast region (Amarah) inhabited by the Shia Arabs. This demographic 
move was known to have affected many aspects of life in Baghdad. Particularly, this 
made the capital a 'ready pool' from which radical movements like the Communist 
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Party recruited its membership in later decades (Batatu: 133 and 473). 
The Constituent Assembly and Tribal Politics 
Iraq's first cabinet was created by the monarchy whose first task was to negotiate the 
terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The cabinet was weak, and the general policy 
pursued by the government was a 'cooperation with Britain and pursuit of 
independence for Iraq at whatever pace Britain seemed to be dictating' (Sluglett 1976: 
141). Opponents of the government's pro-British policy fonned political organisations 
in 1921, and they became Iraq's first political parties. The representative ones were 
the Nationalist Party and the People's Party. However, often, the government 
arbitrarily banned opposition parties from participating in parliamentary elections (al-
Adhami 1979), and thus, political parties and the Constituent Assembly did not fully 
accommodate the political needs of the people. Furthermore, many people did not 
participate in the electoral process as they feared the voting registers would be used 
for conscription (al-Adhami 1979). 
On the other hand, tribal representatives became influential in parliamentary politics, 
as they were bribed by pro-British politicians and were able to fonn a block against 
the nationalists (Longrigg 1953: 191). For example, 'at the Constituent Assembly that 
met on 26 March 1924 to ratify three instruments: the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922, the 
constitution, and the election law, only about 15 were known to be opposed to the 
treaty of the 100 delegates in Baghdad; the majority of the delegates were tribal 
shaikhs and Kurdish leaders on whom the British felt they could depend for support' 
(Marr 1985: 45). On many occasions during the 1920s, the landowing shaikhs and 
urban notables withheld support for the nationalists and remained loyal to the pro-
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British Iraqi government (Longrigg 1953: 123). 
The government also forbade organised political activity in the countryside, by only 
allowing the government-authorised party, which was called the Constitutional Union 
Party (Batatu: 104-108). Political socialisation was thus delayed, and the state 
authorities continued to rely on the rural elite to govern the people. This was typified 
by the following example: 'the paramount Shammarite (the powerful Arab tribe) 
cultivated influential contacts in high places and through them acquired land. This 
was given to him (the leader) in order that he might settle his tribe and persuade them 
to give up their old habits of marauding' (Batatu: 114). 
Fragmented State of the Army 
As recounted earlier, armed forces in a developing state have a special role in state-
building in the area of education and political socialisation. However, since its 
foundation the Iraqi army was an internally fragmented institution: during the 
mandate, the British authorities wished to keep it weak, while after independence, the 
tension between growing Arab nationalists and the more moderate Iraqist wing 
generated a number of coups d'etat, to be discussed below. 
Originally, the creation of the Iraqi Army was decided at the Cairo Conference of 
1020. By the Military Agreement of 1924, it was stipulated that Iraq would be obliged 
to take full responsibility of her own defence within the next four years, and 
recmitment to the nucleus of the Iraqi Army began. However, the British, as a 
mandatory power, showed reluctance to allow the expansion of the Army. The British 
officials \\'l~re opposed to either increasing the numbers of the Army or widening its 
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functions as they thought it would enhance the power of the nationalists (Sluglett 
1976: 260). On the other hand, the key police force, the Levies came to be almost 
entirely staffed by Assyrians by the late 1920s. Soon, the Assyrians came to be seen 
as agents of the occupying power, and the Levies' status among the local population 
remained extremely low (Wilson 1931: 69-70). Thus, to characterise the early phase 
of the Iraqi armed forces as a whole, the pro-British Assyrians were concentrated in 
the Levies, whereas the Arabs and the Kurds came to be more represented in the 
nucleus of the national Army. 
Meanwhile, King Faysal and the nationalists pressed for a National Service Law as a 
prerequisite for full independence. The law was enacted in 1934, but the plan to 
expand the Iraqi Army through conscription was faced with considerable opposition 
in tribal areas, as it meant forcing the tribes to surrender their men. Some British 
officials feared it would also result in strengthening the power of shaikhs, as they 
would payoff old scores by picking tribal sections led by their rivals and sending 
them off to the army (Sluglett 1976: 144). In practice, conscription was implemented 
in a far from 'universal' way. A British official recorded, 'wide tribal areas were in 
practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance was 
not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to 
escape service was habitual' (Longrigg 1953: 246). 
The Iraqi ArnlY, initially staffed by fonller Ottoman officers, came to be dominated 
by Arab recmits from northern provinces. The Pan-Arab ideology, to be discussed 
belm\', was supported by these Arab officers \\'ho suffered from the partition of the 
Arab area of the Ottoman Empire. Before the First \\'orld \\'ar, they had been 
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economically linked with Syria and Palestine. However, the new frontiers which 
divided the Arab East cut them off from these regions, inflaming Arab nationalism 
among them (Batatu: 29). The early Sunni dominance in the army naturally prevented 
Shia Arabs from rising up to higher ranks and the Iraqi Army continued to be 
dominated by Sunni Arabs. Though it was stated that 'some' Kurdish officers were 
brought in as well, the Kurds and the Shia Arabs generally remained in lower ranks 
(Marr 1985: 37). 
Thus, the armed forces, supposed to be one of pillars of state formation, were 
prevented from acting as a integrating institution: first, there was a sectarian tension 
inherited from the mandate era; the Assyrians were concentrated in the Levies and 
were associated with British control. Second, the officer corps was dominated by the 
Sunni Arabs, the military elite from the Ottoman era. This resulted in a relatively low 
representation of the Kurds and the Shia Arabs in the higher ranks. And third, 
conscription was incomplete, and tribal leaders, who controlled the vast majority of 
rural population, remained practically untouched by it. 
Failure of Integration: Major Communal Resistance to the State 
While the monarchy had succeeded in incorporating the landed class drawn from both 
Kurds and Arabs, opponents to the Iraqi government never ceased their resistance. 
Compared to Turkey, the opposition to the government was more ethnically and 
religiously diverse, indicating the plural nature of the populace. 
(1) The Assvrians 
In terrns of incorporation to the new state, the most problematic and tragic case was 
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that of the Assyrian community. The indigenous Assyrians in Iraq used to be confined 
only to the extreme north. However, large Assyrian communities from eastern 
Anatolia (Hakkari province) were repatriated by the British during the First \Vorld 
War, a direct consequence of their siding with Britain against Turkey during the war. 
The settlement of the northern border with Turkey (1926) sealed any possibility of 
these Turkish Assyrians' repatriation to eastern Anatolia. However, their settlement in 
Iraq, scattered them around the Kurdish-inhabited areas of Zakho and Dahuk. The 
settlement of Assyrians was 'deeply resented by the Muslims, and especially the 
Kurds in whose area they were settled' (Marr 1985: 11). Furthermore, Assyrian 
Levies, mentioned above, were frequently used to suppress the Kurdish rebellions. 
This greatly contributed to worsening the relations between the two peoples. A British 
official later commented 'their (the Assyrians') retention as British-administered 
imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the Iraq 
Army, and their repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retrospect, 
to be regretted' (Longrigg 1953: 197). 
As Iraq's formal independence approached in 1930, the Assyrian patriarch was 
alarmed by the removal of freedom in internal affairs which used to be acknowledged 
by the British mandate authority. In 1929, the nationalistic patriarch, Mar Shamun 
demanded the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by his community be guaranteed 
under the ne\v Iraqi government. This claim was based on the fact that the Assyrians 
had officially acted as Allies during the First World War, and also the Levy's 
outstanding service throughout the British mandate (Longrigg 1953: 198-199). These 
claims were not unreasonable, but the level of their autonomy \\'as deemed unsuitable 
to Iraq as it almost equalled that of an independent state. In the latter part of 1932, the 
patriarch even journeyed to Geneva to plead his case to the League of Nations but 
without success (Marr 1985: 57). At the height of their fennent the Assyrian 
nationalists made a cross-border protest and entered into Syria in 1933. This 
contributed to stirring up local sentiment considerably, and the protesters were 
brutally suppressed by the Iraqi Army and also by many Kurdish irregulars (Marr 
1985: 58). The Assyrian community continued to harbour anti-government sentiment 
thereafter. On occasion they cooperated with the Kurdish nationalists (as in the 
1960s), but the Kurdish-Assyrian relations too remain sensitive even to this day. 
(2) The Yazidi Kurds 
The Yazidi community launched a major resistance to the state in the early 1930s. 
The Yazidis were Kurds by ethnicity but kept their unique sectarian identity 
throughout the Ottoman period. They insulated themselves in the Sinjar mountains 
bordering Syria and did not assimilate with their Sunni Kurd neighbours. As the Syro-
Iraqi border was settled in October 1932, Yazidis on both sides of the border resisted 
the penetration of state authorities. Specifically, a major disturbance started when 
thousands of Syrian Yazidis defied the conscription law imposed by the Syrian 
government. Similarly, the Iraqi Yazidis fled to Syria when the Iraqi authority 
imposed universal conscription (Fuccaro 1994). 
By the joint operation of the Iraqi and Syrian governments in 1937, the Yazidi 
migration to and from Syria came to a halt. However, the Yazidis remained alienated 
from an Iraqi state dominated by the Sunni Arabs. From around the 1950s the Yalldi 
community finally began to mingle with the neighbouring Sunni Kurdish community 
(~1cDo\\'all 1996). Throughout Iraqi history, anti-government rebellions by the 
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Yazidis broke out from time to time. In the 1960s, some 50,000 Yazidis rebelled 
against the government and this rebellion was known to have caused much disruption 
to the Iraqi Army fighting the Kurds in the same area (O'Ballance 1973: 126). 
(3) The Kurds 
Compared with the widespread revolts by the Kurds in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan during 
the first ten years of state formation was relatively quiet. A British official recorded 
that Iraqi Kurdistan was generally 'unaffected by the uprising and repression in 
Turkish Kurdistan' and 'normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all 
four of the Kurdish provinces' (Longrigg 1953: 157). 
The new Iraqi government issued an announcement guaranteeing that Kurdish 
officials were to be appointed in Kurdish areas, and the Kurds' rights to their own 
language were to be protected by the Local Languages Law (1926). These positive 
measures were intended to satisfy the prerequisite for Iraq's entry into the League of 
Nations. According to the Local Languages Law, the Kurds could use Kurdish for 
primary education and for publishing. It also instructed that the elections in all 
Kurdish areas were to be held under Kurdish control. However, these measures were 
viewed with suspicion by the Arabs: the Arab ministers in Baghdad, of whom the 
majority were Sunni, tended to dismiss Kurdish national rights as having no 
foundation except in the minds of the British advisers who were anxious to weaken 
national unity (Sluglett 1976: 183). Kurdish national rights were thus associated with 
Britain's alleged intention to weaken the solidarity of the state. Moreover, the Shia 
Arabs were estimated to be particularly sensitive to the autonomous status given to 
the Kurds. The British administration feared that 'privileges granted to the Kurds 
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would be demanded immediately by the Shias of the Euphrates, whose watchful 
jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question' (Longrigg 1953: 
196). 
Meanwhile, the end of the Mandate and the signing of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty 
brought strong tension to the north. In an effort to emphasise Iraqi citizens' equality, 
the Anglo-Iraq Treaty contained no reference to the Kurds' distinct status within Iraq. 
The treaty's silence on Kurdish national rights was also due to Britain's decision to 
support the Iraqi government's foreign policy, particularly its alignment with Turkey 
which was sensitive to the Kurds' autonomous status (Lukitz: 33). In consequence 
strikes and demonstrations were carried out by townspeople, traders and workers 
broke out in the Kurdish forum of Sulaimaniya. Significantly, these protests were not 
dominated by tribal Kurds, and manifested 'perhaps the first evidence' of popular 
Kurdish nationalism (O'Ballance 1996: 20). 
Anti-government rebellion broke out in the tribal mountainous area as well. The first 
major one was led by Shaikh Mahmoud. Mahmoud had originally been appointed as a 
governor by the British administration, but he continuously disobeyed the British and 
Iraqi authorities, detesting any elements of foreign rule. When Mahmoud was 
defeated, his rebellion was succeeded by Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, an elder brother of 
the future Kurdish nationalist leader Mustafa Barzani. Despite the fact that the 
Barzani tribe belonged to the landowning class of the Kurds, the Barzanis had less 
property to protect and distinguished themselves from other landlords by being 
Kurdish nationalists (Jawad 1981: 53). Shaikh Ahmad Barzani's rebellion took place 
between 1932 and 1933. Assisted by tribes hostile to the Barzanis and by the Royal 
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Air Force, the Iraqi government mounted punitive attacks into Barzani territory. The 
bombardment was severe and up to eighty per cent of all living quarters were 
destroyed (Schmidt: 99). Barzani resistance continued until 1934 when the Iraqi 
government issued an amnesty to Shaikh Ahmad and Mustafa Barzani on condition 
that the family would leave the Barzan territory and go further south to Sulaimaniya. 
These Barzanis remained under house arrest until they escaped the city in the mid-
1940s to resume the rebellion. 
In the late 1930s, sporadic Kurdish rebellions took place mostly around the 
mountainous area between Iraq, Iran and Turkey. The Kurdish fighters' crossing into 
the neighbouring states alarmed all three governments, and they concluded a 1937 
Saadbad Pact, in which defence policies against the Kurds were coordinated. The 
Saadabad Pact of 1937 dealt a considerable blow to the Kurdish nationalists by 
obstructing cross-border movements and by removing their shelters in the 
neighbouring states (Entessar 1992: 54). 
The Rise of Pan-Arabism 
After independence, the conflict between the more moderate Iraq-first policy, based 
on territorial state unity rather than pan-Arab unity and radical Pan-Arabism created a 
constant tension in domestic politics. Of particular importance, the Iraq-first policy 
was advocated by the moderate socialist group, Ahali, whose priority in policy 
making was socioeconomic reforms. The Ahali group was founded in 1930 and \\'as 
supported by urban intellectuals. The group's publication became highly influential in 
Baghdad (Penrose: 87, Khadduri 1960: 69). 
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The ideologues of the Ahali group first seized political power in the coup of 1936, 
which was Iraq's first military coup. The general who led the coup, Bakr Sidqi, was 
an ethnic Kurd but described as an Iraqi patriot. Hikmat Sulayman, Sidqi's civilian 
collaborator, took responsibility in political affairs. In accordance with the Fabian-
style socialism, Sulayman's government advocated a land redistribution policy. 
Hikmat Sulayman's cabinet attempted to get hold of the vast Lazmah titles acquired 
through personal connections. However, the cabinet was resented by Arab nationalist 
circles, and also by the conservative landowners who feared the regime's policy 
would result in the loss of their properties (Marr 1985: 76). Bakr Sidqi was identified 
as a 'Kurdish upstart' by his political opponents and was accused of favouring a pro-
Kurdish policy, as many Kurds were awarded promotions in the army (Lukitz: 87). 
Sidqi was known to have responded to such criticism by emphasizing his half-Arab 
origin. His view focused on 'Iraq' instead of 'Arab unity' and could be summarised 
by the following quote 'I keenly sympathise with the Arab cause; however, I feel 
compelled to establish my own country first on a firm footing' (F03 711200 15 as in 
Lukitz: 87). In 1937, Arab nationalists pressed for removal of Sidqi's adherents from 
top political posts, and he was assassinated. Iraq entered an era of instability marked 
by a number of military coups. 
Pan-Arabism particularly gained popUlarity during the 1940s due to the second British 
occupation during the Second World War, and also due to the deplorable treatment of 
Palestinian refugees. The Arab nationalist, Rashid Ali, rose to power out of the 
confrontation between pro-British politicians and nationalistic army officers. The 
British requested that Iraq break its diplomatic relations with Italy, and this 
heightened tension among am1Y officers who fayoured Germany and other Axis 
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countries. In May, British attempted a military intervention to overthrow Rashid Ali. 
The nationalist Iraqi government, in tum, warned that British planes would be fired 
upon if they used any Iraqi air base. The warning was interpreted by Britain as a 
declaration of war and therefore Britain occupied Iraq once again. This second British 
occupation was deeply resented by the Iraqis, even by the moderate intellectuals 
(Penrose: 92). It must also be noted that the ongoing Arab-Israeli war helped spread 
radical Arab nationalism, and soon the Iraq-first policy lost its appeal (Khadduri 
1969: 247). By 1939, the pan-Arabist group established a firm stronghold in the Army 
especially among the younger officers educated in Baghdad (Tachau 1994: 178). 
Despite the above trend, however, it must also be noted there had always been 
advocates of the Iraq-first policy, even though they never became a dominant faction. 
Batatu commented that such Iraqists embraced 'officers of Kurdish, Turcoman, or 
mixed ethnic origin, or Arab officers - Shia or Sunni - who, for one reason or another, 
desired no change in the existing distribution of social power' (Batatu: 29). 
Interim Summary 
Kurdish integration to the Iraqi state was initiated through recruitment to the army on 
the one hand and the empowering of the landed shaikhs on the other. However, 
political socialisation through the military did not facilitate a significant integration of 
the Kurds because their representation in the army was relatively low, and also the 
staff college discriminated against the Kurds from the time of the 1940s Barzani 
rebellion. National integration was problematic in Iraq for several reasons. The 
problem was not simply in the fact that the state was artificially comprised of se\"eral 
sizable mi~orities. Rather, the obstacles seem to ha\"e been mainly political: First, the 
state institutions had come to be dominated by the Sunni Arabs. This dominance, 
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particularly in the armed forces, appeared to have alienated the Shia Arabs and the 
Kurds. Second, pan-Arabism gained considerable popularity in the broader popUlation 
owing to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, and also through opposition to British 
occupation. And third, social reforms that might have benefited ordinary Kurds were 
never carried out because of the combined opposition posed by the radical pan-
Arabists and the conservative landowners who sided with them. 
The Kurdish Democratic Party 
A series of international events III 1945 and 1946, as a result, contributed to 
establishing the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the Kurdish nationalists' first 
political party. By the 1940s the wave of modernisation had created a new generation 
of Kurdish nationalists who began to question the authoritarian decision-making 
methods of the semor nationalist leaders whose followers were mostly tribally 
motivated. 
Events leading to the establishment of the KDP began with the resumption of the 
Barzani rebellion in the early 1940s. Since the mid-1930s, Mustafa Barzani had been 
under house arrest and was still there when the revolt led by his brother Shaikh 
Ahmad Barzani was crushed by a joint Turkish-Iraqi campaign in 1935. In November 
1943, however, Mustafa Barzani decided to flee his forced residence in Sulaimaniya. 
After escaping the arrest, Barzani and his followers began attacking Iraqi army and 
police posts. 
Britain advised the Nuri aI-Said government on a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish 
revolt, and the Minister of State, Majid Mustafa, who himself was of Kurdish origin, 
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was sent to negotiate. Not much is published about Majid Mustafa, but it is knO\\TI 
that he served the Iraqi state on the conviction that doing so would advance the long-
tenn interest of the Kurds within Iraq (Dann 1978). Although the Hashimite 
monarchy's overall policy on the Kurds was elite-biased, the role played by an 
individual like Majid Mustafa manifested a real, if limited, potential for political 
integration. Nuri al-Said's government showed a conciliatory attitude, agreeing to 
measures such as the appointment of more Kurds to public offices, and the building of 
more schools and hospitals in the Kurdish region (Schmidt: 100). However, the 
negotiation did not succeed because the Iraqi government was soon replaced by Arab 
nationalists, who undertook repressive policies towards the Kurds. 
The confrontation between Barzani' s forces and the government continued, and the 
Kurdish tribes hostile to Barzani were used for the government's operation. Hostilities 
continued throughout the summer of 1945, and Mustafa Barzani was encircled by the 
government and anti-nationalist tribes. It was said that the Iraqi government 
concentrated a force of 30,000 (Schmidt: 101). On 7 August 1945 the government 
anny attacked Barzani territory and caused heavy losses. Mustafa Barzani and his 
brother Shaikh Ahmed finally decided to move outside Iraq in January 1946. On 
crossing the Iranian border, they joined the founders of the Mahabad Republic. 
The Mahabad Republic had been founded in 19.+5 in the city of Mahabad in northern 
Iran, with strong Soviet backing. The republic provided a sanctuary for the Iraqi 
Kurds, and the Kurdish Democratic Party was established in its capital. The republic, 
hO\n~\'l~r, collapsed within less than a year \\'hen the Soviets withdrew their support 
and the cit\' was taken back by the Iranian forces. The Kurdish Democratic Party in 
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Mahabad was closed down, but its branch in Iraq survived. The KDP's 'Iraqi branch' 
(thereafter, the KDP) absorbed a section of the Hewa (Hope) group, which was one of 
the earliest Kurdish political parties, established by the Iraqi Kurds during this period. 
Hewa was composed of lawyers, teachers, and journalists and had been based in 
Kirkuk. The organisation evolved into two main offshoots, one was a moderate 
nationalist group, Rizgari (liberation), and the other an ostensibly Marxist group, 
Sharash (revolution). The latter was later absorbed into the Iraqi Communist Party 
(Khadduri 1978: 91-2). Thus even though the Mahabad Republic was eliminated from 
the map, its first political party survived in Iraqi Kurdistan to be joined by local 
nationalists. 
Weak Mass Base 
The KDP's activity in Iraqi Kurdistan was not free of Kurdish society's internal 
divisions. Even after the KDP was established, party members found it difficult to 
organise the mass of people into the party. This was because the majority of the Kurds 
then had been left under the direct influence of tribal leaders and remained tribally 
motivated as well as deeply religious (Jawad in Niblock: -47). Since the state's 
foundation, public education had not advanced much in the north. Although the Iraqi 
education system allowed Kurdish to be taught in the first four grades in primary 
schools, the general level of education remained the lowest in the country (Lukitz: 
125). 
A gulf was created bet\\'een the traditional leadership represented by Mustafa Barzani 
and the small intelligentsia, who tended to look down on Barzani's tribal and religious 
background. At tile same time, the tribal leaders viewed the younger members of the 
KDP and their socialist beliefs with suspicion, and as a result they became unpopular 
among the tribal Kurds (Jawad 1981: 160). The infusion of socialist-inclined ideology 
was partly a consequence of the disparity between the rich aghas and the poyerty 
stricken peasants, which appears to have been worse in the irrigated zone of lowland 
Kurdistan (Gabbay: 102). Particularly after the Iraqi revolution, these aghas became 
aware that the revolution had unleashed 'forces that were inimical to them' (Pelletiere: 
152-3). 
The KDP, however, knew they depended for strength on cooperation with the tribes 
and avoided direct confrontation with the tribal leaders or any direct mention of class 
struggle within Kurdish society. Overall, the tribal system remained unopposed by the 
party (Jawad 1981: 21-2). Even if aghas and shaikhs were detested on ideological 
grounds, they still exercised authority in the community. 
However, the absence of Mustafa Barzani during his twelve-year exile in the Soviet 
Union after 1946 facilitated leftist-domination of the KDP leadership, and the gap 
between the tribal chief~ and the party activists widened. Because of this, on his return 
from the Soviet Union in 1958, Mustafa Barzani became a mere 'nominal chairman' 
of the KDP, and spoke bitterly of the' alleged cowardice, inefficiency and intellectual 
presumptuousness of the KDP politicians' (Dann: 335). Mustafa Barzani's acceptance 
of the 1964 ceasefire with the Aref government even though it contained no explicit 
mention of Kurdish autonomy, was criticised by the KDP's leadership (Jawad:153), 
Ibrahim Ahmad, Jab\ Talabani and many others who raised questions about Barzani's 
unilateral decision (Khadduri 1978: 92). Intra-Kurdish fighting continued during the 
truce, but subsequent wars with the gon~mment forced the Kurds to set aside their 
internal division. For example, the large-scale confrontation with the government in 
the 1960s pushed the antagonism below the threshold and made it increasingly 
unpopular to fight against Barzani-led Kurdish nationalists (Bruinessen 1992: 91). 
Mustafa Barzani was almost a born-leader of the Kurdish nationalists and was far 
more capable of drawing support and loyalty from his followers than the young 
intellectuals (Khadduri 1969: 177). This appears to have led the Kurdish leadership to 
be over-dependent on Barzani's charisma and obstructed the development of an 
organised form of decision making. As will be recounted, the Kurdish nationalists 
were divided over the Baath regime's proposal of an autonomy plan in the 1970s. On 
this occasion, too, Barzani was solely responsible for negotiations with the Baath 
government, and he proved incapable of rallying young men under his leadership 
which was considered too authoritarian (Khadduri 1978: 92). It was not until the 
heavy defeat in 1976 that the alternative leadership (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 
the PUK) was established by Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani but this merely 
divided the Kurdish national movement. Thus the persistent division in the Kurdish 
nationalist movement originates in the 1940s. In later decades it blended into personal 
rivalries between the Barzani and Talabani factions within the nationalists. 
Summary 
Under the monarchy, the Kurds in Iraq were clearly divided into the pro-government 
landed class and the Arab nationalists. The Kurdish landed elite were coopted into the 
state, but they distanced themselves from the Kurdish nationalists, and thus Kurdish 
nationalism was in no sense incorporated into the Iraqi state, even though the Kurds 
made up a considerable part of the landed elite. The Iraqi Kurds were able to retain 
their language and culture. in contrast to Turkish Kurds who were subject to an 
assimilationist policy under Kemalism. However, this relative advantage did not 
become the foundation for Kurdish integration into a bi-national Iraq, because firstly 
the Anglo-Iraqi relations occupied the primary political agenda, and secondly the 
tension with Britain and the Arab-Israeli wars made inflamed radical Arab 
nationalism among the opposition and within the Anuy which was intolerant of 
minority rights. Thus, on the whole, Iraq became an elite-biased and Sunni-Arab 
dominated state. The government's ban on political parties further diminished the 
prospect for accommodating the needs of the poorer majority as well as Kurdish 
nationalism. Under the monarchy, not only did Arab and Kurdish nationalism became 
irreconcilable, but also the gap between the rich and poor widened sharply. 
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3. Political Mobilisation 
Introduction 
This section is about political mobilisation between the 1940s and the 1960s. From 
the 1940s, Turkey moved to a multi-party system, and political participation 
broadened considerably. Turkey also experienced major economic development and 
allowed greater geographic and social mobility to its citizens, although such 
development was less evident in the Kurdish southeast region. In contrast, the Iraqi 
government strengthened the ban on political parties from the 1l)"+Os and failed to 
accommodate political opposition to its parliamentary system. The Iraqi government 
also did not take heed of an increasing demand for social refonns and thereby 
prompted the revolution of 1958, which ushered in a period of intense instability and 
military rule. Thus, both political socialisation and economic development were 
delayed in Iraq. The two countries appeared to be taking very different paths to 
national integration. 
Turkey 
From Elitism to Clientelism 
The Kemalist revolution, despite its radical appearance, had too conservative a nature 
to call it a true revolution. The Kemalists did not, after all, mobilise the greater part of 
the rural peasants for fear of politically alienating the powerful nlral gentry. The 
Kcmalist regime's relative neglect of the countryside resulted in major centre-
periphery gaps. As Joseph S. Szyliowic7 \\Tote, 'despite de\'elopments in the ll)30s, 
only a limited degree of government penetration had occurred. \[uch of tht.' rural 
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populace as we have seen, remained largely isolated from national trends. Ataturk's 
successor and close associate, Ismet Inonu inherited a situation in which serious 
problems, especially possible inter- and intra-elite conflict, could be expected' 
(Szyliowicz, in Tachau: 41). The failure to politically integrate peasants meant the 
clientelistic bond between the rural gentry and the peasants was to be strengthened, 
especially under multi-party competition, to be discussed below. 
The Democrat Party and Multi-Party Competition 
Transition to the multi-party system was made possible by Ataturk's successor Ismet 
Inonu, who allowed the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1946, led by 
Celal Bayan and Adnan Menderes. The DP had emerged from the following social 
context. After the Second W orId War, Turkey's merchants emerged immensely richer 
in both urban and rural areas. The wealthy merchants resented the RPP's statist policy 
and sought greater economic freedom through the alternative party. Their voice 
coincided with the demand for greater religious freedom as well, which had been 
suppressed under the previous Kemalist regime. These two social forces found their 
political expression in the DP. As already seen in the example of the short-lived 
Liberal Republican Party (LRP) established approximately a decade earlier, the social 
forces that had been silenced by the RPP's secular-statist policy remained strong, and 
their demands for greater economic and religious freedom needed to be 
accommodated in the political system. The multiparty system gave them the 
legitimate channels to express their politcal demands, and, at the same time, the 
Turkish state thereby institutionalised enough political participation and avoided the 
path to a praetorian regime. 
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The ranks of the DP were recruited primarily from rural notables, and in cases of the 
Kurdish southeast, from shaikhs and tribal chiefs. Because of their overwhelming 
influence over the villagers, these local leaders provided 'ready vote banks' in the 
elections (Sayari: 107). Those Kurdish notables that joined the DP were said to be 
'Kurds in ethnicity, but not necessarily advocates of Kurdish national rights' (Kirsci 
and Winrow: 105). Rather, because of the weak penetration by the state into the 
periphery, they continued to assume the functions which should normally be 
performed by the state, such as distribution of justice and maintenance of law and 
order (Sayari: 110). 
At the same time, patronage and clientelism became rampant. S low economIC 
development seemed to have been the primary factor that facilitated the spread of 
clientelism. Political participation in general was mainly motivated by material 
benefits, instead of the ideology of a political party. For example, there were instances 
of different party affiliations within the same family to ensure that whatever party 
won the elections, the family's honour, prestige, and economic interests would not be 
affected (Sayari: 108). Also, Heper and Keyman noted, 'a highly unequal distribution 
of income placed many in need of special favours; the multi-party system created 
incentives to use the resources of the state to win political competition: and the 
increased scope of the public sector facilitated the need to meet the localised and 
particular demands of the constituencies through political patronage' (Heper and 
Keyman 1998: 261-2). 
Thus, it was unmistakable that political participation had been considerably 
broadened by the transition to the multi-party system. The nc\\ democratic system, 
however, did not go as far as to accommodate Kurdish national rights. It remained 
largely a means to material gains needed for the everyday lives of the people in the 
countryside, owing to the weak government penetration of such areas. Furthermore, 
local notables' political importance had increased as vote-providers. Thus the state 
failed to establish a direct 'state-citizen link' and made the people even more reliant 
on local notables. 
Islamic Revival and the Kurds 
The restriction put on Islamic organisations was greatly relaxed during the DP's era. 
The teaching of Islam in Turkish schools began in 1948, and the DP took a far less 
secular approach towards Turkish society as a whole. As Kinnane described, 'the 
policies of the DP went further towards easing the pressure of "modernisation" on the 
lives of villagers, religious functionaries and the remaining nomads. It also tolerated a 
remarkably vigorous religious reaction to the years of laicism. The dervish shaikhs 
reappeared and political power began to return to them and the village notables' 
(Kinnane: 31). Kurdish shaikhs were no exceptions and that they too benefited from 
this era's Islamic revival (Bruinessen 1992: 253). The degree of relaxation was such 
that: 'the radio station began broadcasting recitation of Quran and call to the prayer 
was heard in Arabic again ... Islam was no longer frowned upon. Islamic sects 
remained illegal, but in fact were tolerated and edged their way onto the political 
scene' (MER July-August 1988). 
This religious freedom facilitated some Kurds' participation in organised political 
activity through Islamic groups. A remarkable example was the Nurcu movement, 
which meant the followers of Nur (divine light). The Nurcu movement was founded 
133 
by a Kurd who was known to be a reputable Islamic scholar, Said Nursi (1873-1960), 
also known by his adopted name, Said Kurdi. The Nurcu movement grew rapidly 
during the 1950s and 60s. Nursi maintained an opposition to Kemalist reforms and 
adopted a modem interpretation of Islam. Though once a supporter of Mustafa Kemal 
during the Turkish War of Independence, Nursi had fallen out with Mustafa Kemal 
because of his secularist views. Nursi had also been active in Kurdish nationalist 
organisations in the early twentieth century, but he was known to be 'more interested 
in the education and moral uplifting of his fellow Kurds than in separatism' 
(Bruinessen 1992: 258). The movement followed by both the Kurds and the Turks 
incorporated broad segments of Turkey'S multi-ethnic society. It was said there was 
'no clear centre of gravity (in the movement's adherents), but Kurds seem to be 
slightly over-represented in the movement' (Bruinessen 1992: 259). In later decades, 
one of the offshoots of Nurcu (Fethullah) had come to own its own TV channel, 
publishing company and also the influential daily Zaman (Zubaida, MER April-June 
1996). It seemed Islamic organisations were highly effective in accommodating the 
Kurds' political participation in the framework of mainstream Turkish politics, if only 
by completely avoiding direct mention of Kurdish national rights. Today, Fethullah is 
known as a strong supporter of the centre-right True Path Party, and has influential 
connections within the party. 
Regional Gap 
Meanwhile, national service and expansion of the telecommunication network began 
to change rural life. Expansion of rail and road networks gave people greater 
opportunity to migrate to the cities. Also, conscription to the military gave the Turkish 
youth a merit-based opportunity and provided them with education and vocational 
training. Rapid advances in communication mobilised the people in the countryside to 
participate in national politics. 
'Radios were soon to be found in every coffee house or party locale. The 
anny, reorganised and modernised with American support, proved to be an important 
means of reinforcing the changes taking place in rural areas for the peasant draftees 
became part of a new environment in which they were exposed to modernism. Long 
isolated from national life, the rural masses now began to develop political awareness 
and, as a result of the DP's organising efforts, gained a channel through which to 
articulate demands' (Szyliowicz in Tachau: 43). 
The military was also potentially the strongest vehicle of disseminating Turkish 
'nation-state' nationalism because of the broadness of the social stratum from which 
the recruits were drawn. As Frey wrote: 'The anny had always drawn its recruits from 
a wider circle than the religious hierarchy, with its entrenched dynasties of rank and 
wealth, or the bureaucracy, with its inevitable bias in favour of the capital and its 
insistence on traditional, fonnal education' (Frey: 138). This certainly seems to have 
facilitated political socialisation; however, the beneficiaries of this greater geographic 
and social mobility were rather confined to the popUlation whose first language was 
Turkish. It was because public education, based on monolingual policy, turned out to 
be highly inefficient in educating the Kurdish children. Secondly, the geographic 
mobility of the Kurdish region remained lower compared to other parts of the country. 
As for problems generated by monolingual education, a Kurd from Turkey who was 
44 years old (in 2000) recalled: 
'I was born in 1956 in Cermik, that was the Kurdish name, but the town's 
name was changed to Bingollater. Until I entered primary school at the age of seven, 
I could not speak Turkish at all. In school, it was not even possible to ask questions in 
Kurdish. 1 had to learn Turkish by force. It was difficult. It took me about ten years to 
be able to master Turkish. Some pupils still could not speak Turkish even years after 
starting the school education. The government established boarding schools in many 
parts of the country, primarily in the southeast, in cities such as Erzerum, Malatya, 
and Mersin. 1 went to one of them. 1 was brainwashed, and believed that we were the 
Turks. At the age of twelve to thirteen, I thought we were the real Turks. It created a 
conflict within the family, because our parents could not speak Turkish at all' (Kerim 
Yildiz). 
Because the ability to speak Turkish well was a prerequisite to the economIC 
opportunities, the Kurds who grew up in an overwhelmingly Kurdish-speaking 
environment were at a considerable disadvantage. Furthermore, because of slow 
expansion of the economy, there were weak environmental factors that facilitated the 
Kurds' speaking Turkish. After decades of armed revolts, the economic development 
of the southeastern region was lagging behind. 'In spite of the railways and roads, the 
inherent financial difficulties of the Turkish Government has precluded an extensive 
programme of industrial and agricultural renovation in the eastern vilayets, such a 
build-up being chiefly confined to the western provinces inhabited by Turks, where 
great progress has been realised during the last thirty-five years (since the 1930s)' 
(Arfa: 45). Thus, the Kurds in the southeastern region were less socially mobilised 
and less economically developed, constituting a serious challenge to national 
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integration. Even in 1955, as many as one-half million people in Turkey listed 
Kurdish as their mother tongue and another 225,000 Turkish speakers claimed it as a 
second language (Frey: 110). This suggests that the monolingual policy was not as 
effective as it was envisaged to be. 
The evidence of concentrated land-ownership also underlined the continued 
impoverishment of the rural area. Between 1947 and 1962 only 1.8 million hectares 
were distributed under land reform to 360,000 families, with only 8,600 hectares 
being taken from privately owned land (Ahmad 1993: 115). These statistics did not 
apply to the entire region, however. Inequalities of land tenure were much more 
severe in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces (Sayari: 110). The living 
conditions of rural Kurdish peasants did not improve despite the growth in the 
agricultural industry during the 1950s. Turkish agriculture underwent an export boom 
in the 1950s, but the method of production was primitive, and it simply relied on 
increasing the amount of newly cultivated area, which had swelled from 13,900,000 
hectares in 1948 to 22,940,000 hectares in 1959 (Ahmad 1993: 116). The agricultural 
export boom that followed the 1950s mostly benefited the landlords and merchants. 
Moreover, the newly growing economy expanded faster in western Turkey than into 
the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region. A village study indicated that 
modernization of agriculture and improvement in transportation after 1930 
contributed to the replacement of a dominant stratum of aghas by a rising group of 
merchants in western Turkey. In such areas, the people had stopped working for aghas 
and were integrated into a national economic system (Hopkins: 11-2). On the 
contrary, mechanisation of farms in Diyarkakir, known for its predominantly Kurdish 
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population, reduced villagers to the status of wage labourers and thus, modernisation 
there had a considerably different outcome (Hopkins: 21-2). 
A demographic study also showed the lower mobility of the Kurdish region compared 
with the rest of the country. The gap was noticeable from the male-female percentage. 
Generally, in most of the provincial areas, there was an excess of female popUlation 
where the male popUlation was thought to have left for work in the cities. However, in 
the predominantly Kurdish southeastern Anatolia, the picture was different. An excess 
of male population was characteristic, which was attributed to the low rate of labour 
migration and also to the possible under-recording of females (Dewdney in Clarke 
and Fisher: 40-67). 
Interim Summary 
The monolingual policy inherited from the previous regime, particularly the complete 
exclusion of Kurdish from schools, caused great learning problems and 
consequentially created a great obstacle to Turkish national integration. This was 
made worse by the slow expansion of the economy as employment opportunities that 
would otherwise have encouraged the Kurds to learn Turkish were few. 
As evident in the informant's (and his peers') experience, in order to learn Turkish 
successfully, school classes must be taught in combination with Kurdish. The failure 
of state education in this crucial aspect reduced the prospects for Kurdish speakers' 
successful integration, which was aggravated by the slow expansion of the economy. 
The state's failure to carry out effective land reforms also appears to have played a 
part in the poverty in rural areas. It must be pointed out that unlike costly land 
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refonns, bilingual education was readily realisable. Bilingual education would have 
facilitated faster integration of the bulk of the poorer stratum of Kurds to the Turkish 
economy. Instead, the illiterate Kurdish people working under aghas were caught in 
between assimilationist policies of the state on one hand, and exploitation by their 
aghas on the other. 
The 1960 Military Intervention 
The 1960 military intervention against the DP government was facilitated by both 
economic and political factors. There were chronic inflation and social instability 
throughout the 1950s. The rapid growth rate of the Turkish economy had slowed 
down from 13 to 9.5 per cent but with inflation spiralling at a rate of 18 per cent a 
year (Ahmad 1993: 116)." Major cities began to develop slums and the dichotomy 
between the rich and the poor widened. At the same time, the DP's rule became 
increasingly corrupt and the party began to repress all political oppositions. The DP 
government started to impose authoritarian measures over the bureaucracy, press and 
judiciary, which alienated both military and civilian organisations. Relations with the 
military were particularly made worse because the DP historically had weak ties with 
the military. The event that directly triggered the military intervention was said to be 
the DP's move toward restriction on parliamentary activities (Harris: 158). In April 
1960, the government banned all political activity outside the parliament, which was a 
move indirectly targeted at suppressing the rival RPP's activity. Following this 
measure, riots and disturbances spread across the country, and finally the military 
decided to intervene on 27 May 1960. The new military regime executed the former 
premier Adnan Menderes on the charge of bringing the country into a national crisis. 
Kemalism Restored 
The military regime basically aimed at a restoration of Kemalism, consisting of the 
famous Six Principles (republicanism, rationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and 
reformism), and took the same approach to the Kurds. The Kurdish shaikhs, on the 
other hand, considered the new military regime 'irreligious and radical' (Arfa: 46). 
The military's treatment of the Kurds was harsh all the more because many Kurdish 
notables were in the ranks of the DP. It was said that of those shaikhs who were 
arrested, 'all but one had been members of the DP' (Gunter 1997: 8). About 485 
Kurdish notables were arrested, of whom 55 were highly influential ones. They were 
deported from southeastern to western Anatolia, to cities such as Bursa and Izmir 
(Gunter 1997: 8). Although the suppression of the Kurdish shaikhs was based more on 
ideological than ethnic grounds, the subsequent Turkification of the southeastern 
village names indicated that these suppressive measures were taken for the purpose of 
eliminating the Kurdish culture. The regime suppressed the Kurdish shaikhs for their 
alleged corruption and backwardness; however, the Kurdish culture itself also became 
the target of suppression. In the campaign to rename Kurdish villages, for example, 
the Kurdish town name 'Dersim' was renamed to the Turkish 'Tunceli' which is still 
in use today. The military regime threatened armed intervention against any 
disturbances in reaction to these measures (Barkey and Fuller: 14). 
Thus the 1960 military regime treated Kurds in the same manner as the Kemalist 
regime did in the 1920s, simply labelling them as reactionary. Indeed, from the 
viewpoint of the military, the religious shaikhs who benefited from the patronage of 
the DP may well have been 'reactionary'. However, it was also true that so long as the 
state authorities failed to penetrate the Kurdish region. many Kurds were reliant on 
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such notables for their livelihood. The source of problems was not in the Kurds' 
religiosity, but in the social structure which the Turkish state failed to reform. As 
Mesut Yegen put it, 'when the Kurdish question is identified with reactionary politics, 
tribal resistance and so on, the Turkish state is enunciating an attack on the social 
space wherein Kurdishness is constituted' (Yegen 1996). The following account 
showed that the policies taken by the 1960 military regime only alienated the bulk of 
the Kurds: 
'The deportation of the patriarchal chiefs of clans created discontent among 
their relatives and retainers several thousand of whom were likewise deported to the 
west which was a great hardship to them. Instead of decreasing, the discontent of the 
Kurds took a more violent form: hold-ups and armed robberies became such a 
frequent occurrence that the Government discouraged tourists from travelling in the 
eastern provinces' (Arfa: 46). 
Had the Kemalist's modernisation policies been more suitable to the Kurds, the 
structure of Kurdish society could have been different, and thus less reliant on the 
tribal leaders. Just as the old social structure of the village in western Turkey 
collapsed rapidly with the expansion of new economy, there \vas a possibility that the 
Kurdish region could have changed in a similar manner. The Kurdish question and the 
society wherein the Kurds live are in fact inseparable, and it misses the point if the 
Turkish authorities merely denounce the Kurdish patriarchial cheifs for being tribal or 
reactionary. 
Legacies of Military Intervention 
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The military regIme itself was short-lived, and political power was voluntarily 
relinquished to the civilian government in October 1961 after the general election. 
However, the military regime set an important precedent that would affect the 
political life of Turkey over the next decades. The key legacy was, first of all, the 
establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). In this body, the leaders of the 
armed forces asserted the right to consult with, and be consulted by, the civilian 
political leadership over matters deemed to affect national security, and constitutional 
backing was given to the NSC's views. In other words, in any matters deemed by the 
NSC as a 'threat' to national security, the military would enjoy constitutional rights 
and authority. The NSC would use this authority largely to repress political activity it 
considered subversive, including especially Kurdish nationalist activism. 
The second important legacy of the military intervention was constitutional 
amendment. The 1961 Constitution provided for unprecedented political freedom as it 
modified party law so as to facilitate formation of new political parties. Also, by 
amending a majority-list system, the electoral system came to be based on 
proportional representation. On top of this, the Constitutional Court was established to 
curtail the potential abuse of power by the government. These reforms were aimed at 
preventing the re-emergence of authoritarian government and were also attempts to 
re-institutionalise the state in Turkish politics (Heper and Keyman 1998). As a result 
of the expanded scope of rights and liberties, new capacity was given for various 
political groups that raised their own political agendas. Thus, 'democracy flourished, 
but so did dissident groups' (Landau: 314). This also accelerated activities of 
ideologically motivated groups, such as Marxists, the Right Wing Turkish 
nationalists, Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, to be discussed below. 
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The Justice Party 
After the 1961 election, a coalition government was fonned between the newly 
fonned Justice Party (a successor of DP) and the Republican People's Party. Ismet 
Inonu was elected as the prime minister. The popularity of the JP began to outstrip the 
RPP, and by the general election held in October 1965, Ismet Inonu was defeated by 
Suleyman Demirel, who had been elected the leader of the Justice Party. In this 
election, the Justice Party obtained as much as 52.9 per cent of the total vote and 240 
seats out of a 540-seat parliament. Not surprisingly, the JP, as a direct heir of the DP, 
was closely linked to financial circles, multinational companies, and major Kurdish 
notables (Kendal: 83). The JP attracted high support in the Kurdish region throughout 
the election campaign through its promise of investment programmes and economic 
development. However, being the mainstream Turkish political party, the JP never 
explicitly advocated Kurdish national rights. 
Suleyman Demirel was the leader of the generation, and in a way, he embodied 
increased social mobility in the Turkish-speaking population by proving that those 
who are of humble origins could rise to the top. He built a fortune in the construction 
business and became increasingly popular among urban migrants as a symbol of the 
'self-made man' (Ahmad 1993: 139). The rise ofSuleyman Demirel was symbolic of 
the socioeconomic change in the 1960s and 1970s. Characteristic of the Turkish 
economy during these decades was its substantial growth in the agricultural sector due 
to the spread of new technologies such as irrigation, introduction of high-yield wheat, 
and increased lise of fertiliser. The increased construction of dams contributed to the 
spread of irrigation (Harris: 77). It was also an era of overall industrial growth as well. 
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Turkey's GNP increased by 7 per cent. However, the high growth was also 
accompanied by high inflation, which was inherited from the DP's economic policy. 
The JP government could not solve the problems such as high unemployment and 
growing income disparity, and the benefits of economic development were not evenly 
distributed (Tachau 1994: 571). 
Revival of Kurdish Nationalism 
The new phenomenon of the 1960s was the resurfacing of Kurdish nationalism. 
Armed rebellions by the Kurdish nationalists had been almost completely silenced 
since the late 1930s. However, the 1960s political reforms and socioeconomic change 
generated revival of Kurdish nationalism from a completely new strata; not from 
tribal shaikhs or from Ottoman army officers, but from leftist intellectuals and 
politicised workers. As Szyliowicz wrote, 'In 1964 workers numbered almost a 
million, 34 per cent of whom were unionised ... only after the 1960 revolution, when 
unions were granted new rights, did the labour movement become a potent economic 
and political force' (Szyliowicz in Tachau: 57). Another contributing factor to the 
resurgence of Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s was Mustafa Barzani' s military 
success against the Iraqi government (Bruinessen 1992: 32-3). Everyone knew of his 
military success against the Iraqi government, and Turkey could no longer insist 
'there were no Kurds'. Many of the Turkish workers, highly critical of the 
government's policy, disapproved of the official attitude towards the Kurds and 
openly said that there were Kurds in Turkey. Turkey's political left continued to be 
active throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as will be discussed in a later section. 
Growth of Islamic Opposition 
By the late 1960s the Justice Party had come to be increasingly identified with big 
business in Istanbul and among foreign investors. Demirel, facing growing 
opposition, strengthened his ties with the military and began to adopt its Kemalist 
ideology. The official ideology taken by the Justice Party was 'everybody who lived 
in Turkey was a Turk' (Kendal: 83). Demirel sacrificed relations with his political 
opponents in favour of the military (Ahmad 1977: 240-241). The Islamist challenge 
first surfaced inside the JP itself as well. It was because the JP was a 'catch all party' 
propagating a broad ideology which aimed to embrace 'secularist intellectuals and 
reactionary Islamists, officers and the anti-military, former Democrats of all hues and 
those new to politics' (Ahmad 1993: 240). The cost of this was the lack of cohesion 
within the party, and the Islamist, or Caliphatist as they were sometimes called, led by 
Kadri Erogan, threatened his Demirel's leadership. 
The Caliphatist challenge, however, was not just a matter of intra-party competition. 
It indicated the growing trend of Islamic revival in Turkish society as a whole. For the 
first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, an Islamist Party (the National Order 
Party) was established in 1970 by a leader of the Naqshbandi order, Mehmet Zahit 
Koktu. The National Order Party appealed to people who were uprooted from their 
traditional community through migration and settled in the cities, living face to face 
with strangers. 'Semi urbanised and urban Muslims began using diverse cultural 
categories to construct new identities to deal with the challenges presented by 
industrialisation, migration from traditional villages to urban centres, the expansion of 
state power, and the popularisation of knowledge through mass communication' 
(Yavuz 1997: 66). 
The National Order Party was one of the newly established Islamist parties which 
represented the interests of medium to small business against big business based in 
Istanbul, which largely supported Demirel. The National Order Party would be 
immediately banned after the 1971 military intervention, to be discussed later, but 
would re-establish itself in 1972 as the National Salvation Party (NSP). 
Summary 
With the introduction of a multi-party system and political liberalisation, the Kurds 
were accommodated into the Turkish political system in several different ways. The 
first was through political patronage, the second through Islamic movements, and the 
third through leftist organisations. Of all, patronage politics appeared to have been 
most dominant, as the Kurdish region remained less developed which made the 
people more reliant on local notables than in the rest of the country where greater 
mobility was being established. The language problem appeared to have aggravated 
the regional gap: when everything was delivered in Turkish, the Kurds who did not 
know a word of Turkish were less socially mobilised and remained in a less 
economically developed environment. It was phenomenal of this era that the Islamic 
organisation became a growing counter-weight to the military establishment to which 
a considerable number of Kurds were attracted as well. The resurgence of Kurdish 
nationalism and leftist ideology among urban workers, on the other hand, showed that 
urbanised Kurds were susceptible to advanced politicisation. 
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Iraq 
By the late 1950s there was a universal feeling in Iraq that the parliament and the 
cabinet were corrupt and had turned into enclaves of privilege. That sentiment was 
strong in the army, in which the bulk of officers were drawn from the poorer strata of 
the society (Batatu: 764-765). While there was growing discontent, the government 
failed to broaden political participation. Instead, it banned all political oppositions in 
1954. In the following year, Iraq's proposed entry into the Baghdad Pact, which 
involved military cooperation with Britain, added fuel to the growing unpopularity of 
the government. While the declaration of the United Arab Republic was made 
between the radical Syrian and Egyptian regimes, the Iraqi government made a 
counter-proposal to unite the two monarchies of Jordan and Iraq. It was said that these 
moves provided momentum for the opposition groups to carry out the coup d'etat that 
ended the monarchy in July 1958 (Penrose: 202). From the perspective of political 
development, the 1958 Revolution completely eliminated the British influence and 
paved the way for state-building by the hands of Iraqis. In other words, Iraq, as a 
state, only entered the phase of centre-building as completed by Ataturk in Turkey in 
the 1920s at this late date. However, unlike Turkey both ideological and socio-
economic divisions ran deep, inherited from the elite-biased integration policy during 
the monarchy. The political mobilisation unleashed by the revolution exceeded state 
building and lead to chronic instability. Unable to integrate antagonising groups, the 
first revolutionary regime lasted for only five years. This section examines why the 
diverse sectarian groups failed to unite under the republican regime. 
Free Officers 
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The Free Officers movement began its political activities in 1952. The organisation 
was completely clandestine and represented only five per cent of all Iraqi Army 
officers, numbering between 172 and 200 (Batatu: 783). It was predominantly Sunni 
Muslim and Arab in composition as well. There was no Kurdish member in its central 
organisation (the Supreme Committee), though 'a few Kurdish officers supported the 
movement hoping that it would be sympathetic to Kurdish national aspirations' 
(Khadduri 1969: 30-31). Generally, the percentage of both the Kurds and the Shia 
among higher-ranking army officers had long been low. It was also owing to the fact 
that from the mid-1940s, fewer and fewer Kurds had been admitted into the staff 
college (Batatu: 765). Among the fifteen members of the Supreme Committee, only 
three, including the chairman Abdul aI-Karim Qassem, had 'non Arab-Sunni' roots 
(Batatu: 887, table). The political orientation of the key figures of the Free Officers 
varied: Qassem belonged to the moderate liberalist group while Abdul Salem Aref 
and Rifat aI-Hajj Sirri were pan-Arabists. 
National Union Front 
As a whole, ideologies of the Iraqi opposition groups were diverse. In 1957, an 
umbrella organisation was established in order to coordinate different groups, which 
was named the National Union Front (NUF). Earlier, the two main opposition parties, 
the National Democrat Party (NDP) and the Independent Party, had applied for a 
merger. The government refused their application, however, and the two parties 
secretly established the NUF. Two other parties became members of the NUF, the 
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and the Arab Socilalist, or Baath, Party (Jawad in 
Kelidar 1979: 171-182). 
The NDP was in close contact with Qassem, the chairman of the Free Officers 
movement. The NDP advocated moderate socialism and was also described as 'the 
true heir' of the Ahali group, which was influential during the 1930s among 
Baghdad's urban intellectuals (Batatu: 305). Earlier in 1955, the NDP and the 
Independent Party formed a joint platform which included the concept that Kurds and 
Arabs were 'partners' in the Iraqi homeland (Jawad 1981: 22- 23). This was a 
significant clause for the Kurds, however, the KDP's application for the entry to the 
NUF was rejected as it was not able to obtain unanimous consent from the parties 
involved. Jawad also pointed to the fact that generally, during the pre-revolutionary 
era, the Kurdish conflict was a marginal issue in Iraqi politics as a whole (Jawad 
1981: 22- 23). However, the KDP then was closely affiliated with the ICP. 
Ideologically, the KDP's top leadership was dominated by leftist intellectuals 
(especially during Mustafa Barzani's exile years) and the ICP's platform was very 
close to the KDP's in all but Kurdish nationalism (O'Ballance: 65). The two parties 
had a Covenant of Cooperation, and the ICP had a section entirely dedicated to the 
Kurdish issue. Thus even if the KDP was not able to participate in the NUF, it can be 
assumed that the ICP substituted for its role. 
Even after the NUF was established, however, opposition groups were far from 
united. Particularly, the ideological rift between the Baath Party and the ICP was 
irreconcilable. The Baath Party denied the class struggle among the Arab nation, and 
aimed to create an 'Arab classless society'. The party also supported Iraq's union with 
the United Arab Republic (Khadduri 1969: 114-6). The Iraqi Baath Party then was a 
relatively new organisation. The original branch of the Baath Party was originally 
founded by a Syrian teacher, Michael Atlaq and his colleagues in April 1947. The 
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founding members of the Syrian Baath Party had both Christian and Muslim 
backgrounds and advocated Arab secular nationalism transcending religious and 
sectarian differences. Class conflict too was rejected on the ground that it could be 
divisive to Arab unity. The Baath Party's Iraqi branch was established by Fuad al-
Rikabi in 1952, who was a Shia Arab from Nasiriya in Lower Euphrates. The original 
members of the Iraqi Baath Party were known to number only about one hundred 
(Tachau 1994: 190). 
The July 1958 Revolution 
The coup leaders of the Free Officers entered Baghdad in the early hours of 14 July 
1958. The brigade led by Colonel Abdul Salam Aref seized the radio station and 
announced the fall of the Hashimite monarchy. The violence continued for a few days 
after the coup, but no large-scale resistance occurred. It was said that the general 
response to the coup was a favourable one and was 'apparently popular among the 
people of Iraq of nearly all political points of view' (Penrose: 207-8). The Second 
Infantry Division, a predominantly Kurdish unit based in Kirkuk, debated for ten 
hours before telegraphing their loyalty to the new regime (Zeidner 1959: 30), an 
ambivalence which possibly reflected their marginal participation in the Free 
Officer's movement. It was known that even the less radical older generation of the 
Kurds expressed support for the revolutionary regime (Khadduri 1969: 175). 
Early Days: Arab-Kurd Partnership 
Abdul Karim Qassem, formerly the chairman of the Supreme Committee of the Free 
Officers movement, represented the newly created Sovereignty Council of the state 
and became the Prime Minister. A Provisional Constitution was promulgated within 
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two weeks. Its third article declared that the Arabs and the Kurds were 'partners in the 
common Iraqi homeland'. The new government strove to gain the support of the 
Kurds by appointing four Kurds as members of the first cabinet. The new Kurdish 
ministers were: Khalid an-Naqshbandi, Mustafa Ali, Dr. Muhammad Salih Mahmud 
and Baba Ali, a son of the Kurdish leader Shaikh Mahmud who rebelled against the 
British in the 1920s. An observer recorded 'pains have been taken to popularise the 
concept of Arab-Kurdish cooperation and equality of rights under the Republic by 
frequent reference to this concept in the provisional constitution, in government 
decrees and in the public utterrances of its spokesmen' (Zeidner 1959: 30). The 
impact of these gestures was immense. It was a historic occasion as well, when the 
Iraqi state formally stipulated that the Kurds and the Arab were partners. 
The provisional constitution, however, also declared that Iraq was part of a larger 
Arab nation (Article 2). This would later pose a conflict between the Kurdish 
nationalists and the government (Edmonds 1971). However, the initial euphoria of the 
revolution marginalised the discourse. By strengthening the Kurds, Qassem himself 
was thinking about a completely independent Iraq, free from Nasser's influence. He 
genuinely wished for a reconciliation of the centrifugal force that made Iraq 
fragmented (Dann 1978). 
The KDP welcomed the republican regime in its July 16th declaration which stated: 
'the KDP, the vanguard of the Kurdish liberation movement .. , hails as a solid base 
for the welfare, freedom and equality of the Kurdish and Arab peoples the 
increasingly important Arab liberation movement, its success in liberating Iraq, the 
establishment of the Republican regime and the withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact... 
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our party is detennined to maintain and defend the Iraqi Republic with all its 
capabilities and power' (Talabani 1971, quoted in Jawad 1981 :37-8). It insisted the 
'Kurdish autonomy' it wanted, did 'not mean separation, nor a step towards it. 
Autonomy only means having a local identity within the Iraqi State. This aim has 
been adopted after a full consideration of our (Kurdish) people's circumstances, and 
of those of the fraternal Arab people in Iraq' (Jawad 1981: 93). 
Indicative of the rapid political mobilisation that followed the revolution, the ICP's 
membership swelled from about 500 during the previous decade, to 20,000 to 25,000 
(Tachau 1994: 192). This seems to reflect its key role in the revolution and the 
magnitude of secretly-affiliated supporters it mobilised. As Batatu puts it, revolution 
'aroused to political life thousands of people from the manual labouring classes, and 
many of these had turned toward the Communists' (Batatu: 849). These labouring 
classes vehemently attacked both urban and rural landlords as a symbol of 
exploitation. The revolutionary government, too, took anti-landlord measures, for 
example, by reducing the cultivators' rents down by 20 per cent from the original 
rents (Penrose: 212). 
Divisive Issues 
The downfall of the monarchy, however, removed the 'common enemy' which held 
various opposition groups together whose individual goals were, in fact, incompatible. 
The Arab unionists and the Baath party were identified with the Sunni Muslims and 
naturally, the Shia Arabs and the Kurds were alienated from these groups (Dann 1969: 
164). On the other hand, Qassem's ideological position only became clear to everyone 
by the end of the summer of 1958; he had thrown his weight on the side of 
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particularism (Iraqism) and become the centre of its hopes (Batatu: 818). This 
approach was supported by the Arab Christians and Jews as well as Kurds and the 
Communists (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett: 77). Qassem's policy of increasing 
minorities' appointments to public posts, on the other hand, offended the :-\rab 
unionists (Penrose: 234). However, it must be pointed out that he did so in the belief 
that the 'Iraqi people' should enjoy complete equality of rights, and equality stood for 
the assimilation of varying groups to the vanishing point. For example, it was kno\vn 
that he assured a Kurdish delegate that the Kurds were an indivisible part of the Iraqi 
people (Dann 1969: 63). For the same reason, Qassem showed reserve towards the 
proposed Union with Egypt and Syria based on Arab nationality. Qassem's views on 
the UAR were summarised as follows: 'Union' he declared on July 27, 'is something 
not for one individual (Nasser) but for the peoples of the Arab states to decide' (AI 
Hayat, Beirut, No. 3765,27 July 1958 in Batatu: 818). The conflict soon appeared in 
the form of a personal contest between Qassem and Aref, who was an avowed 
Nasserist. In order to create a political balance, Qassem purged hardline Arab 
nationalists from the army and also made an effort to curb extreme leftist activity as 
well. 
Thus, in the early years, the main opponents of Qassem were the Arab nationalists, 
Baathists, and significantly, the conservative class who were critical of the regime's 
socialist policies. By contrast, Qassem was highly popular and even idolised among 
the poorer strata of the population. At the height of his popularity, the Baathists 
unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate him in 1959. 
Riots in Mosul and Kirkuk 
15.~ 
Two serious riots took place in 1959 alone, one in Mosul, and another in Kirkuk. Both 
cities became arenas of confrontation between antagonistic ideological and ethnic 
groups, and these riots considerably destabilised the regime. 
The Mosul revolt was planned and carried out by a group of Arab nationalists. Being 
located on the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions, some Mosulite Arabs 
were sharply inclined to Arab nationalist ideology. The actual disturbance started 
from a political rally held on 6 March 1959. The pro-Communist demonstrators 
clashed with the local residents, and this caused Col. Wahhab Shawaf, the Arab 
nationalist commander, to impose a curfew. Shawaf was an avowed supporter of 
Iraq's union with the United Arab Republic and took this opportunity to announce his 
intention of seizing power in Baghdad (O'Ballance 1973: 66-7). 
An important feature of the Mosul revolt was feudal landlords' participation to the 
Arab nationalists' side, as shaikhs with large properties resented the revolutionary 
regime. For example, the officers' group secured military support from the Shammar 
tribe and Syria. Although, some of the officers did not hide their uneasiness in 
cooperating with the 'old class' (Batatu: 871), the Mosul revolt was led by the Arab 
nationalist officers and was joined by feudal tribal cheifs. Batatu stated: 
'Among its (the participants') chief figures was Ahmad Ajil al-Yawer, 
paramount shaikh of Shammar: The new agrarian law threatened the very core of his 
social position but the real lever of the revolt was an army group ... who cared very 
little about the large proprietors' fear for their land or the probable forfeiture by the 
shaikhs of their tribal position' (Batatu: 870). 
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In some instances, class divisions also aggravated the violence. Batau points to the 
overlapping cleavage manifested among the participants of the riots: 
'What added to the acuteness of the conflicts was the high degree of 
coincidence between the economic and ethnic or religious divisions. For example, 
many of the soldiers of the Fifth Brigade were not only from the poorer layers of the 
population, but were also Kurds, whereas the officers were predominantly from the 
Arab middle or lower middle classes' (Batatu: 866). 
The followers of Shawaf unsuccessfully made attempts to bomb the capital. Anarchy 
broke out in the streets of Mosul, and Qassem brought it under control with the 
assistance of the Kurdish nationalists. At this revolt, the Kurdish nationalists and the 
Communists acted on behalf of Qassem. Thereafter, Qassem leaned sharply towards 
the Communists and the Kurds after the Mosul revolt. For a period, the Communists 
were considerably empowered by the hands of the regime. As for the Kurds, attempts 
were made at the Ministry of Education to improve the position of the Kurdish 
language and literature. Qassem eased restrictions put on the Kurdish press by the 
previous regime and, as a result, a number of Kurdish journals flourished (Penrose: 
279). 
The riot in Kirkuk in July originated from a Communist rally that celebrated the 
anniversary of the rcvolution, in which they called for the purge of thc 'reactionaries'. 
Kirkuk's location on the ethnic boundary of the Kurds, Arabs and the Turcomans 
added tension to the political rally. Turcomans traditionally constituted an elite 
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minority in the city, and the Kurdish population who migrated from the surrounding 
area constituted the lower class. Thus the two groups had traditionally been 
antagonised. Soon after the rally began, street fighting broke out between the wealthy 
Turcomans and the Kurds who constituted the majority of the oil workers (O'Ballance 
1973: 67). Taking this opportunity, the extreme right wing who had been suppressed 
by the regime sought revenge against the Communists as well. As the political rally 
turned into a general riot, the Kurds attacked the Turcomans, and the Arab nationalists 
attacked the Communists. 
After the Kirkuk revolt, Qassem took actions to curb the activities of the Communists. 
He did so by releasing the political enemies of the Communists held in prison and 
also by making the rcp illegal (O'Ballance 1973: 68). The use of excessive violence 
by the Communists aggravated relations between the NDP and the ICP. The 
Communist violence also caused many Kurdish sympathisers to tum against them as 
well (Kinnane: 62). From this time on, the KDP dropped its ostensibly Marxist-
Leninist tone and became a purely Kurdish nationalist organisation. The KDP was 
legalised in 1960, and secretary-general of the KDP Ibrahim Ahmad expressed his 
loyalty to Qassem. 
Slow Economic Expansion 
The revolutionary regime took a cautious approach to economic policy and declared 
that it would limit confiscation of private properties to only the ones inimical to public 
interest. Extensive private estates were confiscated for redistribution purposes~ 
however, the regime did not risk nationalisation of the Iraqi Petroleum Company 
(IPC). Iraq was seriously in need of oil revenue to proceed with numerous 
156 
development programmes and was still reliant on the IPC for the production and the 
sale of oil. The regime declared that the existing contract would be honoured until the 
time of its renewal in 1959. 
New negotiations with the IPC began in the Spring of 1959. Iraqi demand for greater 
output was frustrated by the concerns of the oil company, which was already worried 
about oil's falling price. Furthermore, the IPC upset the Iraqis by unilaterally cutting 
the posted price. This prompted the government to promulgate Law 80 in December 
1961. The law was designed to dispossess the oil companies of all land not yet used 
for oil production, and its enforcement amounted to the dispossession of 99.5 per cent 
of the area over which the companies held prospecting rights under the oil agreements 
(Khadduri 1969: 164). The law enjoyed high support among the population, and no 
subsequent government could ever reverse the terms. 
The development programme was somewhat erratic. The finance was drastically 
diverted from agriculture to the industrial sector: the proportion allocated to 
agriculture was reduced from 39 per cent to 12 per cent despite the fact that still half 
the total workforce was contained in the agrarian sector. This, however, was amended 
shortly afterwards to create a better balance. Overall, the Qassem regime did little or 
nothing to substantially improve economic and social conditions. Those projects 
completed under Qassem, such as the Darband-i Khan dam near Sulaimani, had been 
planned by Nuri Said's Government (Kinnane: 61). 
Agrarian Reforms and Kurdish Resistance 
157 
Land reform constituted part of the regime's key reforms. Its outcome showed, 
however, that the simple redistribution of land did not facilitate greater independence 
of impoverished peasants. The impact of agrarian reform turned out to be political as 
well, as it directly touched the rural community and potentially undermined the 
traditional society. It instantly created hostility to the regime because it attempted to 
change the existing social order. Qassem's agrarian reform in the Kurdish region did 
exactly this; the policy was met with increased hostility from the Kurds, as much of 
Kurdish society had been still dominated by traditional tribal leaders. The following 
section will firstly explain the general failure of the agrarian reforms at a state level 
before explaining the particular difficulty encountered in the Kurdish region. 
Iraqi land reform was based on the Egyptian model, although the conditions of the 
two countries were known to be very different: 'it (the Iraqi land reform law) 
provided for the expropriation of 75 per cent of the privately owned arable area of 
Iraq (over nine times the area that had been expropriated in Egypt). However, except 
for differences in the maximum holding of irrigated and non-irrigated land, the law 
took no account whatsoever of the great regional differences in Iraq, the wide variety 
in the conditions of tenure, in the role of landlords, and in the circumstances affecting 
different crops ... There were pitifully few people capable of effective farm 
management, organising marketing or credit, or even of giving advice to farmers, and 
in some areas peasant were still dependent on tribal ties' (Penrose: 241-4). 
Several other factors obstructed the effectiveness of the 1958 agrarian reform. The 
primary factor was the lack of planning skill, as the state's agency was incapable of 
substituting for the landlords' function to sustain production. The dispossessed 
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landlords were simply 'persuaded to continue to manage their lands and to provide the 
necessary agricultural requisites and guidance to the peasants at reduced renumeration 
and in conditions of the utmost insecurity' (Penrose: 241-2). Essential functions such 
as the supply of seeds, fertilisers, credits, maintenance of agricultural machinery, and 
irrigation facilities could not be sustained by the Ministry of Agriculture. The co-
operative movement also turned out to be unsuccessful in organising the deeply 
traditional peasants who feared communism: 'the peasants themselves did not 
understand the meaning and functions of co-operatives and feared the collectivisation 
and political organization that the militant communists were attempting to promote' 
(Penrose: 244). 
After experiencing a number of practical difficulties, the landlords in many places 
infonnally reestablished their clientelistic control over peasants (Penrose: 246). Thus 
the refonn did not lessen the power of the landlords, rather, it caused general 
confusion that necessitated reinstallment of landlords. Historically the village was the 
key system in agricultural production, and landowners were in charge of management 
and supervision (Lawless: Ill). Particularly in irrigation zones, peasants were heavily 
dependent on these managerial functions of the landlords. 
Even though extensive land-ownership was common in Kurdistan, the Kurds resisted 
the agrarian reforms for the following reasons. The highland Kurdish region is rain-
fed, and the peasants there were more capable of sustaining a higher degree of 
independence of landlords. The rental shares in the Kurdish region were lower than in 
the south, and this also allowed the peasants to have stronger bargaining powers vis-a-
vis the landlords (Lawless: 117). Therefore, the Kurds feared that reforms would 
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bring disruption of production and the collapse of traditional social structure. In 
September 1958, Abdul Salam Aref toured Kurdish territory and promised land 
reform. However, this announcement upset not only the Kurdish shaikhs and 
landowners, but also many of the tribal Kurds who feared Arab domination as a 
consequence of such reform, as it would allow penetration of the region by state 
authority (O'BaUance 1973: 65). Kinnane pointed to the importance of emotional 
loyalties to feudal leaders: 'In the country, the people were and still are conservative 
and largely attached to the feudal order by their social and economic condition. In the 
towns the "progressive" intelligentsia could expect support from the middle class and 
part of the lower artisan class. However, a Kurdish proletariat scarcely existed. The 
Kurds working in the oil industry ... did not make up a politically formidable working 
class' (Kinnane: 61). Thus even though feudalism and extensive land-ownership 
existed, the system was accepted by the people. The government's policy to introduce 
agrarian reforms into such an environment, only invited hostility from the Kurds. 
Final Days of Oassem Era 
By the early 1960s, Qassem was no longer able to balance antagonising ideological 
groups. Qassem's favourable relations with the Kurds too had broken down. By the 
middle of March 1961, five key members of the KDP were arrested, and the party 
ceased to operate publicly. The communists, too, were suppressed and removed from 
the high posts. 
The tension between the Kurds and the government was heightened from the early 
summer of 1961. During the Kuwait crisis, Qassem had refused to meet the delegation 
of the Kurds in June 1961 who were pleading for Government price control of the 
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tobacco crop. This refusal from Qassem prompted Abbas Muhammad, agha of 
Sulaimaniya, to laumch an armed resistance. Government troops were immediately 
sent against him. In August, Mustafa Barzani sent an ultimatum to Qassem, 
demanding an end to the 'transitional period' (Qassem's sole rule) (Kinnane: 65). 
Finally, the Kurdish-government war, which was to continue for the next seventeen 
months from September 1961 was 'triggered' by a tribal chief who was disgruntled by 
the land reform. The chief of the Ako tribe persuaded Barzani to join the war against 
the government. Initially Barzani was known to have resisted participation in the war. 
However, armed confrontation became inevitable when Ako ambushed an Iraqi 
military post in Barzani's territory (Pelletiere: 128). Some of the landowning Kurdish 
shaikhs who fled to Iran after the revolution had returned and joined the nationalists 
as well (Jawad 1981: 77-79). 
In sharp contrast to the quickly mobilised tribal forces, however, there was a debate 
among the younger intellectuals of the KDP who did wish not to participate in the 
war. For example, the secretary of the KDP, Ibrahim Ahmad, did not want the KDP to 
join the forces led by Mustafa Barzani. Ibrahim Ahmad considered that, 'what was 
taking place in the mountains was purely a tribal affair and Barzani was setting 
himself up as a traditional war leader and expanding his landholdings at the expense 
of his enemies' (Pelletiere: 130-1). Thus it was evident that the top leadership of the 
KDP was still loyal to Qassem and was reluctant to go into confrontation with the 
government. Earlier, in October 1961, Qassem closed down the KDP, which 
completely alienated the Kurds. The KDP tried at best to hold to a policy of non-
belligerence but as the war intensified, it finally decided to join Mustafa Barzani in 
December 1961 (Dann 1969: 338). 
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The war quickly escalated, mostly over the mountainous tribal regIon. This also 
reflected the fact that the majority of the Kurds still lived in the tribal society and that 
economic and social reforms set out by Qassem failed to reach the countryside. Dann 
commented that tribal loyalty was still prevalent even among the sedentarised tribes: 
'it was a testimony of the persistence of tribal loyalties among Kurds that the largely 
settled Ako (tribe) were prepared to follow their agha to war on such an issue' (Dann 
1969: 336-7). The chief of the Ako tribe, Abbas Muhammad Agha was known for 
refusing for years to heed the Iraqi army's call for conscription, thus, such tribes were 
the least integrated into the Iraqi state. When Abbas Muhhamad sent his tribesmen to 
the army in later years, it was only in order for them to have military training in the 
use of modem weapons (Schmidt: 192). 
The war prompted many Kurds in the Iraqi Army to desert and join the Kurdish 
nationalists (Marr 1985: 178). The Assyrians also joined the Kurdish nationalist 
forces, as they showed no loyalty to the revolutionary regime (Pelletiere: 128). 
Fighting continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In an effort to 
demoralise the Kurds, the government used heavy aerial bombardment on thousands 
of the defenceless mountain villages. The Kurds fought back by seizing gendarmerie 
posts, closing roads, and eliminating isolated military units. The prolonged war in the 
north increasingly contributed to Qassem's unpopularity. Many Kurdish civilians 
were forced to flee their homes and became refugees. International rescue operations 
were hampered, as the Iraqi Red Crescent Society refused to invite the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to enter the country (Kinnane: 67, also Schmidt: 243). 
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It is important to note that even during the fiercest confrontation with the government, 
Barzani's forces did not attempt to flout Baghdad's sovereignty. Barzani only tried to 
contact, unsuccessfully, the United Nations to protest against the bombing of Kurdish 
villages (Schmidt: 69). He clearly denied intention to secede from Iraq, and he 
deprecated the prospect of creating a pan-Kurdish movement: 'those other Kurds (in 
neighbouring states), have no means of helping us. Sometimes an individual comes to 
us from Turkey or Iran. Some of them are outlaws in their own countries and come to 
fight with us. Then we keep them here. But in general we have no contact with them. 
We seek no help from them. They will be better off if they settle their problems with 
the governments of the countries in which they live' (Schmidt: 206). Barzani also said 
'I have no relations with Iran or Turkey. I am in this [Iraqi] situation, and I want to 
make this [Iraqi] situation better. I am not concerned with people living outside this 
country. I am living in Iraq and dealing with problems in Iraq' (Schmidt: 242, 
February 1963). Thus the Kurds avoided any action or statement which would 
provoke the Ankara or Teheran regimes to act against them, and insisted their fight 
was only concerned with the fate of the Iraqi Kurds (Kinnane: 70). 
Anti-nationalist Tribes 
In his final days, Qassem actively supported the Kurdish tribes that had traditionally 
been hostile to the Barzanis. Qassem thought the Barzanis were becoming too 
powerful a faction within Iraq, and to reduce their influence he began playing the anti-
nationalist tribes against them (O'Ballance 1973: 69). Thus, it appeared the Qassem 
regime no longer cared about its ideological position, but became totally reliant on 
balancing one force against another. Qassem' s government eyen armed the Arab 
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Shammar tribe; however, they showed no interest in fighting the Kurds. The most 
effective method was to use Barzani's traditional rival tribes, such as the Rikanis, 
Zibaris and the Barwaris. This was basically the same old policy made by the 
monarchy (or even before) for containing the Kurdish nationalists. When most of the 
Kurdish tribes rallied under the nationalists, the pro-government tribes, such as the 
Zibaris, Herkis and Baradosts supported the government as they were assured that 
they could retain their land as a quid pro quo (Jawad 1981: 69). At the same time, a 
division like this demonstrated Kurdish society's low degree of mutual contacts: it 
allowed the government to resort to a divide and rule policy with ease. 
Alliance against Qassem 
In the end, the social forces that rallied to remove Qassem were composed of the Arab 
nationalists, the Baathists, and the old conservative class seeking to reverse his 
policies. His reforms also provoked the conservative Shia ulama in the south who 
founded the Islamic Party of Iraq and declared nationalisation and land redistribution 
'haram' or religiously forbidden (Hiro 1990: 23). The Kurds also cooperated with the 
anti-Qassem forces, in the hope of stopping the war. Unfortunately 'the only obvious 
partners for the Kurds were, paradoxically, the Baathists and the (Arab) nationalists, 
in spite of their apparent lack of enthusiasm for any concrete acknowledgement of the 
validity of Kurdish national aspirations' (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett: 80). When the 
Baathists started attacking Qassem' s headquarters on 8 February 1963, a mass 
demonstration broke out in Baghdad still in support of him. Qassem' s era ended on 9 
February 1963 when he was shot and killed by the Baathists. 
Summary 
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Given his general inexperience in government and lack of economic resources 
, 
Qassem's era was too short to substantially alter the social Structure. It did not go 
beyond destroying the existing social structure. Hanna Batatu comments, '(T)he 
revolution upset the old power structure and the old class configuration, has disturbed 
the delicate balance between the Arabs and Kurds and the Shias and Sunnis, mainly 
owing to the unevenness in the social development of these communities' (Batatu: 
807). The key beneficiaries of Qassem's policies were confined to the deprived 
population in urban areas, who did not even believe the news of his death. As many 
historians acknowledge, Qassem was genuinely concerned about the poor, and made a 
spectacular and permanent change to urban slums through extensive public housing 
projects. 
As a whole, the Iraqi revolution and the Qassem era can be characterised more by the 
balancing of antagonising groups than integrating them, even though Qassem's belief 
in Iraq-first policy was unmistakable. The revolutionary regime was equivalent to 
Turkey's state-formation period under Ataturk, but was far less successful. However, 
Iraq's state-building suffered heavily from colonial legacy. Its society was divided 
between the rich and the poor, and due to slow economic integration, different ethnic 
and religious groups kept their own identities and interests. On top of this, strong 
foreign influence from Arab countries disturbed the potential incentive for Iraqi 
integration. Not only were political institutions weak, but the pillar of it, the army was 
dominated by the Sunni Arab group. As a result, Qassem became insecure and relied 
on the support of certain groups while unable to reconcile the antagonistic group. The 
I 960s revolt was also a result of Qassem 's failure to integrate the younger generation 
of Kurdish nationalists, despite the loyalty shown him until the last moment. 
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It is more important, however, to evaluate the precedents he established in his attempt 
to unite a country that lacked a significant preexisting unity rather than simply note 
the little actual progress he made in national integration. These precedents included an 
effort to appoint more Shias and the Kurds to public posts, acceptance of minorities, 
recognition of the Kurdish nation, greater political freedom, exercise of sovereignty 
over the oil company, and above all, an Iraq-first policy. Except for the nationalisation 
of the IPC, no subsequent regimes have promoted those policies and as a result they 
have fallen into a dictatorship by the Sunni minority. In this sense, both the Kurds and 
Qassem lost an important ally in each other. 
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4. Integration or Containment? 
Introduction 
This section discusses the two states' increased capability to either integrate or 
contain Kurdish nationalism in recent decades. What seems common to both states is 
increased Kurdish and other political mobilisation and increased institutional 
development, if of a different variety - one more pluralistic, another more totalitarian. 
Turkey had never officially abandoned the secularism set out by Mustafa Kemal; 
however, it was during this era that the Islamic religion gained political 
instrumentality as a counter-leftist and counter-ethnonationalist ideology and began to 
be actively used by the state authorities. Still, in Turkey, the debate over the Kurdish 
question in general had become increasingly common as the calls for democratisation 
increased since the mid-1990s, a sign of the country's transition to prototypical 
national integration. In contrast, the Iraqi government led by the Baath Party 
strengthened state autonomy by making use of the dramatic increase of oil revenue 
since the 1970s, and succeeded in muting practically all domestic opposition. It was 
from this decade that the government's Kurdish policy became extremely suppressive 
and involved repeated use of chemical weapons. This was one manifestation of the 
totalitarian state structure. 
Turkey 
The 1971 Military Intervention 
By the late 1960s, the system of proportional representation, originally introduced in 
1960 to pre\'ent one-party dominance, accelerated political fragmentation and led to 
167 
weak coalition governments of the centre-right. The relative waning of the Cold War 
also contributed to boosting the activities of leftist organisations (Harris: 161). Social 
disorder spread among ideologically radicalised youth and labour organisations. 
Finally, an uncontrollable state of violence provided the context in which the military-
dominated National Security Council issued an ultimatum to the prime minister 
Suleyman Demirel, forcing him to resign on 12 March 1971. This military takeover 
was also known as 'Coup by Memorandum'. Although the civilian administration was 
maintained throughout the military takeover, the NSC exercised strong influence from 
behind the scenes. The intervention resulted in a number of arrests of politicians and 
political activists. Military rule would last until the October 1973 general election. 
National Salvation Party (1972) 
The Islamist party that had been increasingly influential throughout the 1960s finally 
entered public life after 1971. The former National Order Party re-established itself as 
the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972. The NSP broke the historic barrier with 
the secular and centre-left RPP and formed a coalition with it in 1974. The NSP's 
supporters were found in the lower-middle class, and among small traders and other 
persons of modest income from rural areas. They were the social groups hardest hit by 
Turkey's periodic economic cnses and the ones who were least able to defend 
themselves through existing social institutions. These groups felt not only their 
economic welfare but also their traditional institutions and values to be under attack. 
They saw the growing socialist movement as a threat to the family, religion and 
cultural values (MER July-August 1988). The NSP had strong influence in the 
Kurdish region as well, indicative of the still strongly Islamic nature of Kurdish 
society in rural areas (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 103). 
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The NSP came to acquire the third largest representation in both the 1973 and 1977 
parliamentary elections (Landau: 318-9). The rise of the NSP also facilitated the 
revival of the Islamic culture and seemed to have facilitated the marriage of Sunni 
Islam and Turkish nationalism in general. Turkey's Islamic nationalists, belonging to 
the lower to middle class, resented the foreign-backed big business in Istanbul and 
growing atheistic leftist organisations. Consequentially, the NSP came to have broad 
support, from the nationalist far-right to the Islamic majority. During the 1970s, 
Turkey witnessed a Mosque construction boom, and it even became fashionable for 
government officials to fast during Ramadan. Many educated people could be seen at 
Friday noon prayers, which was described as, 'inconceivable in Ataturk's lifetime' 
(Harris: 129). 
Political Right Wing and the Islamists 
Soon after the restoration of civilian rule In 1973, street violence resurfaced, and 
many militant groups resumed their activities. There was a rapid increase in extremist 
political activities - both right and left - in the years that followed the general amnesty 
of 1971. The memorandum of 1971 changed nothing in terms of either the political 
structures or party activity (Tachau 199-+: 551). It was during this decade that the 
polarisation of extreme-right and extreme-left became most preeminent. The 
important feature of the 1970s' political violence was a sharp increase of right wing 
motivated violence, unlike that of the previous decade which was dominated primarily 
by the leftist organisations (Laquer: 241). 
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The right wing increased their inclination towards Islamic ideology. The Nationalist 
Action Party sponsored extra-parliamentary youth violence, whose ideology was 
based on Islamic and Turkish nationalist lines (Landau: 319). The ultra-nationalist 
Sunni Islam organisations increased their attacks on the heterodox Alevi sect and also 
on the Kurdish nationalist and Turkish leftist organisations. Turkey's Alevi sect 
belongs to a branch of Shia Islam, and encompasses both Kurdish and Turkish 
followers. Because of their experience of religious persecution under the Ottoman 
Empire which was based on Sunni Islam, Alevis traditionally supported secularism 
under the Turkish Republic. The clash between Alevis and Sunni fundamentalists in 
December 1978 was known to be the most spectacular example of religious conflict in 
modem Turkey, which prompted the authorities to declare martial law (Harris: 15). 
The Turkish Left and the Kurdish Nationalism 
Both legal and extra-legal leftist parties were active since the 1960s. Of the former, 
the Turkish Workers Party was born of the political liberalisation following the 1960 
coup. It was the first legal political party in Turkey that recognised the existence of 
the Kurds. At its fourth congress, in 1970, it claimed: 'there is a Kurdish people in the 
cast of Turkey ... The fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected 
the Kurdish people to a policy of assimilation and intimidation which often invited a 
bloody repression' (Gunter 1997: 8, also Kirsci and Winrow: 108). The Turkish 
Workers Party was closed down in 1971. 
(her time, however, the Turkish left evolved toward Marxism, and stated that the 
solution to the Kurdish conflict \\"as achievable through class struggle. For this reason, 
many leftists considered Kurdish demands as 'untimely if not reactionary' 
(Bruinessen 1992: 32-3), and regarded Kurdish nationalism as a secondary issue next 
to the Marxist revolution. The Kurdish leftists, on the other hand, regarded the 
recognition of Kurdish nationalism as the first priority and aimed to lead the Kurds' 
own version of a proletariat revolution (Kirsci and Winrow: 110). Thus it was 
important to note that Turkey's political left was divided into factions each with a 
different emphasis on Kurdish nationalism. For example, the Revolutionary Left, a 
Marxist-Leninist organisation, came into being in 1978. Its key ideologue, Dursan 
Karatas, was an ethnic Kurd, and he publicly declared that he was a Kurd and that 
Turkey was a country with two nations - the Kurds and the Turks. Yet, Karatas 
rejected a form of organisation based on ethno-nationalism (Yonah and Pluchinsky: 
243) and indicated that emphasis on Kurdish nationalism divided the working class on 
ethnic lines. In his words 'the liberation of the Kurdish and Turkish people today is 
possible only through a joint organisation. This is the way to self-determination for 
the Kurdish people. As a separate initiative, liberation is impossible' (Yonah and 
Pluchinsky: 243). 
The Rise of the PKK 
On the other hand, a Marxist, yet more specifically Kurdish, organisation emerged in 
the same year as the Revolutionary Left and was known by its Kurdish acronym PKK, 
or the Kurdish Workers' Party. From the 1970s, many Kurdish groups began to speak 
up for Kurdish national rights, which made a sharp contrast to the pre-1970 period 
\vhen the demands of the Kurds were confined to a basic concern for economic 
development of the Kurdish provinces (Bruinessen 1992: 32-3). The PKK' score 
members had been gathering together since the early 1970s. The founder of the PKK, 
Abdullah Ocalan, was originally involved in a Turkish leftist organisation when he 
was a university student in Ankara. The members of the PKK were dra\\"n almost 
exclusively from the lowest social classes. They were 'the uprooted, half-educated 
village and small-town youth who knew what it felt like to be oppressed, and who 
wanted action, not ideological sophistication' (Bruinessen, MER July-August 1988). 
The organisation saw Kurdistan as a 'classic colony', and labelled feudal Kurdish 
landlords 'collaborators of the government and exploiters (Bruinessen, Ibid.). 
Over time, the PKK became the most influential organisation among the poorest 
stratum of the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. The rise of the PKK demonstrated that 
Turkish integration policies had failed to incorporate the most neglected. A Kurd from 
Turkey gave his personal view about the PKK phenomenon: 
'The PKK was the first Kurdish organisation that was able to continue its 
struggle without a break. There were large numbers of Kurdish organisations in 
Turkey aiming to protect and develop the rights of the Kurds. There were Kurdish 
leaders who led the revolts against the government, but they had feudal and tribal 
mentality. However, the PKK involved, for the first time, women in its struggle and 
organised the national struggle differently. This ability to continue the struggle was 
what distinguished the PKK from other nationalist organisations' (Kerim Yildiz). 
The following is a comment from a young woman involved in the PKK: 
'We support the PKK because they are the only ones who remained inside 
Kurdistan .... The intellectuals who ran the Kurdish national movement were talking 
when the situation was calm, but when conditions became difficult they fled to 
hlrope and spent their time in obscure quarrels' (TvtE December 1987). 
Both comments indicated that the PKK was closely associated with the most 
neglected and deprived Kurds in Turkey. The emergence of the Kurdish nationalist 
organisation based on Marxism could be explained by the slow speed of economic 
development in southeastern Turkey. The economic development of the southeastern 
region constantly lagged behind the rest of Turkey. During the 1970s, both light and 
heavy industries expanded greatly under the third Five-Year Plan (1973-78). Despite 
the fact that redressing of income disparity was one of the targets of the plan, little 
progress was made in the southeast, and a great imbalance remained (Harris: 82). 
While the literacy rate in the 1960s was around 40 per cent and rose to 70 per cent 
over the next twenty years, the lowest rate was in the predominantly Kurdish 
southeast Anatolia, and illiteracy among women was double that of men (Harris: 23). 
Interim Summary 
Rapid industrial growth and class stratification could be given as major characteristics 
of Turkish society in the 1970s, at least in its urban sector. This appeared to have 
diluted the pre-existing ethnic and sectarian differences in Turkish society. However, 
the picture was not so straightforward. Certain classes or ideologies had come to be 
associated with certain ethnic or religious groups, thus creating overlapping cleavages 
in a rapidly modernising society. For example, the deprived stratum of the Kurds was 
attracted to Turkish leftist organisations and/or Kurdish nationalist organisations that 
advocated Marxism. On the other hand, the political right wing attracted conservatiYe 
Sunni Muslims who, at the same time, were often ultra-Turkish nationalists. Another 
cxample was the heterodox A1eyj Muslims, whether they were Kurdish or Turkish, 
attracted to political parties that adyocated secular ideology. This relatively high 
coincidence of ethnicity and political allegiance intensified ideological conflicts. 
However, the leftists' representation of the Kurdish cause could certainly be seen as a 
sign that integration could dilute ethnic differences. 
The 1980 Intervention 
By the late 1970s, political violence became a fact of life in Turkey, particularly in 
urban areas. It was said that the Turkish street scene became a free-for-all and law and 
order broke down. It was not only extreme left and right groups that became violent. 
All kinds of communal and ethnic riots took place also (Laquer: 2.+1). Suspected 
terrorists were hunted down and censorship was tightened. In 1978, the state 
authorities finally declared martial law. However, this affected only the legally 
operating organisations. Activities of underground organisations continued unabated. 
In a way, the violent situation reminiscent of the pre-1971 period resurfaced again. 
The cause of the 1980 intervention was summarised by Tachau as, 'liberalisation of 
the regime encouraged the further fragmentation of the party system through the 
formation of additional parties. Frequent elections made party rivalries a common 
feature of Turkish politics' (Tachau 1994: 551). The Turkish army finally intervened 
on 12 September 1980 to take over a government which was no longer capable of 
containing the violence. For the next three years, all political power would be 
concentrated in the hands of the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC). 
Less than a decade after the military intervention of 1971, another intervention was 
required in order to restore public security. The intervention was said to be largely 
welcomed by the public, including even those who espoused leftist ideology and those 
who despised the military (LA T 1.+ Sept. 1980). However, the draconian measures 
taken by the military regime, to be discussed below, created long term problems in the 
area of civil liberties. 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
One important feature of the national integration policy of the 1980 military regime 
was the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', which was a deliberate encouragement of Islamic 
social forces by the state. It was aimed at countering both the leftist and the 
'separatist' ideologies. In this aspect Turkish-Islamic synthesis was not unlike Abdul 
Hamid II's pan-Islamism, which had served to contain Kurdish nationalism almost 
exactly a century before. The state authority was alarmed by the spread of 
ideologically motivated violence to the small towns which had been dominated by 
conservative social forces. Particularly, the combination of leftist ideology and 
Kurdish nationalism alarmed the state authority (Landau: 318). 
The state authority's increased tolerance towards the Islamic religion had already 
been a continuous trend since the 1960s, and this had continued during the 1980s as 
well. The Third Turkish Republic actively fostered Islam, portraying it as a defender 
of national unity. The regime 'saw great merit in encouraging Islamic ideas and 
education as an antidote to Marxism' (MEl 11 July 1997). In 1982, the teaching of 
Islam was made compulsory in secondary education, and during the three years of 
direct military rule the number of Islamic faculties at university-level education rose 
from two to eight (MEl, Ibid.). Similarly, the number of 'imam-hatip' schools 
providing religious education established by the government increased from 72 in 
1970 to 374 in 1980 (Zubaida 1996). These measures created large numbers of 
educated Muslim intellectuals who constituted a viable counter-force to Kemalism 
and the Western orientation of Turkish educational and political culture in general 
(Zubaida, Ibid.). 
Structural Reforms 
The 1980 regime dramatically changed Turkey's political scene by imposing radical 
reforms. First, it banned all political parties for the first time in the history of the 
Turkish Republic (Landau: 319). All the existing political parties were dissolved in 
October 1981. Second, responding to the late seventies' political disorder, the 1982 
constitution heavily emphasised the unity of the country. The preamble of the new 
constitution proclaimed 'the determination that no protection shall be afforded to 
thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the 
existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and territory' (as in Gunter 
1997: 9). Article 118 of the constitution institutionalised the military's predominant 
position in the country through the National Security Council (Gunter 1997: 9). In 
coming to power, General Kenan Evren diagnosed Turkey's illness as having 
stemmed from constitutional inadequacies and partisan practice (Harris: 169). Thus, 
the following the six-point program was given as a remedy to cure the problems: to 
preserve national unity, restore security, reinvigorate state authority, ensure social 
peace, apply social justice, and reinstate civilian rule (Harris: 169-70). Article 5 of the 
constitution defined the fundamental tasks of the Turkish state as the safeguarding of 
'the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the 
country, the Republic' (as in Kirsci and Winrow: Ill). It is important to note that this 
change affected areas that were traditionally under civilian control, such as 
detcll11ining the school curriculum, regulating T\, stations' broadcasting hours, and 
abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament (Sakallioglu: 158). 
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Article 26 prohibited the use of Kurdish, including private use. It reads: 'No language 
prohibited by the State shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought'. 
'Any written or printed documents, photograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and 
other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized' 
(Gunter 1997: 9). Accordingly, Newruz, the Kurdish celebration of the New Year on 
March 21, was banned, and the Newruz festivity became the rallying point for the 
Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state. Under Article 28, 'publication shall not be 
made in any language prohibited by law'. Many people were indicted for allegedly 
weakening national unity by showing sympathy to the Kurds, including the Turkish 
writer Ismail Besikci (Zurcher: 312). The ban on non-Turkish languages was 
reinforced on 22 October 1983 by Law 2932. The law asserted Turkish to be the 
native language of Turkey's citizens and prohibited the use of other languages, 
including participation in activities that would promote their use (Gunter 1997: 98). 
The law would remain in force for the next eight years. 
Not unnaturally, the new constitution enjoyed a lower approval rate in the 15 
predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces, with 'no' votes at 11.9 per cent 
compared to the country average of 8.6 per cent (Kirsci and Winrow: 111) Yet, across 
the country, the new constitution was approved by 92 per cent of the voters (Finkel 
and Hale: 111). However, it was also pointed out that in 1982 when the referendum 
was held, any campaign against the military was simply 'unthinkable' (Finkel and 
Hale: 111). 
Transition to Civi han Rule 
In the attempt to prevent fragmentation of political parties, a 10 per cent barrier was 
imposed on all political parties as a prerequisite for entry into the national assembly. 
Under this measure, it became almost impossible for the smaller and regional parties 
to enter the parliament. Civilian rule was restored after the November 1983 election, 
and legislation was passed to allow the establishment of the new political parties 
(April 1983). However, at the general election, only three officially authorised parties 
were allowed to run. They were the Motherland Party (MP), the National Democracy 
Party (NDP), and the Populist Party (PP). Other key parties, such as the True Path 
Party (TPP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) were able to compete 
only in municipal elections (Finkel and Hale: 105). Because of this, the result of the 
municipal election was regarded as the more accurate reflection of the voters' will. 
In the first local election (March 1984), the MP remained the majority but the TPP 
showed considerable strength. An important feature of this local election was that the 
two officially created parties, the NDP and the Populist Party, both failed to clear the 
10 per cent barrier, and therefore, both parties were totally discredited by the 
electorate. In November 1985, following its defeat in their first local election, the 
Populist Party decided to merge with the SDPP. For a while, the MP maintained its 
majority. However, from the late 1980s, its main competitors - the TPP and the 
Welfare Party - began to show strength against it (Finkel and Hale: 124). By contrast, 
the leftist strength remained weak and divided; this resulted from the establishment of 
the Democratic Left Party, a rival to the SDPP. On the other hand, in a clear contrast 
to the weak leftist camp, the Islamic Welfare Party strengthened its share in the vote 
in the 1991 election. 
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Escalation of Terrorism 
Meanwhile, the PKK had been carrying out a series of terrorist attacks from the early 
1980s targeted at government forces as well as pro-government Kurds and villages 
under their control. To counter the PKK insurgency, Turkish troops of about 220,000 
were concentrated in the southeast region excluding the special counter-guerrilla force 
and the Village Guards, to be discussed below (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 1-+0). By 
1996, around 3,000 villages were reported to have been rendered uninhabitable by the 
military'S scorched-earth policy which was aimed at cutting off the PKK's logistical 
base by burning entire settlements. Thus, the regime persecuted the mass of civilians. 
It created displaced Kurds seeking shelter and food and facilitated rapid migration to 
the cities by these Kurdish refugees who feared being caught in the war between the 
security forces and the PKK (MEl 7 June 1996). The displaced people were soon 
concentrated in the neighbouring big cities in the region, such as Diyarbakir and 
Adana. It is also important to note that there are other Kurdish nationalist groups 
besides the PKK who advocated the independence of all Turkey's Kurds. It is known 
that there is an anti-PKK Kurdish organisation called Tevger, strengthened by the 
PKK defectors. However their influence was confined to Europe and as a result, PKK 
became the 'only' organisation which enjoyed broad support in the Kurdish region of 
Turkey (Zurcher: 314). 
Public opinion had hardened over the ten years of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
campaign. As terrorism became a serious problem, all opposition parties began 
criticising the government's inability to restore the law and order. The expenditures 
on the military campaign eroded the Turkish economy: 'Ten years of military effort, 
at an estimated cost of 74 billion dollars, may have prevented the spread of terrorism, 
but it did not provide a solution and it transfonned the conflict into a mass 
insurrection. Moreover, the government, by spending 33 per cent of its total revenue 
on this problem, neglected education and health services. The war against the Kurds 
was itself creating a 'war economy' in the southeast: the longer the war continued, the 
more funds were funnelled to the military. The whole country was affected by the 
Kurdish problem. This has created an anti-Kurdish backlash among the Turkish 
popUlation and further polarised the situation' (Yavuz: April 1996). 
Roots of Insurgency and Social Structure Problem 
The escalation of the conflict led, in 1986, to the creation of the Village Guard system 
recruited from pro-government Kurdish tribes. The number of Village Guards was 
about 60,000. They were generously paid and were ready to support the Turkish 
military'S operation against the PKK. The PKK carried out intensive attacks on those 
Village Guards in 1987, and in many cases killed their whole families including 
women and children (Zurcher: 313). It is particularly important to note the structural 
foundation of the Village Guard system. 
The Turkish Republic constantly failed to modify the sharp social division resulting 
from excessive concentration of land ownership. From the time of the Ottoman 
administration the tribal chiefs have benefited from extensive landownership and 
continued to prosper under the modem economy. Those who became the PKK's 
target were often wealthy landlords. The income disparity between the Kurds 
remained stark even in the 1980s. Exploitation by the landlords even accelerated the 
involuntary migration. The Turkish newspaper Aydinlik's report on 'Causes of 
Migration from East' (3 July 1980) reads, 'landO\\·nership is everything in the East 
180 
today. The landlords make the peasants under their patronage work like slaves and use 
various methods to make them dependent on the landlords. A peasants' debt to the 
landlords whose fields he works can never be paid off. The landlords apply every kind 
of pressure to the peasants who work for them, including economic exploitation' (as 
in WER 1611,20 Aug.1980). The PKK emerged as a counter-force on the side of 
these peasants. An anonymous Kurd from Turkey, who is from a shaikhly family 
states these days aghas enjoy less authority from the people. 
'When I was nine or eight years old, I remember old men were kissing my 
hand, because I was from a shaikh's family, and people respected us. Right now, 
aghas and shaikhs no longer have the same influence that they used to have. It's 
changed since the appearance of the PKK in 1984. Even they (the aghas and shaikhs) 
have joined the Kurdish struggle. They are no longer respected just because they are 
shaikhs and aghas. The PKK also forced the people to choose their side. It became 
impossible to be somewhere in between. For the Kurds or not, the PKK forced the 
choice' . 
With regards to the above point of forcing the 'choice', it was reported that some 
Kurdish clans in the southeast divided leadership roles among kin in order to avoid 
retaliation from either (the state or the PKK) side: 
'Fikri Agha's sons in Hakkari (a Kurdish town) had one brother support the 
pre-1980 Republican People's Party as the candidate for local elections, the second 
brother was acti\'\.~ in a right wing political party organisation, the third managed the 
property in the village, and the youngest supported one of the clandestine Kurdish 
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nationalist groups. When the youngest was at one point sought by the military 
authorities for his alleged political involvements, he had no problem seeking refuge 
among his tribesmen' (Yalcin-Heckmann 1990). 
Public projects were planned with an attempt to develop the southeast region, but such 
projects too only benefited these landlords. The South East Anatolian Development 
Project (Turkish acronym, GAP) was commenced in 1983 with a 32 billion dollar 
investment. It was an ambitious project that aimed at harnessing the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers. In completion, it was estimated that the region would have 21 dams 
and 19 hydroelectric power plants and a network of irrigation canals, thus providing 
infrastructure to the underdeveloped region. The project channelled a huge amount of 
public spending to the Kurdish region, but did not produce any significant impact on 
the economy of the region as a whole. It was calculated that between 1983 and 1992 
the ratio of expenditure to revenues was higher in the eastern and southeastern regions 
than any other part of the country, and so was the per capita public investment 
spending (Kirsci and Winrow: 124). However, the unemployment rate remained 
extremely high (36 per cent) and also private investment remained very weak (Kirsci 
and Winrow: 125). It was also pointed out that unskilled workers, as a result of non-
education, would never benefit from the project (Randal: 291). The mass evacuation 
resulting from the war between the armed forces and the PKK continued unabated. 
Furthern10re, the land subject to the GAP was privately owned. It was once again a 
handful of private landlords \vho could make a fortune from the project. Ahmad 
(1993: 204) pointed out: 
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1) The pattern of income distribution was altered in favour of the rich at the 
expense of those in the middle and lower classes, many of whom were pushed 
down to the level of the poor. 
2) Modem, economic liberalisation and structural adjustment exacerbated nation-
wide inequality: the main losers were the peasants (whose subsidies were 
reduced) and workers, and the beneficiaries were of those who engaged in big 
business and industrial enterprises. World Bank reports placed Turkey 
amongst the seven countries with the worst figures for income disparity. 
An infonnant commented that exploitation by village aghas is still severe even to this 
day. However, the state fails to take any effective action largely for political reasons: 
'Under aghas, people are working like slaves. Those slave-like people are 
theoretically entitled to go to school and receive education, but practically, the war 
and conflict between the Kurdish nationalists and the government closed down the 
schools in the area. Aghas are also the government's puppets. The real power is in the 
National Security Council, but they find it easier to control the population through 
aghas. Most of the Kurdish landowners are pro-government' (Kerim Yildiz). 
For reasons which were greatly to do with the social structure, the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey can not be spoken of simply in tenns of confrontation between an ethnic 
group and the govenlment. There was a socioeconomic division that cut across 
Kurdish society, but the state so far failed to integrate the Kurds who belonged to the 
poorest stratum. The failure in education policy seems to be seriously affecting the 
Kurds' social mobility. A Kurdish student who applied to the Diyarbekir Technical 
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College said he was selected because 'I was the only one who spoke Turkish well 
enough' (TME April 1986). This was the circumstance in as late as in the 1980s. 
Also, a political refugee in Switzerland who used to be in the teaching profession in 
Turkey recalled 'I hated my profession. Because I had to teach the children in 
Turkish; it was absurd to explain things to the children in Turkish, when they only 
understood Kurdish' (SRWA August 1991). 
Turkish State and the Right Wing 
An important characteristic of the Turkish authorities' response to the PKK's violence 
was that the state became involved in the right-wing 1slamist group, known as 
Hizbullah (Party of God). Emergency rule in the southeast region was enacted in 1987 
under the premiership of Turgut Oza1. It was during this period that the special 
counter-guerrilla team was established as a hit squad geared at attacking the PKK. At 
the same time, from the year 1990 onward, the political murders of human rights 
activists and sympathisers dramatically increased. The unaccounted killing of pro-
Kurdish journalists and human rights activists continued to rise. Attacks on pro-
Kurdish newspapers such as 'Ozgur Gundem' (Free Agenda) and 'Yeni Ulke' (New 
Country) multiplied, along with attacks on PKK members and alleged sympathisers of 
the PKK. It was widely known that Hizbullah was behind those murders. Hizbullah is 
operative in key Kurdish cities in the southeast. It is suggested that Hizbullah is 
comprised of the right \ving religious nationalists among the Kurds (Bruinessen: MER 
April-June 1996). They are joined by former state police and security officials purged 
from the government in 1991. The state actively utilised Hizbullah's hatred of leftist 
ideology and their hostility towards PKK sympathisers including numerous journalists 
and intellectuals (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 72-3). The go\'ernment allowed those 
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militia to operate freely, trained them, and closed their eyes to these groups' extra-
legal violence. 'While more than 4,000 "separatist suspects" had been detained since 
January 1992, not a single one of the slayings of the Kurdish leaders or sympathisers 
resulted in an arrest' (Gunter 1997: 105). 
The link between the state's security force and those gangsters was gradually brought 
to the light after a series of incidents. In November 1996, the former head of state 
security in charge of the eastern region and a wanted gunman were killed in a car 
crash and were thus found to have been travelling in the same car. One of the victims, 
who escaped with serious injuries, was Sedat Bucak, an MP and hereditary Kurdish 
chief with a 10,000-strong militia behind him. The Bucak affair brought to the light 
the close connection between the state, the right wing, and the pro-government Kurds 
more obviously than any other evidence. Hugh Pope summarises: 'At the heart of the 
matter is whether Turkey is increasingly harbouring an unholy alliance of right-wing 
extremists, corrupt security chiefs and state-backed Kurdish feudal lords, a kind of 
state within a state formed under the pretext of the 12-year old war against Kurdish 
rebels and a longer struggle with left-wing militants' (MEl 22 Nov. 1996). Another 
incident was an arrest of another wanted fugitive in August 1998 who was arrested in 
France and found carrying three passports, one with diplomatic privilege. Nobody can 
doubt that the state is connected to Islamic right wing criminals, and they are used for 
anti leftist and anti Kurdish operations. 
lnternationalisation of the Conflict 
The cycle of the notorious scorched earth policy followed by the Turkish army in their 
hunt for suspected PKK sympathisers created internal displacement in a large number 
185 
of Kurdish villages in the southeast. Thousands of people had to be evacuated by 
trucks to nearby cities, such as Adana and Diyarbekir. The vicious cycle of violence, 
village burning by the anny and the PKK's attacks on village guards created a refugee 
problem that spilled over to the Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq for the first time 
during the 1980s. Civilians in both territories were caught between the Turkish Anny 
and the PKK. 
The first border incursion by the Turkish anny took place in May 1983. Turkish 
forces launched major reprisal attacks against the PKK 18 miles into Iraqi Kurdistan. 
This was prepared by an accord that had been concluded between Turkey and Iraq in 
1978 to pursue 'subversive elements' 9 miles into each other's territory. However, 
this was extended in 1984 to 18 miles (Hiro 1990: 149). The Iraqi Kurds suffered 
heavy casualties from the operation of the Turkish anny. In response, the KDP made 
an agreement with the PKK to allow them the use of northern Iraqi territory which it 
controlled. While the PKK-KDP relations deteriorated over time through the PKK's 
violence toward Iraqi Kurdish villagers a similar protocol was made with the PUK in 
May 1989. This coincided with the PKK's concluding an alliance with Turkish leftist 
organisations such as Dev Sol. The PKK stopped its attacks on the villagers but 
continued to cause havoc in the Iraqi Kurdish villages under the KDP's control. 
First Official Recognition 
The series of conflicts sparked an in flood of Iraqi Kurdish refugees into Turkey. 
Turkey had long denied the existence of the Kurds and kept calling them 'mountain 
Turks'. However, it was hard to maintain this stance after the t\\'o Gulf Wars. During 
the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, there were 36,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees 
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in Diyarbekir who fled Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks. The Gulf War in 1991 
also ended with half a million Iraqi Kurdish refugees pouring into Turkey, whom 
Turkey originally tried to refuse entry. These events prompted the then Turkish Prime 
Minister Turgut Ozal to take a far more 'realistic' policy towards the Kurds. Ozal met 
the Iraqi Kurds' leaders and also granted amnesty to the Turkish Kurds, including 
former Diyarbekir mayor Mehdi Zana. Turgut Ozal launched his first initiati\"e in 
reversing the state's policy toward the Kurds in 1989; in a statement he said 'if in the 
first years of the Republic, during the single-party period, the state committed 
mistakes on this matter, it is necessary to recognise these' (Briefing, Oct. 2, 1989, as 
in Gunter 1997: 98). 
Turgut Ozal himself had a Kurdish connection. In his announcement, Ozal publicly 
admitted his grandmother was Kurdish. Although he was elected from Istanbul, Ozal 
maintained close ties with his locality, Malatya, one of the major cities in the 
predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. Ozal was a technocrat of the same generation 
as Suleiman Demirel and served the State Planning Organisation from 1961. Ozal's 
brother was well connected in the Islamic National Salvation Party, and Ozal himself 
had had strong connections in the Turkish conglomerate Sabanci group. 
Ozal's liberal statement on the Kurdish issue, however, was followed by introduction 
of a draconian law that enabled the government to hunt down any political activist 
thought to be a tenorist. In February 1991, the government indeed repealed the law 
which had banned the use of languages other than Turkish. However, simultaneously, 
the Anti-TeITorism Law went into force, and this enabled the authorities to consider 
cvcn mere \"crbal or written support for Kurdish rights as subject to terrorist charges. 
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Ozal's initiative did ease the restriction on the use of the Kurdish language. However, 
the restriction on Kurdish political activism was in fact strengthened under his 
premiership. 
Initiatives for a Solution from Mainstream Political Parties 
The following are notable initiatives for a solution to the Kurdish conflict from the 
mainstream Turkish political parties. An important feature of this decade was that 
both centre-right and centre-left political parties put the Kurdish issue on the political 
agenda. This seems to be particularly important as it shows that Kurdish national 
rights are no longer only the concern of the extreme left. 
The Motherland Party and Social Democrat Populist Party were the two mainstream 
political parties who on occasion advocated cultural pluralism as a solution to the 
Kurdish conflict. The Motherland Party has many Kurdish MPs and is more rooted in 
rural areas than its main rival TPP, though none of the Kurdish MPs in the 
Motherland Party publicly express their personal views about Kurdish nationalism 
(Kirsci and Winrow: 144). In 1991 the Motherland Party's Turgut Ozal, then 
president, even suggested teaching Kurdish as a second language at schools. 
However, this angered the hardliners among the Turkish nationalists and ended up 
polarising the parliament. (Kirsci and Winrow: 137). 
The SDPP too advocated more cultural autonomy for the Kurds. The party on 
occasion advocated the opening of schools taught in Kurdish. The secretary general of 
the SDPP declared that if the party came to power everyone would be able to speak 
his own mother tongue (Finkel and Hale: 120). In 1988, several parliamentary 
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deputies of the SDPP voted in favour of the 'minority languages' report of the 
Council of Europe. As a result, they were accused by the state authorities of 'having 
fallen prey to the conspiracies of Europe' (Kirsci and Winrow: 112). The party also 
issued a comprehensive policy report on the Kurdish issue in 1990 (Gunter 1997: 99). 
Also, until they resigned in March 1992, the MPs of pro-Kurdish HEP, to be 
discussed below, entered parliament on the SDPP's ticket. 
Expansion of the Islamist Party 
Meanwhile, the Islamist party became strong in the Kurdish region, which was part of 
a nation-wide phenomenon as well. The Islamic Welfare Party succeeded in 
establishing grass-roots support all over the country. The party did not make a direct 
statement on Kurdish rights but appealed to Islamic values. The Kurdish members of 
the Welfare Party worked in Kurdish neighbourhoods of major cities, which allowed 
them to address their particular problems and frustrations in the Kurdish language 
(Zubaida 1996). The Islamic party won the support of a considerable number of Kurds 
by appealing to Islamic justice, which enabled it to avoid alienating its traditional 
Turkish Sunni supporters while recruiting among the Kurds (Yavuz April 1996). The 
party stressed Islamic brotherhood rather than giving any hint of recognising Kurdish 
nationalism. It was pointed out that: 'the Welfare Party favoured the lifting of 
emergency rule, abolishment of the village guards, and finding "just" solutions to the 
conflict. The party used the term, "just solution" widely to many other problems, and 
the Welfare Party's proposal for the Kurdish issue remained ambiguous' (Kirsci and 
V\'inrow: 139-.+5). In the December 1995 general election, the Welfare Party won as 
much as 21..+ per cent of the vote, which exceeded both the Motherland Party (19.7 
per cent) and the TPP (19.2 per cent) (as in Yavuz April 1996). 
Thus, as in the 1970s, Islamic ideology once again proved to be highly instrumental in 
neutralising Kurdish nationalism in the political arena. An observer pointed out that, 
'not only would Islamic values enhance the conservative elements of society - both 
Turkish and Kurdish - but the "Turkish" components of the synthesis would 
discourage the seeds of Kurdish nationalism' (MER 11 Dec. 1998). Moreover, the 
Welfare Party was by no means an advocate of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey or Iraq. 
For example, alarmed by the Iraqi Kurds' increased engagement with the West, the 
Welfare Party opposed Operation Posed Hammer, which provided air patrol for the 
Iraqi Kurds that necessitated the use of a Turkish airbase (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 
102). 
Pro-Kurdish Political Parties 
It was historic that in 1989 Turkey's first pro-Kurdish political party, the People's 
Labour Party (HEP) was established. The origin of the HEP can be traced back to the 
Erdal Inonu's Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP). The SDPP expelled the 
members who attended the Kurdish Conference in Paris for their alleged link with the 
PKK, and these members established the HEP in the fall of 1989. In the October 1991 
general election, twenty-two members of the HEP, who formed an electoral coalition 
with the SDPP, were elected to the Parliament as Turkey's first legal Kurdish 
deputies. There were already many Kurdish MPs in the Parliament, but they refrained 
from speaking out on the Kurdish question. The HEP made a difference by basing its 
platfoml on Kurdish nationalism (Bruinessen MER April-June 1996). The two MPs 
from the HEP, Hatip Dick .. md Leyla Zana, caused an uproar by mentioning the word 
'Kurd' when they \'"ere swom in: 'I swear ... before the great Turkish nation, the 
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indivisible integrity of the country and nation .. I take this oath for the brotherhood of 
the Turkish and Kurdish peoples' (Gunter 1992: 103). Layla Zana is married to ,\lahdi 
Zana, who was elected mayor of Diyarbekir in 1978 as an independent candidate and 
was imprisoned following the 1980 coup for his activitites advocating Kurdish 
national rights. When her husband was arrested, Layla Zana was a complete stranger 
to the world of politics. It was also known that she could neither read nor write 
Turkish. During one of her visits to the prison, she herself was arrested for allegedly 
provoking a riot. Layla Zana slowly gained public acclaim for her commitment to 
human rights and became the first Kurdish woman to be elected to the Turkish 
Parliament. The HEP members resigned and parted from the SDPP in 1992 when the 
SDPP's centre-right coalition partner the True Path Party extended emergency rule in 
the Kurdish southeast and refused to abolish the Village Guard system. 
In July 1993 the HEP was closed. It was succeeded by the short-lived Democracy 
Party (DEP) in January 1994. The Constitutional Court accused the DEP of being a 
branch of the PKK (Kirsci and Winrow: 146-7). The National Security Council also 
made a decision to remove parliamentary immunity from the DEP MPs, and 
following this, eight Kurdish MPs were arrested and imprisoned in 1994 (Sakallioglu 
1(97). After this move, the DEP was succeeded by the HADEP, or the People's 
Democratic Party. 
It was known that the HADEP maintained a distance from the PKK and avoided any 
discourse that could be construed as separatist. Instead, the party advocated a peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish question without resorting to terrorism (Kirsci and Winrow: 
14()-7). However, Layla Zana and her colleagues were accused of separatism in the 
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middle of their tenn and were arrested in March 1994. These HADEP MPs were 
convicted and are at the moment serving a fifteen-year sentence in the prison in 
Ankara. 
There is also a party called the Democratic Mass Party (DKP), led by Serafettin E1ci. 
E1ci was the first parliamentarian to declare that there were Kurds in Turkey and that 
he himself was a Kurd. He was a cabinet minister between 1978 and 1979 under the 
Bulent Ecevit government. E1ci was convicted after the military regime removed his 
immunity in 1981. After serving his prison sentence, E1ci established a moderate party 
that advocated Kurdish nationalism. The DKP was founded in 1994. It rejected the 
violent methods taken by the PKK but considered the DEP and the HADEP as 
'Marxist parties' and too radical (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 80). E1ci's stance was 
criticised by the sympathisers of the PKK as divisive of the Kurds as a whole (Kirsci 
and Winrow: 147). Elci stated, 'my proposals were very mild things, like lifting the 
ban on the Kurdish language, broadcasting from the state-owned media in Kurdish, 
and educating the Kurds in Kurdish. These are very natural rights. The government, 
even today, is very far from giving these rights to the people. If you deny your 
Kurdish identity in Turkey, all paths are open to you. If you appear with your Kurdish 
identity, all doors become closed to you' (Meiselas: 298, an interview with E1ci in 
October 1993). 
Hurdle to the National Assembly 
The Turkish electoral system was not free from the legacies of the 1980 military 
intervention and its refom1s. Relatiyely ne\\' parties like the HADEP were particularly 
hard hit by the 10 per cent barrier imposed as a prerequisite for entry into the National 
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Assembly. The authorities also pended the decision whether or not to let the pro-
Kurdish Party run in the election. For example, the HADEP was eventually pennitted 
to run in the December 1995 election after suffering attacks from state-connected 
right wing groups, including over 20 assassinations of its members as well as arrests 
of its deputies (Bozarslan). It was suggested that the HADEP was allowed to 
participate in the election in order to reduce the popularity of the \Velfare Party 
(Yavuz April 1996). 
At the December 1995 election the HADEP obtained only 4.2 per cent of the total 
vote, which fell well short of the 10 per cent required by the constitution. Given the 
fact that the Kurdish population who reside in Turkey constitute approximately 20 per 
cent of the entire population, in theory the HADEP had the potential to mobilise 
enough support to overcome the constitutional hurdle. However, the party fared badly 
particularly in the urban areas. It was pointed out that the Kurds who migrated to 
major cities either voted for various Turkish parties due to assimilation or in order to 
avoid political confrontation. Also, the conservative Kurds voted for the Islamic party 
or according to tribal adherence (Yavuz April 1996). However, the HADEP took as 
much as 46.7 per cent of the vote in key Kurdish cities such as Diyarbekir. The party 
enjoyed considerable support in other Kurdish cities as well (22 per cent in Mardin, 
26 per cent in Simak, 27.7 per cent in Van, 37.4 per cent in Batman, and 54.3 per cent 
in Hakkari) (as in Bozarslan). Just four years after its foundation, the HADEP has 
gained considerable strength in the Kurdish region and in one case even won the 
support of a tribal leader (Ibid.). In \'iew of the regional diversity in the election result, 
there was criticism from some Turkish media that the threshold for the National 
Assembly was set unfairly high (Kirsci and Winrow: l'+S). 
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Pressure from Industrialist Organisations 
It appeared to be an important event that a group of industrialist, acting independently 
of the state authorities, began to question the wisdom of the state's intransigent policy 
towards the Kurds from the late 1990s. 
The 1981 Constitution was amended in July 1995, enabling greater political 
participation of groups such as professional associations and trade unions (Gurbey: 
11-12). Furthermore, as a result of strong European pressure, Article 8 of the Anti 
Terror Law was amended in October 1995. As a result, the maximum prison sentence 
was lowered from five to three years (Gurbey, Ibid.) Even with these reforms, 
advocacy of Kurdish nationalism is still illegal; nonetheless this constitutional 
relaxation stirred wider discussion over the Kurdish question. It is a promising sign of 
successful national integration that the Turkish industrialists now began to pressure 
the military for greater political freedom, and gave more hope for a democratic 
solution to the conflict. The Turkish business communities, though they themselves 
are not ideologically unified, are now capable of proposing alternatives to the military 
solution. 
Firstly, the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) 
prepared a report on the Kurdish question in August 1995. This was commissioned by 
then-Prime Minister Tansu Ciller from an academic, Dogu Ergil. The report was 
based on the field survey of 1267 subjects (Turkey's Kurds) and indicated that the 
majority advocated a solution without changing the Turkish boundaries and that few 
of them advocated having talks with the PKK. Known from its Turkish acronym. the 
TOBB report criticised the government's policy and argued that it was wrong to call 
the Kurdish conflict simple terrorism (Kirsci and Winrow: 149-150). 
A similar report by the industrialists followed. In January 1997, TCSIAD (the Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen's Association) published a report on comprehensiYe 
democratisation. This report was not specifically prepared for the Kurdish question, 
but it did, however, criticise the military's interference in politics and argue that 
Turkey could not take up the economy of the West and leave out its democracy. It 
appears that the debate over Kurdish national rights was no longer uncommon in 
Turkey. According to a Kurdish observer, 
'It is unmistakable that discussion has started about the Kurdish issue. 
However, Turkey is not in a position to implement all these new ideas suddenly after 
telling its citizens there were no Kurds for seventy years. However, it is possible to 
create the platform with the Turkish people who will support the democracy. 10 years 
ago, they were saying there was no Kurd. Now, the people are saying we need the 
solution. They have identified the problem, and are trying to define the solution' 
(Kerim Yildiz). 
The main obstacle seems to be the still prevalent Turkish nationalism, which became 
even more visible at the time of the capture of the PKK leader in February 1999. The 
demonstrations throughout the country showed that the public regarded the PKK 
leader only as a common criminal, and demonstrated the depth of resentment against 
the PKK. However, now that the PKK has been dissolved (September 1999), the hope 
for contlict resolution lies in a political solution more than ever. It is a positi\'c move 
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that Turkey's industrialists In recent years have started to speak up for greater 
democratisation. 
Summary 
The Islamic party seems instrumental in accommodating the Kurdish political 
demands where the Kurdish nationalist party is deemed still too radical. However, so 
long as Islam continues to neutralise Kurdish nationalism, it also serves the state's 
'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'. It appears that Islam still constitutes a powerful counter-
leftist and counter-ethnonationalist ideology for the state authorities. 
Economic development of the southeast region had been advocated since the 1960s, 
and in recent years through large-scale public projects. Unless the Turkish state 
becomes capable of compensating the landlords, an effective land reform will never 
be likely to take place. This means the number of beneficiaries of those public 
projects is limited, and it underlines the importance attached to bilingual education, 
which would assist the Kurds with access to greater employment opportunities. 
Measures to increase social mobility of the Kurdish speaking population, first by 
bilingual education, second by land reforms where possible, and third by economic 
development, seem crucial for Turkey's transition to prototypical national integration. 
It is impossible for anyone to master a foreign language without being able to consult 
one's first language. The military's rejection of any form of Kurdish nationalism 
alienated the Kurds and only aggravated the PKK's problem. Even if the PKK began 
to disinte~'Tate, sympathisers to its cause could not be eliminated. So long as serious 
inequalities remain, a group like the PKK may reappear at any time. 
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Iraq 
Totalitarian State 
Because of the dramatic increase in oil revenue in the 1970s, the Iraqi state became 
capable of carrying out a number of development programmes without burdening the 
popUlation. From the structural perspective, however, this high degree of state 
autonomy heralded an era of totalitarianism, as defined in the theoretical framework. 
The very capability of the state to silence domestic oppositions removed any serious 
incentive from the government to accommodate Kurdish aspirations. 
The First Baathist Regime 
The first Baath regime (February-November 1963) was not a stable one. The party 
organisation was still weak and lacked a popular base. The Baath oppressed its 
political opponents, especially the Communists, through the use of terror. In order to 
increase popular support, the Baath regime put the avowed pan-Arabist, Abd aI-Salam 
Aref, as the head 0 f the state (Khadduri 1969: 196-7). 
The Kurds welcomed the overthrow of Qassem and declared a ceasefire but did not 
accept the Baath rule and demanded constitutional government as a condition for a 
final settlement (Penrose: 306). The Baath Party then was not internally consolidated 
and contained members with varying degrees of willingness to negotiate with the 
Kurds. At least the party showed some willingness to restore peace in the north. Tahir 
't' ahya from the Baath Party became a negotiator with Mustafa Barzani in 1962. He 
was willing to proceed \\'ith a wider decentralisation programme that would allow the 
Kurds to have limited autonomy. Howeyer, the hard line Arab nationalist group 
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opposed any measures that would be conciliatory to the Kurds and no agreement \vas 
reached. It was rather ironic that the Kurds assisted the Baath Party in overthrowing 
Qassem. Ideologically, the Pan-Arab Baath posed an even worse problem for the 
Kurds. The party even took an assimilationist view. As Penrose states, 'the Baathist 
sentiment tended to ignore the existence of any other national groups in the 
community ... occasionally the claim was made that Kurds were in reality of Semitic 
or Arabic origin' (Penrose: 307). 
With the failure of negotiations, the Baath government launched a military campaign 
against the Kurds in the summer of 1963 in which they tried to rally support by 
characterising Barzani' s followers as 'tribal, feudal and allies of "imperialism" and 
Zionism'. The Baath Party also accused the Kurds of harbouring the Communists. 
The government offered a 100,000 pound reward for Mustafa Barzani and launched 
an offensive that far surpassed any of Qassem's campaigns against the Kurds 
(Kinnane: 75). The state used both air and ground forces to destroy Kurdish villages. 
However, the Baath government failed to defeat the Kurds. 
The Iraqi Baath Party had a problematic relationship with the Nasserists, too. It was 
because at that time, the Syrian Baath Party was increasingly critical of Nasser whom 
they alleged' authoritarian'. The delegates from the Iraqi Baath Party were associated 
with them and thus not welcomed by Nasser at Cairo. The Iraqi Baath Party was put 
in an awkward position as it attempted to coordinate the two - the Syrian and the Iraqi 
- Baaths' stance with regard to the pan-Arab policy (Kbadduri 1969: 206). The 
Baath's quarrel with Nasser, \\'ho was at the peak of his popularity, created a 
fa\'ourable environment for the Nasserist Aref to purge Baathists from the 
198 
government. In November 1963, Aref established contacts with Mustafa Barzani not , 
out of his willingness to accept Kurdish autonomy, but in order to oust their common 
enemy, the Baath government. It was known that Aref asked Barzani to resist the 
Army offensive in order to discredit the Baath government for its weakness (Jawad 
1981: 155). Following this move, Aref succeeded in ousting the first Baathist regime 
with ease. 
Aref Brothers' Regime (1963-8) 
In coming to power, Abd aI-Salam Aref purged officers with radical ideologies and 
declared that no more socialist measures were going to be taken (Khadduri 1969: 
252). The Republican Guard was strengthened by an infusion of men from aj-
Jumailah, Arefs own tribe, and the officers from Arefs home region in northwest 
Iraq which constituted his primary supporters (Batatu: 1132). Thus the Aref regime 
was basically sustained through 'tribal, regional, sectarian, professional and 
nationalist loyalties' (Batatu: 1132). It revived conservative elements which had been 
suppressed under Qassem considerably. They were even described as 'neo-
monarchist' (AI-Aref 1982: 96). The Baathists made an attempt to oust Aref in 1964, 
but the plot did not succeed. 
Aref and Barzani agreed on a temporary ceasefire in February 1964. However, no 
effective measures were taken to follow it up. Meanwhile, the anti-Kurdish officer, 
Ghanem al-Uqaili, set out on an offensive in the spring of 1965. The government 
offensin? failed and the public had become \veary of the Kurdish war and even 
suspected the officers of secretly benefiting from the funds allocated for the military 
operation (Penrose: 335). 
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It was under the Aref regime that the anti-nationalist Kurdish tribes were formally 
organised in a form of government gendarmerie. In 1963, these tribes became the 
gendarmerie called 'al-fursan' (the knights), which the Kurdish nationalists referred to 
as the johsh or donkeys. The johsh is known to desert the government troops instantly 
at the time of confrontation between the Kurds and the government forces, although it 
could also engage in ruthless banditry and violence on Kurdish villages. In Jawad's 
judgement, 'their motivation remained tribal and materialistic. In no sense were they 
unified and the tribes dealt separately with the government. Their relations with the 
government depended mostly upon the strength or weakness of the government. Many 
of the al-Fursanljohsh, fearing reprisals from Barzani's forces under a weak Iraqi 
regime, secretly established friendly relations with Barzani' (Jawad 1981: 53). 
Bruinessen also points to the fact that an 'informal agreement' existed between the 
Kurdish nationalists and johsh to avoid each other, though at times fierce fighting has 
took place between them (Bruinessen 1992: 40). Tribesmen's reasons for enlisting in 
to the johsh were rather complex, as shown by McDowall. One prominent motive was 
economic and another was to avoid retaliation by the government. The johsh provided 
tribesmen with employment, and as long as they were serving the government, the 
tribe was safe. The other prominent reason was tribal rivalry: several known tribes 
such as Surchi, Harki and Zibari had long-standing enmity to the Barzanis, which the 
government could exploit. The government richly rewarded them for their services, 
and they received lucrative factory licenses, land grants, or export/import privileges 
(McDowall 1996: 354-357). 
Brief Initiative for Peace 
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Not all Arefs ministers were against Kurdish autonomy: there were individuals 
seriously concerned about the weakening of the Iraqi army as a result of prolonged 
conflict in the north (Penrose: 338). Meanwhile, the first Aref regime ended with his 
sudden death in April 1966, when a helicopter crashed under suspicious 
circumstances. This brought about a power struggle between an ostensibly anti-
Kurdish officer, Ghanem al-Uqaili, and Arefs brother, Abd aI-Rahman Aref. Against 
the wishes of the hardliners within the military circle, Arefs brother was chosen the 
new president. He himself had a more moderate attitude towards the Kurds. The new 
Aref regime approached Talabani's group within the KDP, who seemed to be more 
willing to negotiate with the government. This led to the proposal of a Twelve Point 
Programme in 1966 for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish conflict. The 
programme was developed under the strong initiative of the civilian prime minister, 
Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz. 
AI-Bazzaz (21 September 1965 - 6 August 1966) struggled against military hardliners 
and set out important steps towards the solution of the Kurdish conflict. The June 29 
Agreement, also known as the Twelve Point Programme, was presented by al-Bazzaz' 
government in 1966. It starts 'In its desire to put an end to the unnatural conditions in 
certain parts of the north ... to preserve the unity of Iraqi soil and to achieve national 
unity, to conform the existing bonds between Arabs and Kurds - which require them 
to act sincerely and persistently in the interest of their common homeland, this 
Cio\'ernment announces the following programme and declares its categorical 
dl'tcrmination to abide by it and to apply it in letter and spirit as soon as possible' 
(Khadduri 1969: 27.+-276). 
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Summary of the Twelve Points Programme (29 June 1966): 
1) The Government has recognised Kurdish nationality In the amended 
provisional constitution and is ready to clarify this point in the permanent 
constitution. Kurdish national rights within the Iraqi homeland, which includes 
two main nationalities - Arab and Kurdish - will be recognised, and Arabs and 
Kurds will enjoy equal rights and duties. 
2) Provincial law will be promulgated on a decentralised basis. Each 
administrative unit will have its own elected council, which will exercise wide 
powers in education, health, and other local affairs, in addition to anything that 
has any connection with domestic and municipal affairs as detailed in the said 
law. 
3) The Kurdish language will be recognised as an official language in addition 
to Arabic. Education will be in both languages, in accordance with the limits 
defined by law and the local councils. 
4) The Government intends to hold parliamentary elections within the period 
stipulated in the provisional constitution and the cabinet policy statement. The 
Kurds will be represented in parliament proportional to their percentage of the 
population. 
5) The Kurds will share with their Arab brothers all public posts in proportion 
to their population, including ministries, public departments, and judicial, 
diplomatic and military posts, with due regard for the principle of efficiency. 
6) A number of scholarships, fellowships, and study grants will be made 
available at all le\'e\s' education for the Kurds, who are to be sent abroad for 
specialisation with due regard for efficiency and the country's needs. 
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7) Government officials in the Kurdish provinces, districts and subdistricts 
will be Kurds. Such posts will not be given to others unless it is in the interest 
of the region. 
8) The establishment of certain political organisations to accompany 
parliamentary life will be permitted. The press will be enabled to express the 
people's desire. The political and literary press in the Kurdish regions will be 
in the Kurdish or the Arabic language or in both. 
9) General amnesty will be given to all who participated in violent acts or who 
had any connection with them. All Kurdish officials and employees will return 
to their previous posts and employees will be treated with justice. The 
Government will do its best to return all dismissed Kurdish workers. 
10) Kurdish personnel of the armed forces and the police force will return to 
their units. Those returning will be treated sympathetically. All those who 
resume a normal life should surrender all their equipment, arms and 
ammunition to the Government. 
11) Funds spent for military operations will be spent for reconstruction of the 
north. A special organisation will be formed to reconstruct the Kurdish region 
in the north. The Government will do its best to compensate all those who 
suffered damage to enable them to return to a productive and useful life in 
security and peace. 
12) Individuals who have left or evacuated will be resettled with the aim of re-
establishing a normal situation. 
The programme. however, never materialised. It was because the government was 
faced \\ith Arab hardliners' opposition to it, who ad\'ocated a military solution of the 
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Kurdish conflict. The Bazzaz government was replaced by another, which was headed 
by an army officer, Naji Talib. Talib was known to have been the least conciliatory to 
the Kurds. The Arab army's defeat by Israel in 1967 added fuel to a heightened Arab 
nationalism. By then, Abd aI-Rahman Arefwas increasingly reliant on the military for 
support. A total of four new governments succeeded Bazzaz. Each of them declared 
its allegiance for the Twelve Point Programme, but it was said, 'none of them found 
the time or the courage either to carry it out or to impose a new plan of settlement, by 
force if necessary' (Khadduri 1969: 277). As the government weakened, the second 
Aref regime was overtaken by a coup in July 1968. 
The Second Baath Regime (1968 - present <03/31/01» 
The Baathists took over the Aref regime through the two-phased coup on 17 July 
1968. After the takeover, a campaign of terror was initiated against the political 
opponents of the Baathists. Many officers who led the coup against Qassem in 1963 
were reinstated. This second Bathist coup was 'not a result of popular rising, nor did it 
produce popular rejoicing' (Penrose: 357). The second Baath regime consolidated its 
power through a group of army officers from Takrit, president Hasan al-Bakr's home 
town in northwest Iraq, which was know as a traditional Sunni stronghold. 
The 1970 Autonomy Plan and Baath Motives 
After nearly a decade of fighting and inconclusive ceasefires throughout the 1960s, 
the Kurdish Autonomy Plan was promulgated on 11 March 1970. The Baath regime 
had its own motives and rationale in issuing the Manifesto. First of alL there was a 
phenomenal rise in oil prices which provided Iraq with the means to meet the 
economic demands of the Kurds \\ithout sacrificing the Arab interests in the country 
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(McLaurin: 139). Secondly, the Baath feared being discredited in the eyes of the 
Army, if it proved unable to conclude the Kurdish war. And thirdly, the Kurdish 
insurgents' threat to Iraq's overall security overstretched Iraq's military capabilities 
(Edmonds 1971: 102). 
In the Manifesto, the Baath Party overtly recognised the cultural rights of the Kurds in 
the constitution promulgated in luly 1970. Edmund Ghareeb's argues that 'the 
Baathists believed that the March 11 manifesto went beyond the transitory goal of 
ending the fighting and laid the groundwork for a permanent solution to the Kurdish 
problem' (Ghareeb: 92). The Baath also tried to win the favour of the more 
progressive lalal Talabani's group. To this end, the Manifesto attacked feudalism and 
advocated implementation of land reforms. Also, the Baath's glorification of 'Arab 
and Kurd brotherhood' had a strongly anti-Zionist tone as it depicted Iraqi territory as 
the forefront of the Arab world confronting Israel (Ismael 1976, as in Appendix: 144). 
The key promises made by the Baath's Revolutionary Command Council were as 
follows: 
1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic language, be an 
official language in the areas populated by a majority of Kurds. 
2) Eliminate any discrimination between Kurds and other nationals in regard 
to holding public offices, including sensitive and important ones such as 
cabinet ministers, army commands etc. 
3) Amend backwardness experienced by the Kurds in cultural and educational 
domains through: 
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a. Implementation of resolutions in regard to the language and cultural 
rights of the Kurds, and preparation of programmes on Kurdish 
national affairs on the radio and TV networks by the Directorate 
General of Kurdish Culture and Information , 
b. Reinstating of students who had to leave school because of the 
violence, and 
c. Building schools in the Kurdish area. 
4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority, appoint 
Kurdish government officials. 
5) Recognise the Kurds' right to set up student, youth, women's and teachers' 
organisations of their own. 
6) General amnesty to all those who took part in past hostilities. 
7) A committee of specialists to speed up development of the Kurdish areas 
attached to the Ministry of Northern Affairs. Economic plan to ensure equal 
development. Provision of state pension to the families of the Kurds who died 
in the conflict. Relieve aggrieved conditions of the people through housing 
and other appropriate aid both in cash and kind. 
8) Repatriation of villagers. 
9) Speedy implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish areas. 
Liquidation of all feudalistic relations. 
10) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities: the Arab 
nationality and the Kurdish nationality. Article (4) of the Constitution will 
include 'The Kurdish language, beside the Arabic language, shall be an 
official language in the Kurdish areas'. All this shall be confirmed in the 
Pemlanent Constitution. 
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11) The broadcasting stations and heavy anns shall be gIven back to the 
Government. 
12) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic will be a Kurd. 
13) The Governorates Law shall be part of the text of this Manifesto. 
14) The High Committee will supervise the implementation of the Manifesto. 
As self-rule is to be established within the framework of the Republic of Iraq, 
the exploitation of the natural riches in the area shall obviously be the 
prerogative of the authorities of the Republic. 
15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative branch in proportion 
to the ratio they have to the population of Iraq. 
The Kurds' Divided Response 
Immediately after the proposal, both sides were satisfied and agreed on many 
secondary issues that dealt with cultural affairs' side. During the four years of the 
moratorium period, Kurdish culture truly flourished and Iraq became a refuge for 
other states' Kurds who suffered cultural suppression (S ulaiman and Blau: 161). 
However, the deadlock came when the two parties tried to define the boundary of the 
Kurdish autonomous region and which cities were to be considered 'inhabited by a 
Kurdish majority'. The status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, with a mixed population 
of Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans, was to be decided by a future plebiscite. But this 
never took place. Also, the Kurdish autonomous region measured approximately 8.5 
per cent of Iraq, whereas the percentage of the Kurdish population in Iraq was far 
more than that. The boundary was thus drawn unilaterally by the Baath government 
with a view to keeping the Kurds as confined as possible (Dann 1978). Furthennore, 
the legislative branch as referred to in Article 15 of the Manifesto had no real power. 
and members were 'virtual nominees' or the mere prerogative of the Regional 
Command of the Baath Party (Nouri Talabany, also Vanly: 156). Mustafa Barzani 
was determined to prevent Kirkuk from being taken by the Baghdad regime. Barzani 
refused to close the border with Iran, established contacts with Israel, and set up his 
own intelligence apparatus against the government (Ghareeb: 132-133). Then 
followed a transitional period which was described as neither peace nor war. 
Some of the KDP members opposed Barzani's stance, and his authoritarian leadership 
was much criticised. His critics included his own eldest son, Ubaidullah Barzani. He 
said, 'he (Mustafa Barzani) does not want self-rule to be implemented even if he was 
given Kirkuk and all of its oil. His acceptance of the (autonomy) law will take 
everything from him, and he wants to remain the absolute ruler' (Ghareeb's interview 
with Ubaidullah Barzani in July 1974: 155). Others who broke off from Barzani 
included Aziz Aqrawi, who stated '(W)e realised it would be treason to wreck the 
March 11 declaration and to become tools in the hands of Israel, Iran, and imperialism 
... Of course there are things which are lacking, but these could be solved by trust on 
both sides ... Barzani's claims are far from reality. He does not seem to realise that he 
is being supported by forces that work against Iraq and do not want to see the Kurds 
enjoying their national rights' (Ghareeb: 155). It was said that Barzani shared none of 
his decision-making with fellow Kurds (Randal: 164). The Kurdish nationalists were 
once again faced with internal problems similar to those evident from the 1940s. 
Resumption 0 r \Var and Defeat 
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During the transitional period, the government embarked on an active Arabisation of 
Kirkuk by bringing in Arab settlers in place of the Kurds. Furthermore, se\'eral 
attempts were made on Mustafa Barzani's life by unknown agents, believed to be 
Baghdad's by the Kurdish nationalists. The relations between the government and the 
Kurdish nationalists had deteriorated to an unrecoverable level by the time the law 
was unilaterally promulgated in 1974, and the war between the Kurds and the 
government resumed. 
When the hostility broke out, the Kurds were assisted by countries hostile to the Iraqi 
Baath regime of that time, including Iran, Israel and the United States. Barzani was 
criticised by the Arab states' leaders for receiving these countries' aid (Jawad, in 
Niblock: 51-2). This external aid, however, was suddenly cut off in 1975 when the 
Iraqi government decided to reach an agreement with Iran over OPEC and over the 
disputed boundary of the Shatt aI-Arab waterway. In exchange for accepting Iranian 
terms, Iraq secured agreement from Iran not to support the Kurds any longer. This 
was finalised in the Algiers Agreement in 1975. The Kurds suffered a catastrophic 
defeat. The Kurdish fighters fled to Iranian Kurdistan, and later Mustafa Barzani fled 
to the US, where he died in exile. 
Later, Mulla Mustafa Barzani was known to have lamented his complete refusal of the 
terms of the Manifesto. He was quoted to have said, 'were it not for the American 
promises, we would never have become trapped and involved to such an extent' 
(Ghareeb: 159). \Vithout the military aid, it appears possible that Barzani might have 
at least extended the negotiation period before plunging into a total conflict. But it 
was also true that Barzani had in fact very few options (Vanly: 158). The fighting 
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prompted a mass evacuation of Kurdish peasants fleeing the violence. Pelletiere 
contrasted this with the 1960s war when most of the peasants remained in the 
mountains and supported the nationalists. He commented that the military aid may 
have contributed to the nationalists' neglect of local economy's capacity for 
sustaining the national rebellion. A Kurdish fighter was quoted, 'Why purchase 
peasants' tobacco when American cigarettes were in plentiful supply?' (Pelletiere: 
175). 
Establishment of PUK 
The Kurds' defeat in 1975 was a turning point for the Kurdish nationalists because it 
allowed them to focus more on the political struggle. After the collapse of the 
resistance in 1975, the Kurdish leadership was reorganised. Ibrahim Ahmad and lalal 
Talabani finally set up a new political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 
to start a more party-based political struggle. The KDP was led by Mustafa Barzani's 
two sons, Idris and Masoud. 1 alaI Talabani was emerging as a spokesman for a new 
generation of Kurdish nationalists. 
J alaI Talabani' s view is summarised in the following quote: 
'The policies they (Kurdish politicians from prominent families) followed and 
their status prevented the nationalist organisations from being representative of the 
masses. They could not lead the masses and could not organise the people to the needs 
of political organisations. Kurdish aghas and chieftains cannot provide leadership for 
Kurdish national liberation movements' (Rizgariya Kurdistan 1 une 1981: 14-8). 
Always critical of the authoritarian leadership of Mustafa Barzani, the socialist-
oriented PUK could have championed the Kurdish nationalist movement as an 
alternative to Barzani' s leadership and could have been more successful in mobilising 
the peasants. However, this was not entirely to be the case, and the reality was 
'localisation' of the two parties' sphere of influence: the KDP became the dominant 
power of northwest Kurdistan and the PUK of the southeast region near Iran. The 
difference of the Kurdish dialects spoken in the two parties' spheres of influence was 
analysed to be partially responsible for this. J alaI Talabani' s districts are Sorani 
speaking, while Barzani's districts are Kurmanji speaking (Bruinessen in MER July-
August 1986). This seems to reflect the still strong tribal base of both parties. 
Totalitarian Structure 
As against Kurdish nationalists' fragmentation, the Baath regime erected a monolithic 
regime. The Baath party constitutes an organisational hierarchy based on two to three 
person cells at the lowest level. The cells are grouped in branches headed by the 
Regional Command from which the party discipline and command flows downward. 
Characteristic of totalitarian regime it mobilised the youth. It was said, 'no previous 
Iraqi rulers - excepting Qassem - have used as effectively modem organisational 
weapons or mass mobilisation' as the second Baath regime (Batatu: 1088). Despite its 
lack of popular support, the relative stability of the Baath regime in the 1970s was 
thus mostly attributed to a high degree of political institutionalisation. 
Yet, during the two decades of Baath rule since 1968, the regime has largely alienated 
the Shia and the Kurds. Despite the fact that it calls for unity of the Arab nation, the 
Iraqi Baath's scope for secular Arab integration seems to be sectarian and 
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ideologically narrower than the one envisaged by Michael Aflaq, due to its 
domination by the Sunni Arabs. The second Baath regime tried to restore traditional 
Sunni dominance in the government to reverse the increase of Shia in public posts 
effected by Qassem's policy (Penrose: 358). The Kurdish officers who were promoted 
during the Qasim era were 'all forced to retire and sent to the southern part of Iraq' 
(Nouri Talabany). In the late 1970s, the Shia Arabs were increased once again only 
for strategic purposes. According to the study of representatives of the National 
Assembly, it is estimated that in 1980 about a 40 per cent Shia contingent existed in 
the Assembly (Marr 1988: 194-5). 
The Baath Party also tried to recruit Kurds. According to Kurdish informants, this was 
done mostly through bribes. An Iraqi Kurd woman recalls, 'How they recruit the 
Kurds - it's all money. The Baath heavily pay and bribe the Kurdish members. They 
give them cars, nice houses etc. And the Kurdish members of the Baath start behaving 
like they were Arabs. Also there are certain clans who traditionally support the 
government, like Zibaris. They are like black sheep. Whenever there is a big fight, the 
government gives them money to spy. [As a result] nobody trusts anyone' ('Zuzan', 
pseudonym). 
Another Iraqi exile commented, 
'The Baath party recruit the Kurdish members with bribes and interest. They are 
traitors to the cause of the Kurds. Regrettably, there are many former Baath members 
in the KDP. In general, the Baath Party could not possibly be more unpopular with the 
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Kurdish people. The Baathist regime has been responsible for the destruction of more 
than 4500 villages and the deaths of many thousands of Kurds' (Nouri Talabany). 
Control over the Society 
As state oil revenues increased dramatically in the 1970s, almost everything became 
reliant on government funding. It was said, 'most of the economic growth has been in 
public administration and defence rather than in industry' (Marr 1985: 248). 
Genuinely private enterprises were eliminated from Iraq. At the same time, party 
membership in the Baath became a 'prerequisite for promotion in the anny and 
bureaucracy' (Marr 1988: 188-9). The government sector swelled: by the end of 1977, 
'something like one-fifth or perhaps one-fourth of the inhabitants of Iraq would be 
depending directly upon the government for their livelihood and their life chances. In 
the town, more than one-third of the employed persons are already employees of the 
government' (Batatu: 1123). Thus, the whole country was, in one way or another, 
regulated by the state. The extent of totalitarianism can be seen from the following 
experience of a university professor: 
'I was forced to retire as a professor of law at Baghdad University in 1982, 
because I was not a Baathist. 32 professors and members of staff were also forced to 
retire and deported to southern Iraq. There were concentration camps to detain the 
Kurds. My relatives were also killed. I am still alive because I was not involved in 
politics' (Nouri Talabany). 
The middle c lass under the second Baath regime \vas characterised as more or less a 
'creation' of the state. The state succeeded in marginalising the political activities of 
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the trade unions. The state used, 'distributive policies to create economic groups as a 
base of social support. Explicitly designed to depoliticise the population, these 
distributive policies forestalled the emergence of class conflict and public debate 
about the ends of development and growth' (Chaudry). Marr asserted that the changes 
made under the second Baath regime promoted 'integrating the Kurds and Shia into 
the middle class' (Marr 1985: 248). However, it must be noted that the middle class 
created under this circumstance was neither autonomous nor politically significant. 
Thus, sponsorship became synonymous with economic control by the state. The state 
kept the clientelist ties to the economic proprietors as a 'sole' provider of capital 
(Chaudry). 
Monopoly of Economic Resource 
The second Baath regime implemented a five-year development plan between 1970-
1975. The rise of oil prices allowed greater allocation of funds for economic 
development. According to Marr's study, health and education in the north improved 
greatly in the late 1970s (Marr 1985: 285). During these years, Iraq had strengthened 
its ties with the Soviet Union and reached a bilateral alliance treaty in 1972. The 
Rumei la oil field in southern Iraq was developed with Soviet backing. Increased 
economic independence gave Iraqi leaders confidence that they were no longer 
dependent on the West and facilitated their decision to completely nationalise the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 (Hiro 1992: 25). 
The conclusion of the Kurdish war in 1975 brought some development programmes 
into the north but also accelerated the government's Arabisation policy. After the 
collapse of the Kurdish resistance in 1975, the govenlment implemented policies of 
214 
deportation of the Kurds living in the strategically important cities with mixed 
populations of Arabs and Kurds (Chaliand: 196-201). During this decade at least 500 
villages were razed to create a security zone between Iran and Iraq, and 600,000 
villagers were moved to collective resettlement camps (MRG: 25). In 1975, when the 
autonomy law was (unilaterally) enacted, a large percentage of the Kurdish popUlation 
was transferred to an area more accessible to the government (Sluglett and Farouk-
Sluglett: 187). 
The second Baath regime was not successful in improving agrarian production. The 
agrarian law of 1970 was known to have adopted a more sophisticated form of land 
categorisation in an attempt to avoid over-fragmentation of land ownership. Also, 
between the years 1970 and 1975, as much as 22 per cent of the total development 
budget was allocated for agrarian infrastructure, compared to 11 per cent from 1961 to 
1965 (Theobald and Jawad in Niblock: 203). Under the 1975 law, the big estates of 
tribal leaders, including those of Kurdish leaders, were forcibly broken up (Penrose: 
459). In theory, the reform could have had a profound effect on the rural society, 
because as late as the 1970s, almost half the workforce was contained in the agrarian 
sector (Penrose: 482). Covertly, however, the landlordism persisted. Agricultural 
output remained low, and in many places the landlord restored an informal tie with 
the former tenants. Those landlords continued to enjoy high esteem among their 
former tenants (Rassam: 162). It was argued that the Iraqi peasants' strong attachment 
to kin organisations, such as tribes, was the preeminent factor that preserved the old 
structure even after the introduction of agrarian reform (Theobald in J awad: 210-1). 
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Another factor that obstructed agrarian production under the Baath was the regime's 
policy of keeping food prices deliberately low in an attempt to keep industrial wages 
at competitive levels (Wilson in Niblock: 230). This created few incentives for 
agricultural producers to participate in the market economy, and the result of such 
policy was a sharp increase in the food-import bill (Wilson in Niblock: 230). This 
accelerated the trend of turning Iraq from a food-exporting country to an importing 
country, leading to continued neglect of the agricultural sector in the coming decade. 
Interim Summary 
The rise of the Baath regime coincided with a dramatic increase in oil revenue, and 
this allowed the government to impose unilaterally a development programme that 
would threaten Kurdish autonomy. The dependence on oil shaped a state structure that 
would practically silence all political opposition in the society. It had become 
extremely difficult to establish a civil organisation that was completely unaffected by 
the government's power. 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) 
The Iran-Iraq war began shortly after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Saddam 
Hussein attacked Iran in a bid to secure the disputed Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The 
new Iranian regime responded to the Iraqi attack, calling for a holy war. Iraq was 
known to be the first to play the Kurdish card, when the Iraqi government established 
a supply route to the Iranian Kurds fighting the Iranian government (January 1981) 
(Entessar 1989: 95). The same tactic was soon used by the Iranian regime vis-a-vis 
the two Iraqi Kurdish factions fighting for autonomy. 
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Kurds and Iran 
As the Iran-Iraq war began, the Kurds resumed their fight for the first time since the 
catastrophic defeat in 1975. The Iranian Islamic Republic, despite its own suppression 
of the Kurds in Iran, supported Iraqi Kurds throughout the Iran-Iraq war in order to 
weaken Iraq and further its attempts to advance into the eastern front of Iraqi territory. 
The Western states and the Soviet Union, alarmed by the leader of the Iranian 
Revolution (1979), Ayatollah Khomeini, poured military supp0l1 into Iraq 
(Karadaghi: 224). Although the Iraqi Kurds received support from Iran, it was 
obvious that this support was a token one and that Iran was not committed to Kurdish 
autonomy in Iraq. 
As the war progressed, however, Jalal Talabani's PUK broke with Iran. Talabani 
sought peace with Baghdad in (December 1983), and had indeed reached a temporary 
agreement on the terms of limited autonomy for the Kurds (Entessar 1984: 922). At 
this time, Talabani accused the KDP of establishing a complete alliance with the 
Iranian forces. Thus by January 1984, the war had come to bear an obvious proxy 
character, with Iraq pouring support into the PUK and Iranian Kurds led by 
Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, and Iran to the KDP (Pelletiere: 178). 
Turkey and Iraq 
Agreement between the Kurds (the PUK) and Baghdad, however, alarmed Turkey 
\\'hich was troubled by its own Kurdish separatist movements. Turkey feared that the 
stronger position enjoyed by the Iraqi Kurds would encourage the Turkish Kurds' 
separatist activities. Fearing this, Turkey joined Iraq in a bilateral agreement to 
contain the Kurdish movement by a bilateral agreement. In fvlay 1983, the Turkish 
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troops infiltrated Iraqi territory with the agreement of Saddam Hussein. In fact, this 
agreement dated back to 1978, when the two states secretly agreed on pursuing 
'subversive elements' up to nine miles inside each other's territories (Hiro 1990: 1.+9). 
The same agreement was formally signed in October 1984, which permitted cross-
border operations into each other's territory up to eighteen miles. Baghdad sought to 
secure Turkish support by demonstrating that it would not commit itself to Kurdish 
autonomy in Iraq. Soon after the agreement, the Iraqi government started deporting 
Iranian Kurds who were seeking shelter in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The Kurds completely stopped negotiations with the regime of Saddam Hussein. It 
was characterised as 'the end of a period during which some at least of the Kurdish 
group entertained the illusion that they could negotiate with Saddam Hussein' (MER 
19 Sept. 1985, as in Chub in and Tripp: 104). In 1985 Masoud Barzani stated that 'we 
will live with the Arab people in the state of Iraq, but not with a dictatorial regime' 
(MER 19 Sept. 1985, as in Chubin and Tripp: 104). The government's continuous 
suppression of the Iranian Kurds finally forced the PUK to cut off their contacts with 
the Iraqi government in 1986. It was at this time that the union of the two main 
Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, materialised in the form of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Front (IKF). The IKF was to last until the time of the Gulf War in 1991. 
Ethnic-cleansing Policy 
From the 1980s onward, the state was increasingly equipped with modem weapons 
and resorted to a genocidal policy against the Kurds. The earliest incident took place 
in 1986 around the Arbil go\'ernorate. The san1e campaign led to the genocide in 
Halabja in March 1988. The brutality of the retaliation adopted by the government 
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was epitomised in the name of the anti-Kurd campaign 'Anfal' which meant 'spoils' 
of the war and was derived from the eighth chapter of Quran (HRW: 1). The 
campaign was well-planned, and although it was supposed to target only those Kurds 
who assisted the Iranian troops, it was in fact indiscriminate and was aimed at 
destroying whole sectors of the Kurdish popUlation (Cook: 110-111). The evidence of 
systematic genocide became public knowledge through the capture of Iraqi 
government documents, in the course of the 1991 uprising. The research on the 
captured documents by the Human Rights Watch revealed that the Halabja's tragedy 
(March 1988) was only one of the systematic acts of genocide conducted by the 
government beginning in March 1987. Chemical weapons were extensively used 
along with other conventional weapons. The Human Rights Watch admitted that the 
government 'retaliation' took place in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. However, even 
though the retaliation was part of the Iran-Iraq war, it went too far (HRW: 17). 
The Anfal campaign constituted part of the regime's resort to an Islamic appeal. As 
the Iran-Iraq war dragged on, Saddam Hussein reversed Baath secularism and resorted 
to manipulating Islamic symbols. In 1986, the government ordered strict observance 
of the Islamic fast, closed down night clubs and deported foreign barmaids (Hiro 
1990: 179). Saddam Hussein claimed descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammad, 
and had himself photographed in Mecca (Randal: 246). Thus Saddam Hussein 
increasingly resorted to 'nationalising Islam', meaning, emphasising the religion's 
Arab origin against Iran (Tripp: 60). This was intended to unite the Shia Arabs that 
share the Shia faith with Iranians. 
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The looting and burning of villages during the Anfal campaign was undertaken by the 
Kurdish militia called the johsh, mentioned earlier. Unlike the anny, the johsh unit, 
depended upon recruitment by local leaders. There were evidences of tribal chiefs 
who were 'forced' into cooperation: 'we wanted to keep our people safe. There was 
no work in Kurdistan and no way to get money. The government was bringing men 
from Sudan to work but would not take Kurds. By enrolling in the johsh the Kurds did 
fifteen days duty per month. Many had escaped from the anny. They were all asking 
me for safety so as not to be killed in the Iran-Iraq war. So we defended them by 
putting them in the johsh' (McDowall 1996: 355). Addressing Kurdish nationalists 
rhetorically, another tribal chief declared: 'my villages are still standing and are still 
wealthy, my people still dress as Kurds, speak Kurdish and have a good life. Look at 
what your nationalism has done for you. Your villages are destroyed, your people 
have been forcibly resettled, you live in exile and you have nothing left. Why call me 
a traitor?' (McDowall 1996: 377). Furthennore, in an interview with McDowall, 
Masoud Barzani claimed that integrating the fighters from the johsh deserters into the 
nationalist forces would undennine the effectiveness of the pershmerga (Kurdish 
fighters) forces, as some johsh acted as infonners (McDowall, Ibid., interviewed on 
10 October 1991). 
Incompatible Opposition Groups 
Basically, current Iraqi opposition groups can be categorised as: (l) Islamic Shia, (2) 
Kurds, (3) Arab nationalists, and (.+) the Communists (Karadaghi in Chaliand: 21'+-
230). The Arab nationalists in this category is opposed to the Baath rule, and is 
composed of anny deserters. These groups experience constant disunions on 
ideological, religious and national grounds, and even as a whole are a weak 
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opposition. The Shia Arabs constitute the majority of the population and thus are 
deemed to provide the most viable potential opposition. However, they are divided 
along tribal rivalries and some are actively pro-government (Bengio in Baram and 
Rubin: 60-61). Furthermore, the Shia opposition group is almost entirely dependent 
on Iranian military support (Bengio, Ibid.). This meant, the Shia opposition's only 
hope was to establish a viable link with the Kurds. However, no such link existed 
between the Shia and the Kurdish parties. Furthermore, the objectives of the t,,·o 
oppositions are dramatically different and are in fact incompatible. The Shia group 
envisages establishment of the Islamic government, which is known to be no more 
tolerant of Kurdish autonomy than is the current Baath government. The lack of 
cooperation among opposition groups also appears to reflect the fragmented nature of 
the Iraqi society. 
Summary 
With its overwhelming state autonomy, Iraq evolved into a totalitarian state. 
Totalitarianism also affected the nature of Iraqi society resulting 111 the complete 
absence of civil organisations which could act autonomously from the state. The 
fragmented state of opposition groups also demonstrated the failed integration of Iraq, 
and thus the ethnic and religious sectarian division remained strong. In Turkey, the 
Kurdish issues from the 1990s have become part of the agendas of the industrialist 
orU<lnisations which are keen to establish a democratic framework. In Iraq, no Co , 
equivalent developments have taken place: the industries were completely controlled 
by the state, and the politically viable working class was weak. The Baath party 
succeeded in political institutionalisation to a great extent, but its rule depended on a 
combination of political mobil isation and sectarian control and clientelism: the Baath 
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Party relied on rural notables to govern the countryside. It appears Iraq's national 
integration under the Baath Party continues to be weak. 
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Chapter IV 
Great Power Intervention and Nation-building 
Introduction 
This chapter is an examination of great power intervention's effect on the nation-
building efforts of an ethnic minority. Two pivotal cases of external powers' 
involvement in the Kurdish nation-building will be discussed, firstly events over the 
First World War, and secondly after the Gulf War of 1991, both instances when the 
Kurds seemingly had a chance to acquire statehood or at least substantial autonomy. 
During the First World War, the issue of self-determination of non-Turkish peoples 
was used to justify the Allied states' involvement in the anti-Ottoman Arab and 
Kurdish nationalist movements. However, once the war was over, the principle of 
self-determination withered away, and national independence of these national groups 
was arbitrarily denied or left entirely to the great powers' decisions. In the case under 
discussion, the Allied states and Turkey, not the Kurdish people, decided that there 
would be no Kurdish state after the First World War. Thus, external interventions in 
the 1920s ended up devastating Kurdish nationalists' aspirations. 
As for the most recent case, the eventual outcome of the Allies' involvement in the 
de-facto independence of the Kurds since 1991 is not yet known. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Gulf War, it appeared that the Allies' military intervention was 
effective in protecting the Kurds from the Iraqi government's persecution. However, 
ten years after the ceasefire, external interventions by the Allies and by the United 
Nations now appear to ha\'e largely failed in facilitating a viable solution to the crisis 
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affecting the Kurds, to be discussed below. This chapter, consisting of two parts, 
analyses foreign interventions from the perspective of whether or not they have either 
facilitated national independence for the Kurds or alternatively facilitated a viable 
relation between states and ethnic minorities within their borders. Foreign Office 
archives were consulted for the first part of the chapter. 
Part l. The First World War 
Introduction 
The following section outlines the international context of the First World War in the 
Middle East, especially the role of Britain, Iraq's fonner mandatory power which took 
direct responsibility for delineating the state borders of the region. This process was 
illustrative of how intervening powers would put priority on their national interest, at 
the expense of that of the local peoples'. Kurdish demand for self-rule was deemed 
instrumental by Britain at one time, when it was thought to counter the pan-Islamic 
movement, but was deemed disturbing to its interests afterwards, when Britain 
decided to create Iraq, whose territory encompassed large areas inhabited by the 
Kurds. In order to clarify the overall context in which the Kurdish state was 
eventually denied, the following narrative includes Britain's contacts with Turkish 
nationalists and the Arab insurgents as well. 
Secret Diplomacy 
Before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire constituted a strategic buffer among 
the European states competing for colonies, as they wished to secure the Empire on 
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their side against rival states. The Ottoman Empire remained inviolable, even though 
it was so weak that it was called the 'sick man of Europe' (Kedourie 1987: 11). 
However, once the First World War had broke out, the Empire's territory suddenly 
became an object of colonial designs. 
A plan to divide the Ottoman Empire was prepared by Britain and France, but this 
was not revealed to the anti-Ottoman insurgents. Instead, the promise of independent 
statehood was given to the Arabs in order to keep them on the Allies' side during the 
war. One of the most important diplomatic agreements reached between the Allies 
and anti-Ottoman Arab insurgents was the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. It 
denotes a series of correspondence exchanged between Sherif Husein of Mecca and 
the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon, who then was in Egypt. The 
correspondence was exchanged between 1915 and 1916, and in it, Britain pledged that 
if Hussein proclaimed an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, it would provide military 
and financial support during the war, and after the Allies' victory it would help to 
create an independent Arab state in the Arabian Penninsula and the Fertile Crescent. 
There was a simultaneous arrangement underway at that time. At the very moment 
when Britain pledged the creation of an Arab state, Britain and France concluded the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement (May-October 1916). It allocated most of the Arabian 
peninsula, Mesopotamia, Transjordan and Palestine to Britain, and Lebanon and Syria 
to France. Thus the agreement totally ran counter to the pledge made to the Arabs 
who were fighting the Ottomans in their large-scale revolt started in 1916. The Sykes-
Picot Agreement also divided the Kurdish area between Britain, France and Russia. 
The city of Mosul, later to be contested between Turkey and Britain, was put under 
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the French sphere by this arrangement. Thus, Britain and France promised creation of 
an independent Arab state and at the same time planned the partition of the same 
territory. This had been planned from a fairly early stage of the war, and it appears 
that the Sykes-Picot Agreement reflected the great powers' initial plan most 
accurately. 
On the other hand, British contacts with Kurdish nationalists at the early phase of the 
War was not as obvious as that with the Arab nationalists. It is estimated that initially, 
the Kurdish area was of secondary strategic importance to Britain, whose primary 
concern was concentrated on the Gulf (Marr 1985: 31-1). In Kurdistan there were 
many powers competing to secure support from Kurdish tribal leaders including the 
Ottoman government, the Gennans, and the Russians. For the most part, the Kurds' 
actions in the First World War were pro-Ottoman, but not unanimously so. Some 
Kurdish tribal chiefs sided with the Ottomans but some, particularly tribes around 
Dersim, were known to have refused to assist the Ottomans and sought safety with the 
neighbouring Russian people (Kendal: 31). 
The Wilsonian Principle and Self-Detennination 
The First World War turned into a war of attrition, during which the Russian regime 
changed from Tzarist to Soviet. The Bolshevist Revolution had a crucial impact on 
the war when the new government revealed all the secret treaties made under the 
Tsarist regime. This had a totally demoralising effect on the anti-Ottoman rebels, who 
\\cre fighting against the Ottoman Empire for the promised independent statehood. 
The US-led peace initiative, known as the Fourteen Points was presented by the US 
President \\'oodrow Wilson on 8 January 1918. This was intended to promise national 
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independence to all the non-Turkish peoples formerly governed by the Ottoman 
Empire. Wilson declared his support for an 'absolutely unmolested opportunity for 
autonomous development for them, and laid plans for a comprehensive peace (Gelvin: 
13). The first on the list was a call for an end to secret diplomacy, symbolised in the 
phrase coined by Wilson 'open covenants, openly arrived at'. This clause was 
proposed in the belief that secret alliances might lead to another world war and also 
was intended to calm the shock shared by the public after the Boshevik revelation of 
secret treaties (Nolan 1995: 277). Another important clause was number ten, in which 
self-determination of the non-Turkish people of the former Ottoman and Austrian 
Empires was stipulated. 
Application of self-determination principles, however, was done differently in Europe 
than in the Middle East. In Europe, all small nations under the Austria-Hungary 
Empire achieved national independence after the war. In the Middle East, the 
independence of non-Turkish peoples was compromised through the Mandate system, 
in which colonies and territories taken from the Central Powers were administered by 
the states appointed by the League of Nations, which included Britain, France, 
Australia, Japan, and South Africa. The problem with the Mandate system was that 
although it was designed to allow progressive steps for complete independence for 
newly established states, at the same time, it allowed considerable room for control by 
former colonial powers. In fact, Britain and France displayed great ambivalence to the 
principle of self-deternlination (Gelvin: 13). 
Furthermore, despite Wilson's attempts to halt secret diplomacy, it was continued 
even after the war. The making and the revelation of the Lloyd-George Clemanceau 
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Agreement (December 1918) is an illustrative example. The agreement was 
necessitated after the armistice (the Mudros Annistice, 30 October 1918), when the 
British had accidentally occupied territory that was supposed to put under the French 
according to the prior (Sykes-Picot) agreement. The British-occupied territory 
included the oil-rich city of Mosul. The two premiers, Lloyd George and Clemanceau. 
held a talk and agreed that Mosul would be annexed to the British territory. In 
exchange, France would have a share in oil resources from Mosul. It was also agreed 
that the French would have a mandate control over Syria. At the San Remo 
Conference which was held in 1920 (April 19-26, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece 
and Belgium), the form of mandates of the Middle Eastern territory was discussed and 
was officially decided. With little surprise, Britain was assigned mandates over 
Palestine and Mesopotamia and that of Syria and Lebanon were assigned to France. 
On top of this, the French oil rights in Mosul were publicly acknowledged. Thus, the 
San Remo Conference gave a token recognition to the secret agreements already 
concluded between Lloyd George and Clemanceau two years earlier. 
New Developments in Anatolia 
Meanwhile, after the Greek landing on Izmir in May 1919, Mustafa Kemal 
successfully put together the demobilised Ottoman army and numerous irregulars to 
fight the occupying forces. It must be pointed out that Kemal's forces included many 
Kurdish chieftains who felt threatened by the Allies' occupation. Shortly after the 
arnlistice, anti-foreign propaganda was spread by the Turkish nationalists. In this, the 
Turkish nationalists called for the Kurds to join them: 
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'In Di yarbekir the agitation started by the Unionists [Kemalists] produced a certain 
unrest among the Kurds, which proclaimed Turco-Kurdish independence. The line 
taken was that if the Kurds were not to remain under Turkish rule, they should not 
allow foreigners to govern them. The Turks and Kurds of Urfa openly declared they 
would not tolerate Allied interference' (FO 371/4157, 4/311919 GHQ intelligence 
summary). 
The British officials observed widespread influence of the CUP among the Kurds, and 
listed the names of prominent Kurdish activists in Anatolia who opposed the Kurdish 
representatives who were negotiating for the creation of an independent Kurdish state 
at the Paris Peace Conference (F037114193). Britain summarised the circumstance as 
follows: 'Kurdistan was split into two groups; the pro-Kurdish, who, under suitable 
management, might be pro-British, and the pro-Turkish party who were fanatically 
inclined anti-Christian' (F0371/4193). Among the pro-British Kurds were the Badr 
Khan family, mentioned earlier. The Badr Khans pledged their loyalty to the British 
government and distanced themselves from the Kemalists. 
While the Kurdish political activists' general contacts with the majority of Kurds 
remained weak, Kemal's calls for national independence deeply penetrated to the 
hearts of the people in Anatolia, including the Kurds, who feared foreign occupation. 
As a result, Kemal succeeded in allying a considerable number of Kurds on the 
Turkish nationalists' side. It was said that already by the end of 1919 at least seventy 
Kurdish tribes had declared their support for the Turkish nationalists (Macfie 1998: 
214). In order to win Kurdish support, the CUP's propaganda had been modified to 
emphasise the Islamic cause, instead of Turkish nationalism. British intelligence 
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reports summarised: 'Faced with personal danger, within and without their own 
country, they (CUP) now perforce to attempt to win the support of the people \\"hich 
had before been immaterial to them ... Since this anti-Christian movement requires the 
co-operation of the Kurds, who have their own aspirations which vary considerably, it 
has become necessary for the CUP element to pretend to support the [not explicitly 
Turkish] policy, as far as this race (Kurds) is concerned' (F0371 .+157, GHQ 
intelligence summary March 1919). Thus, the propaganda to mobilise the Kurds was 
largely anti-Christian. 
Furthermore, the statement issued by the Kemalists, 'the National Will', portrayed the 
pro-Western Kurdish nationalists as traitors. Members of Badr Khans were accused 
by them of 'working for the sake of British Gold and Englishmen whose aim was to 
create disturbances in our country, promising the formation of a Kurdistan' 
(F037114193/149271). Once again, it was based on the claim that creation of 
Kurdistan was inimical to the country which was based on Islamic religion. The 
Kemalists' statement continued, 'they (the Kurdish nationalists) even persuaded some 
of our Muslim brothers to join them, and tried to raise up the Muslims against each 
other thereby causing the country to be occupied' (Ibid.). British intelligence judged 
that 'the idea that the British were encouraging the establishment of an independent 
Kurdistan had aroused serious alarm, and, as a consequence it had stimulated further 
anti-British propaganda'. Also that, 'any form of foreign intervention would have the 
same effect as putting a match to a barrel of gunpowder' (F0371 .+ 193 153U9.+. 
153673). The intelligence report concluded, 'no organisation for counter [Kemalists] 
propaganda exists. The Kurdish intelligentsia, the majority of whom have been 
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vanished [sic (have vanished)] from their country, are debarred from all 
communication with their compatriots' (F0371/4193/163038). 
It was under the above mentioned circumstance that the Sevres Treaty (1920) was 
signed at the Paris Peace Conference. It must be pointed that even though the Se\'res 
Treaty had endorsed the creation of a Kurdish state, the Kurdish nationalists' base of 
support in Anatolia was weak. Muhammad Sherif Pasha, a Kurd from the aristocratic 
Baban family, represented the Kurds. It was known that he was a staunch supporter of 
Abdul Hamid and had a diplomatic career in the Ottoman government. As a political 
figure, Sherif Pasha was a cross between an Ottoman loyalists and a Kurdish 
nationalist. 
The terms agreed to in the Sevres Treaty would have created independent Armenia, 
Mesopotamia, Syria, and Kurdistan. The clause most relevant to the Kurds reads: 
'A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed 
by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six 
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy 
for the predominantly Kurdish area lying east of the Euphrates, and north of the 
frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and 
(3)' . 
'If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 sha11 address themseh'es to the Council 
of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the 
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population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then 
considers that these people are capable of such independence and recommends that it 
should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, 
and to renounce all rights and title over these areas' (Article 64). 
The issue over where to draw the boundary between the proposed Armenian and 
Kurdish states was disputed. The area where the Kurds and Arn1enians li\'ed 
considerably overlapped. The Sevres Treaty's section on Armenia (Article 89), 
however, allocated several territories whose popUlation was mainly Kurdish to 
Armenia (Kendal: 35). In this regard the draftees of the treaty appear to have favoured 
the peoples under European protection. Members of the British Foreign Office had 
been debating this issue from 1919, in which opposition to the creation of a Kurdish 
state was raised on the grounds that such a state would threaten the interests of 
Christian peoples in the area (F0371/4193, Interdepartmental Conference of the 
Middle Eastern Affairs). 
Furthermore, those who opposed the creation of a Kurdish state, such as Col. Wilson, 
did so on the ground that it would result in depriving Iraq of economically-important 
cities, many of which were located in Kurdistan, from Iraq. Particularly, Sulaimaniya 
and Mosul were deemed vital to the economic prosperity of Iraq. Thus Wilson argued 
that the Kurdish inhabited region must become part of Iraq (Wilson: 133). It appeared 
that the British debate over the creation of a Kurdish state was mostly focused on such 
a state's instrumentality, not the fulfilment of Kurdish aspirations. Winston Churchill, 
then Secretary of Colonies, envisaged creating a Kurdish state which would serve as 
an ethnic buffer between Iraq and Turkey (LP&S/} 01782): 'The potential advantage 
of excluding it (Kurdish state) from Iraq ... I had in my mind the picture of a buffer 
state ethnologically composed of non-Arab elements and interposed between Iraq and 
Turkey ... I realise that our programme must be more attractive than any alternative 
Turks might offer and must be broad enough to satisfy more ambitious Kurdish 
nationalists' (L/P&SIl 01782). 
On the other hand, British officials sympathetic to the Kurds, such as Major E.W.C. 
Noel and Simon Montagu, supported the creation of at least the Southern Kurdish 
state (that excluded Turkish Kurdistan) located in northern Iraq. Also, Col. C. N. 
French, who was then in Egypt Force, rightly predicted in 1919 that 'to include Iraq 
certain rich Kurd district [sic] in order to enrich an Arabian Mesopotamia was hardly 
in accordance with the principles of self-detennination laid down in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations ... there should be no Kurdish territory in Iraq, otherwise a sort 
of Kurdistan irredenta would be created '" they would prove a source of weakness in 
every other way. I consider that any attempt to administer Kurdistan and Annenia by 
Western methods would be a mistake' (F0371/4192). Col. French recommended 
leaving it to some fonn of native administration run by the local inhabitants, but his 
recommendations were not reflected in actual British policy. 
However, one thing was certain: nobody - even among those who supported some 
fonn of Kurdish independence - was ready to create the Kurdish state that 
encompassed all areas inhabited by the Kurds, a real Kurdish state for all Kurds. It 
also became obvious that no state authorities wished to assume a mandate over such a 
Kurdish state (F03 71/4193). To make the circumstance worse. there \\ as no 
satisLlctory Kurdish leader who \\'as deemed capable of representing all the Kurds 
during this crucial period. The two prospective Kurdish leaders of that time: Sherif 
Muhammad Pasha and Sheikh Mahmoud, to be discussed below, were both seen as 
totally unsuitable for the task of governing the entire Kurdish people (F03714193). 
As a result, by 1921 the British Foreign Office's discussion had already started to 
focus on the viability of the Iraqi state, instead of whether or not to create the Kurdish 
state. 
Developments in Northern Iraq and the Syrian Region 
Meanwhile, as the occupation of Mesopotamia continued, British relations with the 
local Iraqi population began to deteriorate. Britain's mandate over Iraq formally 
commenced on 1 May 1920. The formal announcement of the mandatory power, 
however, triggered a widespread rebellion throughout Iraq in the summer of 1920. 
Iraq was not yet a sufficiently unified state to call it a 'national' rebellion; however, 
various groups inside the country spontaneously opposed the foreign rule imposed by 
the League of Nations. The early Iraqi nationalist organisations such as 'al-Ahd al-
Iraqi' played a key role in this revolt, which was characterised as, 'a struggle for 
liberation from external rule, the achievement of independence, and the establishment 
of a local government' (Tauber: 315). After suppressing the 1920 rebellion, Britain 
adopted the policy of buttressing the moderate Arab nationalists on one hand, and 
appeasing tribal leaders on the other. 
In August 1921 the throne of Iraq was presented to Faysal I of Mecca by the British 
High Commissioner. It was done under the following circumstance: Faysal 
represented the entire Arab people's cause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 and 
entered Damascus to establish the Arab state. Shortly after, howe\'er, he was driven 
out of Syria by the French army in 1920. France established its mandate over S\Tia 
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and also signed an agreement with Turkey in October 1921. By this agreement, the 
predominantly Kurdish lazireh and Kurd-Dagh provinces were annexed to Syria 
while other Kurdish districts remained a part of Turkey. The Kurds were thus 
partitioned between Syria and Turkey. National independence for the Arabs and the 
Kurds, as envisaged by the Fourteen Points, was thus compromised by the great 
powers. 
On the other hand, the British administration set up in northern Iraq had been made 
less stable by the Kurdish tribes led by Shaikh Mahmoud. Because of his extensive 
influence, Britain briefly appointed Mahmoud as a governor of Sulaimaniya. 
However, he disobeyed British officials and was soon dismissed. In 1922, Mahmoud 
claimed to be the king of Kurdistan and shortly after became uncontrollable by the 
British authorities. Britain suppressed his followers with an RAP bombing which was 
also the first case in history where an air raid was conducted against a people. 
This Kurdish rebellion, however, appears to have affected British foreign policy in 
two aspects. The first was it gave Britain leverage over Arab nationalists in Iraq, and 
it affected Britain's negotiation with Turkey over Mosul (Ali 1997: 528-530). First, 
Britain took advantage of the military dependency of the Iraqi Arab nationalists, as 
they alone would have had no way of suppressing Shaikh Mahmoud. Because of this, 
Britain did not suppress the rebellion instantly, and thus Mahmoud was left rebellious 
until Iraq was brought to sign the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1924. And second, Britain did 
not wish to endanger its position in the ongoing Lausanne negiotiation \\'ith Turkey, to 
be discussed below. by using its force against the Kurds. This would han? allowed the 
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Turks to portray Britain as a non-legitimate ruler over the Kurdish region. Thus, \vith 
the signing of Anglo-Iraq Treaty and with the conclusion of the border dispute \\"ith 
the Turks, Britain no longer had the need to allow Shaikh Mahmoud to threaten its 
administration in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The Turkish-British Handshake 
There was, meanwhile, a new advance made by Turkish nationalists. By August 1922 
Mustafa Kemal successfully drove the occupying Greek Anny out of Anatolia, and 
the Kemalists' victory won them international recognition as the official successor 
authority to the Ottoman Empire at Lausanne in 1923. Because of this successful 
assumption of authority, Turkey became the only country defeated in the First World 
War to abrogate the tenns imposed by the Allies. By the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey 
gave up nearly all claims to the fonner Ottoman lands in Europe. However, in its 
effort to secure the core Anatolian territory, the Turkish delegate led by Ismet Inonu, 
who was an ethnic Kurd, emphasised that 'the government of the Great National 
Assembly was the government of both Turks and Kurds. Although Turks and Kurds 
spoke different languages, those two peoples were not significantly different [from 
one another] to fonn a single bloc from the viewpoint of race, face, and custom' 
(Ismet Inonu's speech in Lausanne on 23 Jan. 1923, as in Kendal: 49). After months 
of negotiation, the Treaty of Lausanne was eventually signed in July 1923. Although 
the treaty contained provisions with regard to the protection of ethnic minorities, it 
only affected the non-Muslim minorities, such as the Annenians and the Greeks. The 
fact that the Kurds were an ethnic minority was disregarded by the Turkish 
government on the ground that the Kurds governed Turkey as equal parters with the 
Turks (Kendal: 51). 
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The tenns of the Treaty of Lausanne superseded the provisions of the Se\'res Treaty 
and annexed most of the Kurdish territory to the current Turkish Republic, except the 
city of Mosul, which was retained by Iraq. 
This was a vital period for Kemalist Turkey as it was in the early phase of state 
formation, struggling to establish the government's uncontested legitimacy. Because 
of this, during the war of independence Mustafa Kemal refrained from alienating 
Islamic sentiments shared by the majority of Kurds, and he did not embark upon 
secularising refonns aimed to establish the Turkish Republic modelled after the 
Western style nation-state. Upon consolidating his power, Kemal, for the first time, 
started a series of refonns. By the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, many Kurds 
were severely alienated. This triggered a major Kurdish rebellion throughout eastern 
Anatolia in February 1925, which was led by Shaikh Said. However, the disturbance 
appears to have affected the Turkish-British negotiation over northern Iraqi border as 
well. The details of the Shaikh Said rebellion are given in Chapter III-2. 
The Shaikh Said rebellion posed the first major threat to the newly established 
Turkish government. The protracted negotiation over Mosul was ongoing throughout 
the crisis, during which Britain showed its determination to include Mosul in Iraq. A 
British official recalled: 'we were now engaged upon what was for Iraq a life-and-
death struggle none of us had any doubt, for we were convinced that Basra and 
Ba~Jhdad without Mosul could for economic and strategic reasons, ne\'er be built up ~ , 
into a viable state. Although the world press was wont to represent the battle as part of 
a gigantic struggle for the control of oil it is interesting to look back and recall how 
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very little oil figured in our calculations ... as distinct from the general patterns of 
trade, both import and export, which made the three vilayets a single and indivisible 
economic unit' (Edmonds: 398) It was also widely believed in Turkey that the Shaikh 
Said revolt was partly assisted by Britain (Bruinessen: 275, Barkey in Olson 1996: 
67). The negotiations finally ended in December 1925. Following this, a bilateral 
treaty between Turkey and Britain was signed in June 1926, by which Turkey gained 
10 per cent of Mosul's oil concession from Britain and furthermore, Britain promised 
to refrain from agitation on behalf of the Kurds and Annenians in the future 
(Bruinessen: 275). Thus the Kurdish rebellion was used to further the British position 
in Iraq. It was also obvious that Turkey was diplomatically weak at that time and had 
little control over its periphery. The government was also threatened by counter-
revolution as well. These factors all appear to have contributed to the settlement of the 
Iraqi-Turkish border. The exact depth of British involvement in the Kurdish rebellion 
was not known. However, as pointed by a few observers, Kurdish rebellions during 
this period appear to have been highly instrumental as cards for negotiation among 
stronger powers surrounding the Kurds. 
Summary of Part (1) 
We have seen that the potential Kurdish state, even if on a limited scale, was 
completely eliminated from the map because of changes in the strategic priorities of 
Britain. This was combined with the fact that many Kurds chose to side with the 
Turks for fear of foreign occupation. Kurdish nationalism was acceptable to Britain 
only for so long as it was instrumental to the overall British policy towards the ;-.. llddle 
East. and the Kurds' right to self-detem1ination was essentially a secondary issue, 
even though there were sympathetic individuals in the British government. The 
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disappearance of independent statehood was in fact, not an exclusively Kurdish 
experience. A few years prior to the Kurdish case, the Annenian Republic, briefly 
became independent after WWI, and shared a similar fate. Just as the potential 
Kurdish state was not materialised due to the coincidence of interest among the 
surrounding powers, the short-lived Annenian Republic was crushed after an 
agreement was reached between Soviet Russia and Turkey in 1921: Turkey refrained 
from interference in the Annenian secessionism in the Caucasus area and in , , 
exchange, Soviet Russia recognised the authority of the new Ankara government. 
Thus the interests of small nations who occupy strategically important locations are 
sacrificed by the work of more powerful states that surround them. No external state 
truly cared about the self-determination of the Kurds as a first priority. 
From the point of view of Kurdish nation-building, the post-WWI period was crucial 
because it divided the Kurdish people more or less permanently. The loss of the 
Kurdish state meant perhaps the greatest obstruction to physical, social, and political 
development of Kurdish nationhood. The Kurds were not the only tribal people in that 
area. There were equally strongly tribal people, for example, in southern Iraq and 
rural Turkey. But opportunities for detribalisation were made greater for the Arab 
population by having an Iraqi state that was governed by the Arabs. Turkey became a 
spectacular example of a new state that devoted state resources to create a new 
Turkish national identity through education, social reforms, and economic 
development. All those possibilities were drastically reduced for the Kurdish people, 
firstly from the sheer loss of independent statehood, and secondly from the hostile 
nation-building policies of the states the Kurds were divided among. Why are many of 
the Kurdish people tribally organised to this day? It is not because they are the Kurds, 
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but because they were deprived of the government apparatus that is capable of 
representing Kurds on a different, modem basis. This point was examined in Chapter 
III. 
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Part 2. The 1991 Gulf War 
Introduction: The Kurds Between Western Intervention and Iraqi Threat 
The experience of the Iraqi Kurds since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 presents, as 
during the 1920s, a case illustrative of external intervention's contribution to the 
welfare of 'minorities'. 
In recent decades, the role of the Kurds in the Great Powers' policy was that of a 
'pawn'. The Kurds have been supported while they were instrumental, and have been 
abandoned when their goals no longer coincided with that of the intervening states. 
This was not a new phenomenon in the history of the Kurds. As seen in Chapter III, 
during the 1974-5 Iraqi civil war, Kurdish leaders were supplied with considerable 
military aid from Iran, Israel and the United States. However, once Iran and Iraq 
struck an accord at Algiers in 1975, all the military aid to the Kurdish guerrillas was 
suddenly cut off resulting in their complete defeat. 
Another example could be found in 1988. In the final stage of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
notorious Anfal campaign by the Iraqi government destroyed thousands of Kurdish 
villages along the Iranian border. France and the US condemned the attack but no 
sanctions were imposed on Iraq. The West simply would not allow Khomeini's Iran to 
win the Iran-Iraq War. In 1988, the US Senator Claiborne Pell introduced the 
Prevention of Genocide Act to put pressure on the Iraqi regime, but the Bush 
administration had the measure killed (Zunes MEP Jun. 1998, also Halperin: 39). The 
West ignored the Iraqi use of chemical weapon against the Kurds that had already 
been confinned by 1986. Furthennore, the Soviet Union and France continued to 
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supply anns to Iraq despite the fact that France condemned of Iraq's attacks on the 
Kurds (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 73). The West anned Iraq heavily and 
closed their eyes to its genocidal policy toward the Kurds. Until as late as 1989 this , 
policy was continued; the Bush administration pushed new loans through to the Iraqi 
government in order to facilitate US-Iraqi trade and actively supported the Iraqi 
regime's procurement of weapons (Zunes, Ibid.) 
The events in 1991 came in this context. In 1991, at the outbreak of the second Gul f 
War, the Allied states encouraged Iraqi oppositions to rise up and overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. However, once the ceasefire was reached no ground forces were deployed to 
protect the rebels. On 1 April 1991, the KDP leader called for assistance, but all 
Western governments gave no response (Aburish 2000: 312). The result was the Iraqi 
government's complete victory over the opposition groups and the exodus of two 
million refugees into neighbouring states. 
For almost a decade, however, the Allied states have been enforcing a No-fly zone 
above the 36th parallel and restricting Iraqi military activities there. Because of this 
operation, the Iraqi Kurds have been enjoying greater security, and this appears to be 
a positive factor for the welfare of the Kurds. At the same time, it must be noted that 
the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have been denying any intention of establishing a state 
completely independent from Iraq. This means that their tie to Baghdad is crucially 
important, and all intervening bodies, in this case - the Allied states and the United 
Nations - should concentrate their efforts on improving relations between the Kurds 
and the Iraqi government, if they seek a workable solution to the problem of the 
Kurds' place in Iraq. While at the same time, howe\,er, as long as the current Iraqi 
regime's totalitarian structure remains in place, it is questionable if a viable solution 
for the Kurdish conflict in Iraq can ever materialise. In this respect, if only the 
minority group in question could benefit from it, some fonn of external intervention 
seems desirable. This would lead us to a question of the 'quality' of intervention; it 
must be remembered that a truly responsible external intervention is capable of 
providing a working government framework, as recounted earlier. When this is not 
possible for any intervener/s, the external intervention should, at least, not aggravate 
existing political conditions affecting the minority group. This principle, however, 
seems to have been hardly achieved in the Kurdish experience of external 
interventions. As mentioned above, intervening states always abandoned the Kurdish 
nationalists once these states' own political interests no longer coincided with that of 
the Kurds. If this continues to be the case, ultimately, the current de-facto 
independence of the Kurds will prove fragile. The basic security of the Kurdish 
Regional Government remains entirely dependent on the support of the intervening 
external powers. The decision to intervene taken by the states involved in this case is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it argues, as a minimum requirement of 
intervening bodies, all interventions should be conducted in a manner which would 
give the interest of the local people priority, instead of theirs. Based on this 
proposition, the following section will examine whether or not the ongoing external 
intervention conducted for the Iraqi Kurds, first, through the Allied states' military 
actions and second, through the UN economic sanction regime (including the Oil for 
Food Progranlme) is truly serving the interest of the Kurds or establishing a viable 
relation bet\veen the Kurdish areas and the rest of the Iraqi state as a whole. This 
chapter will firstly analyse military actions taken by the Allied states after the Gulf 
War in response to the refugee exodus triggered by the 1991 Kurdish rebellion, and 
secondly it will examine these actions' impact on the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG). Finally it will assess whether or not all these acts of intervention have 
contributed to the workable welfare of the Kurds and the Iraqi people as a whole. 
Iraq's Suppression of the Kurdish Uprising in 1991 
Before Iraq had recovered from the Iran-Iraq War that ended in 1988, the outbreak of 
Gulf War in 1990 once again devastated the country's war-tom infrastructure. The 
Iraqi casualties from the Gulf War were estimated to be at least 65,000 and many of 
the victims died in the trenches along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Many of the Army 
conscripts sent to the most dangerous front line were either Kurdish or Shia soldiers 
(Pilger 1991), reflecting the lower status of these groups within the Army. It must also 
be pointed that the war had been waged by the Iraqi government, not by the Iraqi 
people. By the late 1980s, Iraq's state structure was already totalitarian, and the 
majority of ordinary Iraqis had no control over the government's decision to occupy 
Kuwait. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait invited much criticism abroad, and facilitated 
even the Arab states to participate in the Gulf War Coalition against Iraq. 
As the Gulf War ended in total Iraqi defeat in late February 1991, two revolts against 
president Saddam Hussein broke out; first in southern Iraq predominantly inhabited 
by the Shia Arabs, and second, in the Kurdish north. The first revolt was initially 
triggered by a group of retreating Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. The anti-government 
revolt started by these soldiers was joined by the Shia opposition group, the Supreme 
Assembly of the Islamic Revolution (SAIRI). The disturbance spread quickly across 
key cities in the south, such as Nassiriyah, Karbala and Najaf. 
The Kurdish revolt began on 14 March 1991. Momentum was given to it when the 
100,OOO-strong government gendarmeries, johsh, switched sides to the Kurdish 
nationalists. Because the Western promise of backing for the Kurdish revolt appeared 
almost certain at that time, it was said that even the anti-nationalist tribal chiefs joined 
in the nationalists' uprising (Hiro 1992: 405, also in Randal: 44-5). In fact, the 
Western states encouraged the Kurds and other Iraqi opposition to rise against the 
Baath regime. For example, on 15 February 1991 the US president George Bush was 
reported to have said, 'there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for 
the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force 
Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and comply with the United Nations' 
resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. We have no argument with 
the people of Iraq. Our differences are with that brutal dictator in Baghdad' (as in 
Halperin: 40). By late March, the Kurdish nationalists had succeeded in controlling 
major cities in the north, such as Dohuk, Arbil, Zakho and the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. 
To the surprise of many, however, despite being completely defeated by the Allied 
states, the Iraqi government was still capable of mobilising its armed forces to 
suppress these rebellions. The suppression was rapid. The Shia rebellion in the south 
had been completely suppressed by the Republican Guards by mid-March. After this 
operation, the government troops were concentrated in the north. From 22 March, the 
government began reorganising the troops in the Mosul region. By the end of March, 
the Iraqi Army had taken back all key cities occupied by the Kurds, including Kirkuk. 
It was known that the government used heavy weapons and helicopter gunships, and a 
few thousand civilians were killed (Hiro 1992: 405). As the Iraqi Army advanced 
further towards the mountains, Kurdish civilians flooded into the borders of the 
neighbouring states. There were no Allied troops to protect the fleeing Kurds from the 
advancing Iraqi Army. One witness recalled: 
'When the fighting began between the Kurdish nationalists and the 
government in the south of Mosul, people started realising there was no way that the 
nationalists were going to win the war. Within a week, the town (Mosul) was like a 
ghost town. We did not want to leave, and we were probably the last family still 
remaining in the town. But one morning when shells started reaching the basement 
where we were hiding, we decided to flee. We fled to Dohuk on foot and with some 
pick-Up transport. We walked and walked, there was no more road, then we arrived in 
Sirsensk. We were very angry that the West was not going to support the Kurds' 
('Zuzan', pseudonym). 
Another Kurd who fled to the Iranian border commented: 
'I felt betrayed by the West. I had to stay in the camp in Iran for several 
months. The condition was so bad. But I was very scared to go back to my home in 
Kirkuk, and I went to Arbil (further north) instead. Even today I feel the West is not 
serious enough about supporting the Kurds' (Nouri Talabany). 
The number of Kurdish refugees who fled Iraq during this exodus was estimated to be 
up to two million, or half the population of the region, of whom, 500,000 crossed the 
bordcr into Turkey while more than a million fled to Iran. Between 2,000 and 3,000 
refugees were known to have died daily from exposure and also from an outbreak of 
spreadable disease while they waited entry into the two countries (Hear: 69). Turkcy' 
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adopted a hostile attitude to the refugees by refusing their entry. However, owing to 
the mounting international pressure, it finally opened the border. A witness recalled: 
'I knew Turkish soldiers shot some people who were trying to get food. We 
were so fed up with the camp. It was so miserable. 1 stayed there about a month and a 
half. They were looking for someone who could interpret, and I volunteered. I myself 
was very sick from dysentery. We eventually decided to go back, when the Iraqi 
government said the Kurds can come back. Actually, the Kurdish nationalists said 
people should stay in the camp, as it was getting so much attention. But we did not 
want to stay any longer' ('Zuzan', pseudonym). 
The exodus was taken advantage of by the Iraqi government when it strengthened the 
'Arabisation' of the economically important city, Kirkuk. The government did not 
allow refugees from Kirkuk to return to their city. The report compiled by exiles from 
Kirkuk gave evidence that refugees from Kirkuk were given two options before 
returning to Iraq; the first option was to go to southern Iraq, in which case they were 
allowed to collect and bring their belongings from Kirkuk. The second option was to 
move to either of the two Kurdish governorates farther north (Arbil or Sulaimaniya), 
in which case all personal property would be confiscated by the government. Through 
this policy, 15,615 families (92,712 people) were expelled to Sulaymaniya 
governorates, and 913 families (5,811 people) were expelled to Arbil governorates 
between May 1991 and October 1999 (KTRS: May 2000). This indicated the Iraqi 
government intended not only to Arabise Kirkuk, but also to de-populate the Kurdish 
inhabited area as much as possible. 
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Military Actions after the Ceasefire 
One important feature of the 1991 Gulf War, particularly relevant to this study, was 
the fact that the Coalition forces did not actually topple the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. The Coalition forces concentrated their effort on liberating Kuwait, and the 
Iraqi regime that caused the very crisis was left intact once the occupying forces were 
driven out of Kuwait. Why did the Coalition not replace the Baath regime when they 
were badly defeated, the time when it was most vulnerable? In fact, the agreement of 
ceasefire made at that stage (February 1991) aroused some criticism in the states that 
participated in the Coalition, that it was premature and that the Coalition forces should 
continue their actions until they toppled Saddam Hussein (Record 1993: 52). 
However, not only was there strong reservation towards further deployment of troops, 
but there also was a strong concern over Iraq's political instability which could result 
from the fall of the regime. In short, 'a central government of almost any stripe in 
Baghdad was preferable to Iraq's disintegration into a Lebanon writ-large' (Record 
1993: 108). In light of the fragmented state of Iraqi opposition groups, it was highly 
likely that Iraq could have faced an era of political instability if the existing 
government was removed. It would have left Iraq without any viable centre of power. 
Thus a partial restriction of the Iraqi military activities through the No-fly zone, 
instead of a full occupation of the country, was deemed most viable for all parties. 
If the Allied states were not committed so far as to the actual occupation of Iraq 
leading to the establishment of an alternative government, was 'non-intervention' a 
viable option? Without doubt, the humanitarian relief operations provided for the 
millions of refugees ha\'t~ been vital and essential. This \\'as materialised through 
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) that began on 16 April 1991. The Allies' action 
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prevented the further spread of the refugee crisis and saved the lives of many people 
who otherwise would have been left to die. It should be noted, however, that ope 
initially met strong reservations expressed by some Western leaders, who feared such 
an operation would entangle them into Iraq's domestic affairs. When the European 
states eventually agreed to create a Safe Haven for the refugees, the US administration 
expressed strong reservations. This was because the US had been advised against 
intervention by regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who feared 
assisting the Iranian backed Shia and the Kurdish independence movements would 
lead to the fragmentation of Iraq (Hiro 1992: 406). 
However, the US and European governments finally reached an agreement to take 
military action. It was decided that this operation would exclude Iraqi government 
activities above the 36th parallel. After this announcement, severe fighting took place 
between the Kurdish nationalists and the Iraqi Army. In the end of April, the Kurdish 
nationalist parties finally called for the ceasefire with Iraqi authorities in order at least 
to facilitate the return of the refugees. By this time, the Shia Arabs, too, could no 
longer sustain the anti-government activities (Hiro 1992: 401). Even after the 
ceasefire was declared, however, many of the Kurds did not trust the Iraqi 
government at all and saw the Allied troops as their only protector (Hear: 70). 
Safe Haven and its Legal Basis 
It is unmistakable that the Allied states' intervention was one of essential factors that 
facilitated repatriation of the refugees. A study conducted between May and June 
1991 summarised the five conditions that were crucial in repatriation: (1) The 
restriction of Iraqi military activity, (2) Agreement between the C~ and the Iraqi 
government, (3) Control of a substantial part of Kurdish territory by the Kurdish 
nationalists, (4) Negotiations between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leaders , 
and (5) Deteriorating condition of refugees in the recipient countries, especially 
Turkey (Hear: 72-3). 
Thus the Allied intervention has played a crucial role in minimising the cnSlS, 
however, it also involved a certain political risk, namely the military action's 
incompatibility with the UN Charter. The Charter regulates military actions taken by 
the member states against one another as follows. 
First of all, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by member states against other 
members except in the case of receiving an armed attack waged by them. Because the 
military action against Iraq by the Allied states was conducted after the ceasefire, it 
did not satisfy this provision (Cook: 52-3). Also, the UN Security Council Resolution 
688 adopted on 4 April 1991, on which the Allied states based their action, had not 
been passed under the UN Charter's Chapter Seven, the only chapter that allows 
legitimate use of force. 
Provisions in Chapter Seven gives authorisation to use force only as a last resort, 
provided all non-military measures had failed. These are listed in its Articles 41 and 
42, which read: 
'Article 41 .. , Measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed ... these may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
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relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relation. 
Article 42 ... Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for 
in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security'. 
Technically speaking, military actions taken for the Kurdish Safe Haven did not 
comply with the above conditions. 
The Security Council Resolution 688, on which the Allied states' military actions are 
based, needs some examination. It reads: 
The Security Council ... Recalling Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter of the 
United Nations, gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
popUlation in many parts of Iraq, most recently in Kurdish populated areas, 
which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international 
frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace 
and security in the region ... Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human 
suffering involved ... Reaffinning the commitment of all Member States to the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and all 
States in the area ... 
1) Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of 
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of 
which threaten international peace and security in the region. 
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2) Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international 
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express 
the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure 
that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected. 
3) Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make 
available all necessary facilities for their operations. 
4) Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq 
and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the 
region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the 
Kurdish population, suffering from repression in all its forms inflicted by the 
Iraqi authorities. 
5) Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his 
disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address 
urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population. 
6) Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organisations to 
contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts. 
7) Demands that Iraq co-operate with the Secretary-General to these ends. 
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8) Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
(Abridged from the full text in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 71). 
An important aspect of this resolution was that the UN made a formal request to the 
Iraqi government on behalf of the persecuted civilians inside Iraqi territory. \Vith this 
resolution, the UN had gone far to request that swift action be taken by the Iraqi 
government, but averted measures which would require the use of force sanctioned by 
Chapter Seven. 
As mentioned in the preamble of SCR 688, Article 2 of the UN Charter's Chapter One 
stipulates the inviolability of state sovereignty. The only exemption to this provision 
was, once again, chapter seven which authorises the use of force if certain conditions 
are met. The following is a relevant passage from Chapter One: 
'Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under chapter seven'. 
Thus, any military action taken by the UN member states was deemed legal only 
when it complied with the Security Council Resolution passed under the UN Charter's 
Chapter Seven. Yet, in reality, it is rare that all five Security Council member states, 
each with veto power, would unanimously agree on a resolution to be passed under 
Chapter Seven. At the same time, the outdated provisions of Chapter Seven did not 
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meet the scale and the speed of contemporary humanitarian crises: it would have been 
totally inhumane to wait until all the non-military measures were exhausted whilst 
leaving the refugees to suffer every day. As a result, the Allied states interpreted the 
SCR688 on their own terms in order to materialise swift actions. Military actions 
against Iraq, taken even after the ceasefire, was thus deemed a 'means to an end', i.e., 
the means to enforce the terms listed in SCR 688. This approach was evident in the 
statement by the US administration made in April 1991, that the Allied action was 
'consistent' with the UN Resolution 688 (Cook: 41). 
The UN Secretary-General of that time, Perez de Cuellar, however, distanced himself 
from the view taken by the Allied states. He was quoted as saying, 'Foreign military 
presence in Iraq required either Iraqi consent or separate Security Council 
authorisation. Verbal consent was never granted, nor was authorisation given' 
(Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 77). Thus the UN took the view that the Allies' 
action was basically unilateral, and so did the Iraqi government. This difference over 
interpretation of the SCR 688 created a decade-long problem among the Allied states, 
the UN, and Iraq, to be discussed below. 
The UN Sanctions Continued 
The international economic sanctions on Iraq had originally come into effect at the 
time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (August 1990). This constituted part of the non-
military measures defined in the chapter seven. The sanction, however, was sustained 
even after the war for the purpose of demilitarising Iraq. Under this, exports of oil 
from Iraq, as well as all imports to Iraq were to be banned except for humanitarian 
materials. A list of conditions \\'ere set for the removal of the sanctions with which 
Iraq had to comply. These were: (1) The destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), (2) Iraq's acceptance of Kuwaiti sovereignty, (3) Repatriation of 
Kuwaiti personnel held in Iraq, and (4) Deduction of 30 per cent of all Iraqi oil 
revenue for compensation to Kuwait. 
In order to carry out the inspection of the complete elimination of Iraq's WMD. the 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established in 1991. This was 
set up to identify and destroy products of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical 
programmes, and the sanction regime would not be lifted unless Iraq complied with 
disarmament. 
Although the UN sanctions aimed to force the Iraqi government to comply with the 
demilitarisation programme, its impact on Iraqi civilians including the Kurds turned 
out to be extremely severe. Under the sanctions, the Iraqi population were reduced to 
live in an unprecedented level of poverty. For example, Iraq's GDP per capita in 1989 
had been $2,849, however, this had dropped to $200 in 1997 (Centre for Economic 
Social Rights 1997, as in MER Spring 1998). The damage to Iraq's infrastructure was 
severe. The water system and other facilities were destroyed by bombing during the 
war, however, they could not be repaired afterwards owing to the sanctions. The loss 
of generating capacity particularly affected the quality of sanitation, which relied 
mainly on electric pumps (Graham Brown: 157). In tum, the lack of clean water and 
deteriorating health services caused preventable childhood diseases to spread rapidly. 
A survey conducted by health experts in fourteen major Iraqi cities, including the 
southern cities of Basra, Nasiriya, Najaf, Kerbala, and the mostly Kurdish northern 
cities of Kirkuk, Sulayrnaniya, ArbiL Mosul, Dohuk, and Amadiyyah, showed that 
many of the hospitals had been reduced to 'mere reservoirs of infection', due to the 
shortage of medicine, surgical supplies, food, water and electricity (Simons: 151). The 
first nation-wide survey on health problems was conducted in August 1991 by the 
International Study Team (1ST). The survey results indicated that malnutrition had 
sharply increased, particularly among young children, who suffered diarrheal disease 
(Graham-Brown: 317). The infant mortality rate between 1989-90 had been 80 per 
1,000. However, this figure had doubled between years 1994-95, up to 160 per 1,000 
(Centre for Economic Social Rights 1997, as in MER Spring 1998). Also, the ban on 
imports created a generation of Iraqi children who were completely denied access to 
the knowledge of events outside Iraq. It was also pointed out that the number of 
deaths that occurred as a result of the UN sanctions was higher than those caused by 
the war in 1991 (Graham-Brown, quoting Garfield 1999: 92). 
The broader picture was that Iraq turned out to be particularly vulnerable to the 
comprehensive trade embargo. Prior to the UN sanctions, Iraq was importing some 70 
per cent of its food. Iraq's import-biased economy also contributed significantly to 
making people dependent on high technology. On top of this, the socialist regime's 
subsidies aggravated people's lack of skill to deal with the shortage. A UN staff 
remembered: 
'I was reconstructing the water system. I do the same work in Africa as well, 
but there the system is very simple. In Iraq, it was all reliant on modem technology, 
and this caused a particular problem. For example, there were sewage pumps, but 
because of one small pipe that was missing between them, the machines did not work. 
That pipe was made in a \'ery high tech company abroad and used to be imported. In 
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the past they could afford doing like that because of oil money. People were used to 
getting everything for free as well under the socialist government' (' S te\'e' , 
pseudonym). 
The UN, State Sovereignty and Relief Operations (1991-1996) 
To the extent UN relief operations were to comply with the UN charter, all agencies 
operating in Iraq were to be dependent on the Iraqi government's consent. Thus, to 
implement the humanitarian relief effort envisaged in the SCR 688, it was necessary 
for the UN to obtain agreements from the Iraqi government. This was done through 
negotiating the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The first MOU 
came into effect in May 1991. The essential feature of the MOU was that it was based 
on the understanding that humanitarian assistance was impartial and that all civilians 
in need were entitled to receive it (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 81). With this 
agreement, for the first time, the UN was able to set up a hundred civilian-run camps 
inside Iraq. Also, other humanitarian organisations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Society were allowed into 
the Iraqi territory. In the ICRC's case, it took the form of the Iraqi Red Crescent's 
Society giving an invitation to the ICRC. Through the MOU, the Iraqi government 
also agreed to withdraw its military and police forces from the area near the Turkish 
border. As soon as the emergency relief operation was over, UNICEF took over the 
UNHCR's task to focus more on long-term reconstruction programmes. 
The level of protection available for aid workers agreed by the l\ 1 OL'. howe\'cr, was 
fragile. The presence of foreign troops, including armed UN police was refused by the 
Iraq i gO\l~nunent. It took more than one month after the first \ IOU \\'as agrecd for 
UN Guards to eventually be accepted (25 May 1991) on the condition that they 
carried only personal weapons (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 82). By international 
standards, the UN Guards' status ranked lower than the level of the U~ Peacekeepers. 
This was because the UN Guards were to deal only with humanitarian issues, and 
were hence not authorised by the Security Council (Morphet: 220). 
Furthermore, the arrival of the UN Guards to the crisis-affected region came late. 
Also, their manpower fluctuated according to the level of funding available to the UN 
Humanitarian Programme. The poorly equipped UN Guards was not comparable with 
the Allied states' contingents, which had 20,000 troops at its height (Cook: .+()-7). 
UNICEF staff considered the UN Guards' existence to be almost a symbolic one: 
'The UN Guards were really weak. They were only allowed to carry pistols and were 
not very trained in the job. They were not given much mandate either. Furthermore, 
because they were so visible, wearing the UN uniform, on occasion they were 
bombed in a car, probably by the Iraqi government, as they did not like the UN 
Guards. But for the local Kurdish people they symbolised that the UN was here' 
('Steve', pseudonym). 
Iraq showed an uncooperative attitude towards the UN by refusing the renewal of the 
MOU in November 1991. The new MOU was eventually signed in October 1992, and 
after this agreement expired in March 1993, no further negotiation took place. The 
MOU was never renewed afterwards. It was pointed out that 'the UNHCR's 
withdrawal may ha\'e sent a signal to the Iraqi government that the emergency was 
over and the situation had "normalised" (Graham-Brown: 269). Without the MOl~. 
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the unresolved legal basis of humanitarian operations made the aid workers 
increasingly vulnerable (Cook: 54-5). 
The Iraqi government began a campaign of protest against the No-fly Zone. The 
presence of international organisations on Iraqi soil was increasingly detested, 
especially those in the Kurdish governorates that relied on the Allied states' 
protection. Saddam Hussein was quoted comparing the Kurdish region to 4a termite 
that will devour the whole of Iraq' (NYT, 12 March 1992, as in Keen). All foreign 
organisation, including the UN, were associated with the threat to Iraq's sovereignty 
and the Kurds were seen as agents of the Western states hostile to Baathist Iraq. The 
distribution of humanitarian goods came to be constantly obstructed by the Iraqi 
government. It was said that the scarce resources were unequally distributed to those 
who were Baath Party loyalists, and also punitive measures were taken against the 
southern and northern part of the country that attempted to rebel against the regime 
(Cook: 62). 
From the aid worker's point of view, security was vital to the successful relief 
operation. A former NGO member emphasised the vital importance of military 
protection to humanitarian relief operations . 
. I knew the Allies' Military Coordination Center was my real protector. Now I 
work in Sierra Leone as well, where there is no military protection. There, only small 
areas are safe. Whereas in Iraq under the area covered by the military we had a total 
access to all these vulnerable groups. Without the military, it (the Kurdish operation) 
could have been a failure. There are idealists in the UN who think that the 
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humanitarian mission should have nothing to do with the military. In the Kurdish 
operation, for example, the Red Cross refused to attend any meeting where the 
military was present. After the Kurdish operation, the UN realised the importance of 
coordinating the activities of different parties involved, including the military and the 
media, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs created an Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There was no such body before' 
('Steve', pseudonym). 
Apparently there is a 'hybrid' situation; even though the military intervention was 
conducted without a definite legal framework, it was vital in alleviating the refugee 
crisis swiftly. On the other hand, the Iraqi government remained capable of arbitrarily 
obstructing the relief operation conducted through the UN. The security of the UN-
based operation was increasingly put at risk. 
Impact of Intervention on the Kurds 
(l) Establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
Under Allied protection, the Kurds established a semi-independent government (the 
Kurdish Regional Government). This was the first autonomous government run by the 
Kurds that had been realised since establishment of the state system after the First 
World War. Although the KRG had no formal link with the Iraqi government, the UN 
still treated the KRG as part of Iraq. However, the UN also established direct 
communication with the KRG bypassing the Iraqi government, so in reality, its status 
was more than just that of an Iraqi province. 
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The ground security of the KRG was almost entirely reliant on the Kurdish 
pershmergas, because even though the Allies' Military Coordination Center (~lCC) 
was present in Zakho, a town near the Turkish border, the extent of its patrol area was 
limited. Originally, the Allied states planned to deploy a 5,000 strong rapid reaction 
force. However, the plan was withdrawn in September 1991 and was switched to air 
patrols alone (Cook: 45). Under this scheme, the area north of the 36th parallel was 
patrolled daily by the Allies' planes. The US, UK, Turkey and France (until 1996) 
contributed to this operation known as Operation Poised Hammer. The air patrol, 
however, only covered about 40 per cent of the Iraqi Kurdish population and was thus 
rather limited to the border region with Turkey. 
The formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) was declared prior to the election of 
the first Kurdish Parliament (May 1992). The IKF was composed of eight different 
parties including the KDP, PUK, and smaller parties such as Kurdistan Socialist Party 
(PASOK), Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP), Kurdistan Toilers Party, the 
Iraqi Communist Party's Kurdistan branch, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement. 
By establishing the IKF, the rival pershmerga forces from the KDP and the PUK were 
formally unified. After the May 1992 election, the Kurdish Parliament was sworn in 
July 1992. Arbil was chosen as the capital of the KRG. 
The result of the election was an almost a 50-50 split between the KDP and PUK in 
the 105 seat parliament. The votes for the parties that did not receive 7 per cent of the 
total votes were added to either that of the KDP or the PUK's according to party 
adherence. As a result, 50.22 per cent went to the KDP and .+l).78 per cent to PUK 
(Gunter 1993, quotes AFP 22 rvlay 1992). It was decided that 50 seats went to the 
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KDP, another 50 to the PUK, and the remaInmg 5 seats were allocated to the 
Assyrians' party. The Kurds' first "free election" was, however, less than it seemed. 
There was virtually no secret voting, and a great deal of communal and family voting 
took place (Cook: 77). A Kurdish woman who participated in the election also 
admitted that she voted according to the tribe and also that it was everyone's 
knowledge that the votes were being manipulated ('Zuzan', pseudonym). 
On 4 October 1992, the KRG declared the establishment of federalism in Iraq as its 
eventual goal, thus affirming that it did not aim at becoming completely independent 
from Iraq. The two leaders, Masoud Barzani and J alaI Talabani emphasised this point 
(Gunter 1996). However, their approach to the Baath regime varied; the KDP's 
Masoud Barzani was relatively more willing to continue negotiations with Saddam 
Hussein, while the PUK's J alaI Talabani insisted on ruling out any negotiations with 
him (Freij quoting the MEl 23 Oct. 1992). 
The draft constitution of the KRG was based on federalism. Its Article 1 declared that 
Iraqi Kurdistan was a 'Region of the Federal Republic of Iraq'. In terms of its relation 
with the rest of Iraq, it stipulated 'The people of Iraqi Kurdistan enter into a voluntary 
federation with the Arabic part of Iraq within the framework of a Federal Iraqi 
Republic'. In its Article 2, however, it also defined Iraqi Kurdistan to be part of (the 
entire) Kurdistan (Revised Version, October 1992). The draft constitution, however, 
was supported by only 33 out of 105 members of the Parliament. This was owing to 
the reservations by the MPs who were susceptible to Turkish pressure \\'hich opposed 
a Kurdish federal government in Iraq (Nouri Talabany). The KRG EU representati\e 
also admitted that the KRG was not in a position to confront Turkey. 'Our relations 
262 
with Turkey remained difficult. We could say, at best, that we kept a "friendly" 
relation with Turkey. We have our representatives in Turkey, and we allow the Turks 
to cross to our territory as well' (Jat). 
(2) Kurds and the UN Sanctions 
Since the KRG was established, the Kurds were put in a political dilemma; while they 
enjoyed the Allied states' protection, they were damaged by the economic blockade 
imposed by the Iraqi government targeted at the KRG in October 1991. This was 
clearly a retaliatory measure taken against the Kurds' contact with the Allied states. 
The Iraqi government told the Kurds the embargo would not be lifted unless they cut 
off all foreign contacts (21 April 1991, The Observer as in McDowall 1996: 376). 
The combined embargoes: the one imposed by the UN that affected all of Iraq and 
another imposed by the Iraqi government specifically on the KRG, damaged the 
nascent Kurdish regime and especially the poorer strata of Kurdish society. The KRG 
had to survive on limited funds amidst unstable political conditions. Between 1991 
and 1996, the main revenue of the KRG was drawn from the transit tax imposed on 
trucks entering from Turkey, which provided about one million dollars per month 
(NYT 28 Jun. 1994). UN relief funds also provided another 200 million dollars a year, 
of which 40 million was from the United States (NYT Ibid.) The UN also assisted the 
Kurds with relief operations such as the shelter programme (1991-1992) and food and 
fuel distribution operations (1993). However, some international agencies did not 
operate in the Kurdish region because the Iraqi government did not allow them to. 
This was so of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the \Vorld Health 
Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (Keene: 175). Furthermore, 
the traditional dependence of the Kurds on government subsidies aggravated the 
shortage. Since the internal embargo had begun, the Kurds' income from the Iraqi 
public sector was wiped out. The economic blockades affected various services that 
had previously been provided by the Iraqi government, such as electricity, water, 
sanitation, health services, veterinary services, subsidised food, welfare payment and 
education. Another serious damage to the local economy was the Iraqi government's 
withdrawal of the original Iraqi dinar's 25D note in May 1993. This currency 
happened to be the most commonly circulated in Kurdistan. It was estimated to have 
wiped out 20 million dollars of Kurdish savings overnight (Keene, quoting Hawkar 
July-August 1993). When the Turkish-based PKK sealed off the Turkish border, it 
was said that the Iraqi Kurds suffered a 'triple embargo' ~ the UN embargo, the Iraqi 
embargo, and the loss of illegal trades with Turkey (Cook: 52). A UN staff member 
recalled that humanitarian aid was vital particularly for the poorer people: 
'I was in Iraq between 1992 and 1994. I arrived in northern Iraq on New 
Year's Eve of 1992. The refugees were returning from the camps in the summer of 
1991. There was no water system, no fuels, and people were collecting wood from the 
mountains. The food supply was not enough. In their first spring, farmers sold their 
grain to the Iraqi Arabs, not to the Kurdish people because they could not buy it. 
There were no government jobs anymore, so they were both very poor people. If the 
Kurds had been left on their own after the war, it could have been very bad. The 
international aid just got to the very poorest people. The shortage was exacerbated 
partly because the Kurds destroyed everything that was associated with the Iraqi 
goVel11ment, for example, the president's palace. But also Kurdish leaders stole and 
sold the equipment, like garbage trucks and cranes. 'There was an open market across 
the Iranian border in a car park like place, and there they were, all the machines and 
trucks that were given to them as an aid' ('Steve', pseudonym). 
Thus, until the Oil for Food Programme began (1996), the Kurdish Regional 
Government was not unlike a sealed enclave. The harsh economic condition fuelled 
fighting among the rival Kurdish parties over scarce resources, and destabilised the 
fledgling government. By 1993 the attempt to unify all parties' pershmergas had 
largely failed. It also became obvious that the KRG's revenue had come to be 
monopolised by the KDP. It was because the KDP happened to control the 
northwestern area along the Turkish border, the location that allowed them to control 
the trade with Turkey. Thus the PUK that mostly controlled eastern provinces near the 
Iranian border was excluded from the trade. 
An exile criticised the KDP's action: 'the people in Sulaimaniya under the PUK 
suffered a lot of casualties during the Iran-Iraq War. I think the KDP treated them 
very unfairly. They betrayed the most patriotic people' (,Zuzan', pseudonym). The 
resumption of internal war dismayed many Kurds. A university student, who, two 
years earlier, clamoured to work in the Kurdish parliament lamented the situation: 'we 
waited 200 years for this opportunity (of autonomy) and now our leaders destroyed it' 
(NYT 28 Jun. 1994). Under the stark economic conditions, militias became the main 
employment for the young Kurds, and thus the violence came to feed itself. A 
guerrilla leader was quoted, 'There are only two places to find jobs now - in the 
militias (of either of the two factions). If you are not on one side or another, you will 
lose' (NYT, Ibid.). The first major fighting between the two rival parties broke out in 
\ 1 ay 199 .. L Soon, the Safe Hayen came to be dominated by their rival fiefdoms. The 
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intra-Kurdish fighting almost completely destroyed the autonomous government. One 
report indicated that there were 650,000 internally displaced people in northern Iraq, 
of whom, two thirds were displaced since 1991, meaning, since the ceasefire of the 
Gulf War (Adebajo: 1998). 
Foreign States' Motives 
The KRG's existence and the Allied states' protection were inseparable. While the 
Allied states desired the Kurds to form a viable opposition against the Iraqi regime, 
their greater autonomy alarmed the neighbouring states that were eager to contain the 
Kurdish dissidents inside their territories. The following is a summary of foreign 
states' motives and the Kurds response to their support/non-support. 
(1) The West 
The US administration has long admitted financing covert operations against the Iraqi 
regime. The most recent example was its funding of the Iraqi National Congress 
(INC), an umbrella organisation of various Iraqi opposition groups. The INC was 
established in 1992 with the backing of the US Central Intelligence Agency. It was 
desired the INC would settle the feud between the two Kurdish parties so as to 
provide a viable forum for popular opposition to Saddam Hussein (16 Sept. 1996 
IHT). 
The INC, however, was not as nearly as effective as it was expected to be. It was 
wrecked by internal disputes (MEl 12 Sept. 1997). One observer stated it included at 
least 80 groups (Aburish 2000: 357). Its president, Ahmad Chalabi, attributed the 
INC's weakness to a lack of funding, and this led him to focus on a judicial campaign 
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(INDICT) against the Iraqi ruler from power, but the campaign remained completely 
ineffective. The Iraqi National Accord (INA), based in Jordan, conducted an extensive 
media operation by publishing an opposition newspaper. However, overall, opposition 
groups outside Iraq were all extremely weak (MEl 12 Sept. 1997). The goals of the 
different Iraqi opposition parties were incompatible and they failed to establish a 
united front. 
As the Kurdish parties started infighting, the Western plan to overthrow the Baath 
regime was no longer realistic. Furthermore, after May 1994 the KDP overtly started 
receiving military aid from Baghdad, a move that coincided with the intensification of 
the KDP-PUK strife (8 Nov. 1996 MEl). This caused the INC to suffer catastrophic 
damage when the KDP invited the Iraqi Army to the Kurdish territory in order to 
defeat the rival PUK (August 1996). As a result of this action, the INC was 
completely penetrated by Iraqi security forces. Between 1991 to 1996, despite the 
international sanction, the Iraqi Baath regime had proved resilient, and the KDP 
leader did not hesitate to ally with it. On the other hand, the PUK allied with the PKK 
and Iran. These Kurdish parties' divisions stymied the Western states' anti-Baath 
operation. Shortly after the collapse of the INC, the Allies' Military Coordination 
Center (MCC) in Kurdistan was closed down, and France withdrew its air force from 
the OPH. The US had to evacuate several hundreds of the Kurds who worked for the 
CIA, as the Iraqi government excluded those Kurds from political amnesty (Randal: 
246). In response to the fierce criticism for allying with the Iraqi government, Masoud 
Barzani justified himself saying that he 'did not intend to be used as a card for a 
certain time to put pressure on Baghdad and then be abandoned' (IND 21 Sept. 1996). 
It appeared that unless foreign states were committed to assisting the Iraqi opposition 
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militarily, the Kurds had little choice but to opt for the Iraqi regIme e\en on a 
temporary basis. 
The US sponsored a series of peace talks among the Kurds in the hope of eventually 
uniting the Kurds against the Baath regime. In August 1995, talks between the KDP 
and the PUK was hosted by the US in Drogheda, Ireland. The two parties pledged to 
maintain a ceasefire but it did not last long. Another major round of peace talk was 
held on 17 September 1998 in Washington, where the two parties signed the 
Washington Peace Accord, in which, according to the KDP spokesman 'both parties 
(KDP and PUK) have agreed to work for a united, pluralistic and democratic Iraq that 
would ensure the political and human rights of the Kurdish people on a federal basis 
and maintain the nation's unity and territorial integrity' (MEl 2 Oct. 1998). However, 
this cease fire also soon collapsed. 
(2) The Regional States 
The reason behind the US reluctance to supply military aid to Iraqi opposition groups, 
including the Kurds, was the pressure from Turkey. The US and Turkey were NATO 
allies, but had conflicting interests regarding the Kurds. It was reported that Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran, and Syria had repeatedly engaged in a series of national security 
consultations since the end of the Gulf War (Olson 1994, MEP). Turkey threatened 
the continuance of the OPR in December 1992, when it declared its right to revoke 
the right of Allied states to use its air base (Cook: 45). Though it allowed the 
operation to continue, it was the first time Turkey had subordinated Western interests 
to its own. From its very beginning the KRG's existence was severely constrained by 
the intentions of the Turkish state. Because of the extraordinary situation that came 
26S 
out of the Gulf War in which the Iraqi sovereignty was limited, Iraqi Kurds needed to 
secure Turkish cooperation despite the fact that it rejected the principle of federalism. 
Without Turkish approval, the air operation is not sustainable. For this reason, Turkey 
and the Iraqi Kurds were often described as de-facto allies. A KDP spokesman was 
quoted as saying 'Turkey is our lifeline to the West and the whole world in our fight 
against Saddam Hussein ... If Poised Hammer is withdrawn, Saddam's units will 
again reign in this region and we will lose everything' (Gunter 1993: citing FBIS-
WEU 9 Apr. 1992). However, if we look at the events during the Iran-Iraq war of 
1980s, Turkey and Iraq acted as allies, and at the deepest level, they still share an 
interest against Kurdish federalism. Kurdish federalism in Northern Iraq is the last 
thing Turkey would want to see because of its potential impact on Turkey's own 
Kurdish conflict. 
The Turkish Prime Minister at the time of the Gulf War, Turgut Ozal, pursued a 
liberal approach towards the Kurds, such as meeting with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders 
and granting amnesty to the Kurds held in Turkish prisons. But overall, Ozal secured 
the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurds for the purpose of suppressing the PKK. It was 
even reported that some 30,000-strong Iraqi Kurdish pershmergas were engaged in 
patrolling the border, and they were 'backed by and possibly paid for by Turkey' 
(Pope 6 Nov. 1992 IND). A newspaper report in 1995 said, 'some 24,000 Iraqi 
Kurdish soldiers will replace the Turkish invasion' (11 Apr. 1995 IND), meaning, the 
Iraqi Kurds would substitute for the Turkish army in fighting the PKK Kurdish 
guerrillas. The relations between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds had been cool from the 
mid 1980s when the PKK's guerrillas spread mines and attacked women and children 
in northern Iraq. It was reported some Iraqi Kurds were as afraid of the PKK as they 
were of the Iraqi security forces (Guardian 14 Aug. 1991). The KDP leader ~lasoud 
Barzani loathed the Marxist ideology adopted by the PKK and was quoted as saying 
that the refugee camp of Turkish Kurds was becoming 'a seedbed of Stalinism' (28 
Nov.1995 IND). The two Kurdish parties' relation is described as 'ambivalent' at its 
best (TME Nov. 1998). The Iraqi Kurdish authority made an agreement with the 
Turkish authorities rather than with the PKK. The 1991 Iraqi Kurdish front issued a 
warning to the PKK that 'if it failed to cease activities against Turkey, it would be 
purged from the region' (FBIS-WEU Jun. 29, 1992, as in Gunter 1993: 110). 
Turkey carried out major cross-border pursuits of the PKK after the KRG was 
established in northern Iraq. The first in 1995, code-named Operation Steel, took 
place deep into Iraqi Kurdish territory. Another operation, code named Operation 
Sledge-Hammer, was carried out in 1997. Amid the confrontation of multiple parties, 
northern Iraq's Turkish border area was devastated by both Turkish and Iraqi forces, 
the Marxist PKK, and the more conservative Iraqi Kurdish groups which opposed 
them. And even though the Iraqi Kurds were now able to communicate directly with 
the Turkish authorities, their position was vulnerable. Once the UN sanctions were 
lifted, there was little reason to believe Turkey would continue to ally with the Iraqi 
Kurds, as such action potentially contributes to strengthening Kurdish autonomy in 
Iraq. 
Iran was apprehensive of greater Western presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iran-based 
Islamic Party of Kurdistan became increasingly militant since 1993. The Islamic 
movement secured control over substantial areas in eastern and southern Kurdistan 
with Iranian backing. The growth of the Islamic party in the Kurdish-controlled 
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regIOn was something new in Kurdish politics: 'the steep nse of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Kurdistan was something unexpected before the imposition of C:\ 
sanctions. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan made concerted efforts for the Islamic 
Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) to gain a psychological hold over the Kurdish 
popUlation. Many poor families became dependent on the IMK simply to survive. 
Those who agreed to bear arms for the Islamic fighters were paid an attractive salary' 
(Laizer 1996: 117, also in al-Khafaji MER Oct.-Dec. 1996). 
Oil for Food Programme (1996 - present <31103/01» 
The existing terms of international economic sanctions on Iraq (SCR 687) were 
modified by the UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986, which was adopted in 
April 1995. Better known as the Oil for Food Programme, the SCR 986 allowed Iraq 
to export a limited quantity of oil to purchase humanitarian goods, mostly food and 
medicine, raw materials and parts for civilian needs. Through this programme, Iraq 
could sell two billion dollars worth of its oil every six months. Fifty per cent of the 
proceeds would be allocated for use by the Iraqi government, for the humanitarian 
needs of the entire country except the three Kurdish governorates. The three Kurdish 
governorates were allocated a 15 per cent (later modified to 13 per cent) share for use 
for similar humanitarian needs. 30 per cent went to the Kuwait Compensation Fund, 
and the remaining 5 per cent was spent for the UN to cover costs of administration. 
The share that went to the Kurdish sector came directly through the UN's 
Humanitarian Programme which operated in the north, not through the Iraqi 
government. In that sense, the resolution acknowledged the 'de-facto' independence 
of the Kurds. However, it also stated clearly that nothing in the resolution should be 
taken as construing infringement of state sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq 
(Graham-Brown: 81). Thus, even if the UN Programme bypassed Baghdad in funding 
the Kurds, it acknowledged Iraqi sovereignty throughout. 
The Oil for Food Programme contributed greatly to modifying the severe economic 
disparity aggravated during the years between 1991 and 1996. The Kurds had suffered 
both internal (imposed by the Iraqi government) and international (the UN sanctions) 
economic blockades. Since the UN Oil for Food Programme began, the Kurdish 
Regional Government started internal trading with Baghdad through the purchase of 
electricity and fuels. It began to have regular contacts with Baghdad through this 
trade, which was done in dollars. This was because the two parties no longer had a 
common currency; the area controlled by the government and by the KRG each had a 
different type of dinar. In 2000 between 80 and 100 Iraqi government dinar was 1 
Kurdish dinar (Jat). 
The stronger currency allowed the KRG to reconstruct the countryside that was 
destroyed by the government's deportation campaign in the past decades. Also, the 
revenue enabled them to pay for basic health services and salaries of KRG employees. 
The Oil for Food Programme stabilised economic conditions and allowed more equal 
distribution of revenues and aid materials. The Iraqi government did not permit part of 
the sale of oil to be used for the demining programme along the Iranian border or for 
the treatment of victims of chemical weapon used against the Kurds by the Iraqi 
government in the 1980s. It was because the Iraqi government did not recognise their 
responsibility in causing these damages. The KRG, with the EU's backing, privately 
invested in the demining programme to a UN commissioned company. 
On the other hand, the abundance of food-stuff, particularly wheat supplied by the 
UN, began to undermine the self-sufficiency of local Kurdish agriculture. The 
Kurdish government raised this issue formally to the UN in its memorandum prepared 
in March 1999: 'Imported food and grain should supplement, rather than substitute, 
for what is locally produced. Over the past seven years, the international community 
has assisted in the rehabilitation of the rural economy and rebuilding of hundreds of 
villages destroyed by the Iraqi government during the 70s and the 80s. The present 
UN program, which involves the importation of large quantities of grain and other 
food stuff, undermines the rural economy in a serious way, and could instigate a 
reverse migration of the farmers back to the major urban centres' (Joint memorandum 
by KDP and PUK on behalf of the authorities of the KRG to United Nations Review 
Panels on Iraq, 11 March, 1999, 5-4). Newspaper reports indicated that the local 
economic problems were aggravated by the excessive aid. 'So awash were the free 
goods from the UN programmes that some of the goods entered the smuggling trade. 
The farmers sold their land and moved to cities to collect aid. The UN acknowledged 
that the nine kilograms of wheat flour and one kilo of rice per month it distributes to 
each person in Kurdistan were more than people need' (WSJ 6 Jan. 2000). The report 
summarised that the Kurds developed an 'unhealthy dependence on the spoils of the 
embargo'. 
Foreign Interventions' Impact on Iraq 
The Iraqi regime remained intact throughout the past decade, and furthermore, it 
increased its surveillance power over the people, because of its control over the 
rationing system. A decade-long economic sanction caused considerable harm to 
ordinary Iraqis who had no means of influencing the government's actions. The U~ 
273 
sanctions further removed the Iraqi people from a means of resistance as their lives 
began to be focused on day-to-day survival. The F AO mission in 1997 found chronic 
energy deficiency among 25 per cent of young men and 16 per cent of young women, 
with particular deficiency in vitamins A and C (MER: Spring 1998). The inhumane 
result of the economic sanction even caused the UN Humanitarian Coordinator Denis 
Halliday to resign the post in August 1998. In his interview Halliday stated: 
'The sanctions were failing in the purpose they were set up for back in 1990-
91. They weren't leading to disarmament and, second, the cost of sanctions was 
completely unacceptable - killing 6-7,000 children a month. Sustaining a level of 
malnutrition of about 30 per cent for children under five leads to physical and mental 
problems. It's incompatible with the UN Charter, with the Convention on Human 
Rights, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and probably with many other 
international agreements. I just found that impossible to accept as the head of the UN 
in Iraq' (MEl 13 Nov. 1998). 
As mentioned, economic sanctions on Iraq originally constituted part of the non-
military measure to pressure the Iraqi government to give up its occupation of Kuwait. 
It is doubtful whether the sanctions achieved their goal, as they punished the wrong 
people. Unlike those in democratic countries, people in Iraq have no control over the 
government. There were NGOs that started to campaign against the economic 
sanctions on Iraq on the grounds that they breached the Geneva Convention's article 
54 that prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (M utawi: MEl 10 Apr. 
1998). In December 2000, Iraq suspended all oil exports to protest the continuance of 
the UN sanctions (MEl 8 Dec. 2000). Once again, Iraqi authorities showed their 
ability to unilaterally affect its citizens, in this case, through eliminating funds from 
the Oil for Food Programme. 
It is doubtful foreign interventions conducted during the 19905 contributed to 
improving the relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. However, it also 
seems to be the case that the military protection for the Iraqi Kurds, should at least, be 
continued until a workable agreement is reached between the Kurds and the Iraqi 
government. The KRG's EU representative stated that the most important problem in 
negotiations with the Iraqi government was the issue over security, and that the air 
patrol by the Allied states were essential for the KRG's existence: 'Baghdad wished 
to reinstall the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan, but we wanted to manage our own army. We 
are willing to contribute the Kurds' army to the federal state. Because there is no trust 
between us yet, we must build the mechanism of security slowly' (Jat). The Kurds' 
task was to reach a stable accommodation with the Iraqi government. 
On the other hand, the US and UK have been almost continuously at war with Iraq 
since December 1998 with the aim of destroying the regime. Newspaper reports 
described military confrontations were taking place roughly once every three days, 
and Baghdad claimed that more than 200 civilians were killed (7 Dec. 1999 IND). An 
aid worker stated the people in Iraq did not understand why they were bombed and 
simply believed the inforn1ation provided by the government. The Allied military 
actions did not enjoy unanimous international support as well. Unlike the Gulf- \\' ar 
coalition, fewer and fewer states showed their support for the use of force against Iraq 
(15 Feb. 1998 IND). 
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It is still the case, however, that the Kurds need security from the Allied states. Rather 
than allowing themselves to be used against Iraq, they should make best use of the 
military protection as they continue the dialogue with Baghdad. Earlier, the KDP 
leader showed such a determination by stating that he would no longer allow any 
foreign states to use Kurdistan as a base for plots against Saddam Hussein and said 
'we were in dialogue with Baghdad, but it was not yet at a phase where we could say 
we reached an agreement' (MEl 2 Oct. 1998). So far, the Kurds have been used by the 
foreign states. However, it now seems there is an opportunity for intervening states to 
contribute to the security of the KRG while the Kurdish-Baghdad negotiations 
continue. 
The Socioeconomic Base of the KDP and the PUK in the 1990s 
Although the Kurds have had control of northern Iraq for almost a decade (since 
1992), the likelihood of a united and economically independent Kurdistan remains 
low. The weaker control by Baghdad did not necessarily mean that the Kurds had 
become more autonomous and politically united. The tribal, territorial, and cultural 
differences still run deep between the two major Kurdish political parties even 
without the reach of official Iraqi control; the two rival parties, the KDP and the PUK 
maintain armed checkpoints to restrict the movement of the peoples living under their 
spheres of influence (RFE/RL Sept. 28, 2000). 
Masoud Barzani's KDP continues to be a dominant party in the Bahdinan region, 
which shares a border with Turkey. To this day, the followers of the KDP are 
generally thought to be more traditional and religious than their rivals (Barkey, 
January 1997). The two small Islamic parties in the Kurdish region, for example 
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(Kurdish Hizbullah and Revolutionary Hizbullah), are both headed by Barzani's 
relatives and are often in conflict with Jalal Talabani's PUK. The PCK. on the other 
hand, continues to attract more followers from the urban middle class than the KDP. 
though the PUK, too, relies on some tribal connections based in eastern parts of the 
Kurdish region (Barkey, Ibid.). The PUK is particularly popular among wealthy 
Kurds in such cities as Sulaymaniya, Arbil, and Koisanjaq. It also attracts 
unemployed youth who are paid a basic wage to serve as anned combatants for the 
party (Laizer: 128). 
The source of the two parties' conflict is financial as well as cultural and tribal. Even 
after the signing of the 1998 Washington accord in which the two parties were to 
share the transit customs more equally, the KDP has made only one revenue-sharing 
payment to the PUK so far. The KDP, however, is now hit by a dramatic reduction in 
traffic between Turkey and the Bahdinan region and thus is even less likely to divide 
its revenues with the PUK (RFE/RL June 23, 1999). Approximately 2,000 trucks used 
to cross the lucrative Turkey - Bahdinan border per day, but the number has now 
dropped to 250 (RFE/RL Ibid.). Meanwhile, Iraq has begun to redirect its oil 
smuggling routes, firstly to Syria and secondly to an alternative road under 
construction that bypasses the Kurdish-controlled area, in order to deprive the Kurds 
of transit customs from oil-smuggling trucks (BBC, Aug. 31, 2001). When the 
construction of such road is complete, the economy of Kurdistan is likely to suffer 
serious damage, and the Kurds will be left even more vulnerable to economic and 
political control by Baghdad. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusive Remarks 
1) The Costs and Benefits of Authoritarian State Formation 
In cases of state formation through Revolution from Above, we saw that the newly 
established government's resort to authoritarian measures was largely inevitable and 
even essential. The contrasting paths of state formation taken by Iraq and Turkey 
showed that without establishing a strong state, the authorities' ability to implement 
crucial nation-building measures such as provision of national education, welfare, and 
economic development would be considerably obstructed. 
Thus, through the RPP's single-party rule, the Turkish authorities succeeded in 
secularisation, unification of the national curriculum, reforms of the Turkish 
language, and defining Turkish citizenship (pp. 93-95). Because religious power was 
synonymous with political power under the Ottoman Empire, deposition of the 
Caliphate was the first step to be taken in creating a modem, secular state. This move 
also meant thwarting the Islamic political elite that grew powerful under the Sultanate 
system (p. 98). Socially, the new concept of citizenship provided an alternative to the 
Caliph's authority to which the people could psychologically attach themselves. 
Strong emphasis was put on 'Turk' citizenship defined in territorial and linguistic 
tern1S (p. 93). Also, enhancement of literacy through language reforms was carried out 
with profound effects. The introduction of Roman alphabet which was more suited to 
transcribing the Turkish than Arabic letters was a radical step. These were all far-
reaching reforms and yet were accomplished within just a few years. Howe\'cr. the 
Turkish authorities \,ere in a relatively advanced position comparc to other new 
nations, as it could inherit the government apparatus of the Ottoman Empire and 
immediately make use of it. Moreover, the centralisation efforts had been made by 
several generations of the sultans since the 18th century (pp. 77-79). 
On the other hand, the authoritarian measures taken by the Turkish authorities 
involved the problems of assimilationist policies such as the ban on non-Turkish 
languages and abolition of Kurdish town names (p. 95 and 106). This was partly 
owing to the essentially elitist nature of Revolution from Above which required little 
or no mass participation, and partly owing to the state's 'legitimate' fear ofpoliticised 
Kurdish nationalism as the conflict grew unmanageable. 
Because of the highly political nature of Kurdish nationalism, there are pros and cons 
of Kurdish identity in terms of culture and language recognitions. For anyone who 
lives under democratic government it is hardly imaginable that a mere expression of 
one's own culture and language would lead to a political persecution. Beginning from 
the late 19th century, however, the Kurdish communities were inseparable from 
political insurgencies led by semi-autonomous leaders such as shaikhs and aghas, at 
least in the eyes of the Ottoman and later the Turkish authorities (pp. 101-105). The 
state authorities regarded Kurdishness, per se, as a threat to national unity. For this 
reason, the Kurds in Turkey have long been denied basic cultural rights to declare 
themselves Kurds and speak Kurdish in public. 
Contrary to the authorities' intention, however, the monolingual education and other 
cultural assimilationist policies including the re-naming of Kurdish villages appear to 
han; obstructed Kurdish integration to Turkey considerably. t-vlally Turkish Kurds 
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were culturally alienated but were also denied the opportunity to participate In 
Turkish society because of their language barrier (this excluded the completely 
assimilated Kurds, such as Ismet Inonu and those who deliberately hid their Kurdish 
origin). The Kurdish children often did not understand the things taught only in 
Turkish and even if they did, with greater difficulty. College exams naturally favoured 
those fluent in Turkish (pp. 180-184). In this respect, the Kemalist regime appears to 
have had a better chance of successfully integrating the Kurds by at least allowing the 
use of Kurdish as a second language at schools where the most Kurdish-speaking 
Kurds were exposed to Turkish for the first time. Ideally, the Turkish regime could 
have realised that cultural diversity in itself posed no political threat or at least that 
bilingual education would be beneficial. Ironically, it was the state's adherence to 
assimilationist policies - which were intended to preserve national unity - that 
worsened the divisions within the state as it failed to modify the unequal social 
structure. As a result, the dominance of feudal Kurds over the illiterate masses 
resulted in a protracted Marxist-terrorist problem represented by the PKK. 
By contrast, the Iraqi society was characterised by its fragmentation: the monarchy, 
the pro and anti British, feudal landowners, tribal leaders, and numerous minority 
religious sects and ethnic groups that distanced themselves from the state (pp. 116-
121). In the case of the Yazidi Kurds, they even differentiated themselves from the 
Sunni Kurds (p. 118). There was no leader equivalent to Mustafa Kemal in Turkey 
who could strongly press for national unity. As a result, strong subnational identities 
were preserved at the expense of an all-encompassing Iraqi citizenship. 
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The most noticeable Kurdish policy in terms of cultural and language recognition was 
implemented in 1926 when the Local Languages Law was introduced (p. 119). On an 
individual level no Kurd was barred from speaking Kurdish, which in theory, could 
have contributed to the Kurdish integration into the Arab part of Iraq by promoting 
Kurdish-Arabic bilingualism. But in reality, insufficient resources were allocated to 
the Kurdish region for education, and general impoverishment could not be modified 
because of successive military conflicts over the control of Kurdish territory rich in 
natural resources. In contrast to the Turkish Kurds who had to fight for cultural 
recognition, the Iraqi Kurds' struggle has been characterised more by their actual need 
to protect their territory from monopolised control by the state. 
The Sunni-Arab dominance also caused a problem in Iraq, which became particularly 
apparent from around the 1940s. This was not so much a result of the 
institutionalisation of assimilationist policies, but instead, was a result of the original 
ethnic composition of political elite, the elite Sunni Arab officers of the former 
Ottoman Army. The Sunni Arabs were in fact a numeric minority in Iraq. However, 
they managed to remain in power by dominating the army and other state institutions 
(pp.121-123). 
The division in Iraqi society was 'horizontal' as well as 'vertical'. It not only cut 
across different ethnic groups but also across inside of each sectarian group between 
the rich and the poor. The elite-biased integration pattern caused the non-governing 
groups, such as the Kurds and the Shia to be divided among themselves. Thus the 
Shia and the Kurdish landlords shared more interests with the Sunni Arab landowners 
than with their religious or ethnic kin (pp. 110-112). This vertical division was 
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evident in the post-revolutionary as well as the pre-revolutionary era (pp. 153-155), 
To a lesser extent the feudal culture was present among the Kurdish nationalists as 
well, as seen in the weak mass-base of the Kurdish Democratic Party (p. 124). As a 
whole, the Iraqi society was divided into the wealthy oligarchy and the poorer masses 
who constituted the majority. At the same time the minority rule by the Sunni-Arabs 
alienated not only the Kurds and Christian minorities but also the Shia Arabs. The 
Sunni Arabs also maintained tribal and clientelistic control even after modem political 
parties were created, as seen in the example of the Baath Party. Thus the lack of 
authoritarian state formation in Iraq left the state ill-equipped for integrative nation-
building and allowed a monopoly of power by an oligarchic ruling group. 
2) Institutionalising Mass Political Participation 
Political authoritarianism was a necessary evil until the state established viable 
political institutions which allowed mass political participation. Otherwise, the regime 
would fall into the state of praetorianism (p. 30). Thus, by the time Turkish authorities 
introduced a multi-party system, few doubted the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic, 
and political oppositions were absorbed into the system established by the state. As a 
result, since 1946, even the supporters of the Islamists, the arch-enemy of the RPP, 
have been part of the parliamentary system. It was a significant move, as the 
opponents to the RPP's statist and radical-secularist policies constituted a significant 
part of the population, as evident in the considerable support the Democrat Party 
enjoyed (p. 131). As the multi-party system took root, even the Kurdish nationalists 
became capable of legally articulating their demands, firstly through the leftist parties 
and in later decades through the parties more specifically focused on Kurdish 
nationalism (p. 190). In all cases, however, the direct mention of Kurdish national 
rights had to be avoided. 
Turkey, however, repeatedly manifested its authoritarianism through periodic coups. 
The first one was in 1960, followed by the 1971 and the 1980 coups. Prior to every 
coup sectarian violence became uncontrollable. In other words, sufficient political 
assimilation had not yet taken place that would have absorbed the impact of social 
mobilisation. However, Turkey also increasingly showed its democratic forces by 
allowing the parliamentary system to continue after the interruptive period, and 
followers of the banned political parties could resume most of their activ'ities under 
the new party names. The democratic framework continued to grow. In recent 
decades, even the mainstream Turkish political parties discuss solutions to the 
Kurdish conflict (p. 188) along with the ostensibly pro-Kurdish political parties, 
though they are frequently subject to harassment and abuse by the state and its 
associated agents (pp. 184-185). The constitutional amendment in 1995 made a 
significant impact in liberating the scope of political debates (p. 194). Prior to this, a 
mere expression interpreted by the authorities as divisive to the national unity was 
subject to prosecution according to the controversial Anti Terrorism Law set in 1991. 
In sharp contrast to Turkey's move to the multi-party system, the Iraqi authorities 
arbitrarily banned political opposition from the 1940s. Furthermore, the authorities 
empowered tribal shaikhs and the landowning elite and ruled the populace through 
them while allowing only the government-authorised political party to exist. As a 
result, the Iraqi society remained largely fragmented, social problems were 
aggravated, and eventually, clandestine political movements became the only \\'ay to 
oppose the government, in this case, the Free Officers' movement (p. 1.+7). Thus, the 
failure to broaden political participation proved fatal to Iraq's monarchy and ushered 
in a decade of revolutionary instability in which successive military regimes sought to 
contain Kurdish insurgency. The successive regimes after the 1958 revolution also 
failed to broaden political participation. Except for the early period of the Qassem 
regime, all the revolutionary regimes suppressed political oppositions by force. For 
the Kurds, limited autonomy proposals were made in 1966 (pp. 201-20.+) and again in 
1970 (pp. 204-207). Neither proposal worked (or both missed the opportunity to 
work) as seen in the strong opposition by the Arab hard-liners (p. 200). In response to 
the 1970 autonomy proposal, the Kurds gave a divided reaction, reflecting the degree 
of dissent among the Kurdish nationalists who were opposed to Barzani' s 
authoritarian leadership. In theory, the government could have attracted those who 
sought more egalitarian leadership. However, what followed in reality was the 
Baath's resort to Arabisation and ethnic cleansing policies which gained momentum 
after the defeat of the Kurdish natiionalists. The PUK was established in 1976 as an 
opponent of the KDP as well as of the Baathists (pp. 208-210). 
As those two contrasting examples showed - one allowing a parliamentary system to 
develop and another banning political oppositions by force - the institutionalisation of 
mass political participation appears to be vital for the survival and stabilisation of new 
regimes. With numerous antagonising and often counter-revolutionary forces 
competing for power, establishment of a single legitimate system capable of 
accommodating alternative demands seems to be vital, even if further authoritarian 
measures have to be taken to maintain the minimum law and order. 
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3) Economic Development and State Structure 
Economic development facilitates national integration when it promotes social 
structure change and creates a politically viable middle class. As was the case in many 
European states, strong economic growth speeded up assimilation of different ethnic 
and, on occasion, linguistic groups. On the other hand, in the Middle East, economic 
development followed by more rapid social mobilisation led diverse sectarian groups 
to differentiate themselves from each other. Economic development was either weak 
or uneven, and this led different ethnic and religious groups to compete for the scarce 
resources. 
The above circumstance, that is, more rapid social mobilisation than assimilation, was 
made worse by the pre-existing problem, namely, the unequal social structures 
inherited from the Ottoman administration in the nineteenth century (p. 79). In 
Turkey, the state largely failed to integrate, particularly the Kurdish peasants who 
worked in slave-like conditions under the village aghas. In rural areas those aghas 
were superior to the state in terms of decision-making and everyday livelihood of the 
people dependent on them. The contrast was clear between the western and the 
southeastern parts of Turkey in the way that the peasants were or were not integrated 
to the nation-wide commercial economy (pp. 134-138). In the Turkish-speaking 
western region, people had simply stopped working for aghas and switched to more 
profitable commercial agriculture; in the Kurdish-speaking southeast, the people were 
still dependent on the old social structure, and labour mobility was markedly lower 
than other regions. This regional gap was made worse by the state's dependence on 
feudal leaders to control the population; the authorities often saw it as easier to control 
the Kurds through intermediaries who were often pro-government tribal chiefs. The 
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state's reliance on such feudal leaders, in tum, made the emergence of terrorist groups 
like the PKK almost inevitable (p. 171). And the PKK contributed to polarising the 
Kurds by indiscriminately attacking the pro-government tribal chiefs and those under 
their influence. 
Over time, however, Turkey's growmg industrialist groups such as TUSIAD 
successfully established a civil society capable of voicing opposition to the military 
(p. 194). This contributed to activating debates over the Kurdish conflict through a 
perspective other than that of the military. This was noticeable particularly from the 
mid-1990s when the constitutional amendment was made. 
On the other hand, Iraq, with its oil resources, evolved into a totalitarian state (pp. 
211-216). The Baath regime's monopoly of economic and political resources allowed 
successive governments to pursue an Arabisation policy, whilst giving the Kurds a 
token share of autonomy. This was a regrettable development as most Kurds in Iraq 
were bilingual due to the unique fact that Kurdish had been allowed in schools, 
universities and government offices located in the Kurdish region. Provided that state 
authorities made appropriate use of their resources, the potential for economic 
integration and cultural assimilation of the Kurds was greater in Iraq than in Turkey. 
What happened instead was the Sunni-Arab dominated government's pursuance of 
ethnic cleansing policies on one hand and their control of the pro-government tribes 
on the other. Through these policies, the state succeeded in eliminating and dividing 
the opposition (p. 221). Because no significant economic integration had yet taken 
place, the unequal social structure continued to allow the state to manipulate the 
feudal leaders through bribes and other material benefits. 
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The organising of labour movement signifies an important phase of social structure 
change, that is to connect peoples from different social, racial, and geographical 
origins under a common cause. In a similar development to Turkish leftist parties' 
sympathetic attitudes towards Kurdish rights, the Iep began to address the Kurdish 
issue from the 1950s. However, it appeared that Turkey's working class was far more 
politically viable than that of Iraq, and these two labour movements were not readily 
comparable. The Turkish workers became important political factors even in small 
towns, while those in Iraq were mainly confined to urban areas (p. 144). Needless to 
say, from the 1980s, the Iraqi authorities became capable of silencing political 
opposition, including that by trade unions, through distributive policies and violence 
that made them powerless and politically insignificant (pp. 214-216). 
It is not necessarily the case that countries with a single economic commodity will 
evolve into totalitarian states. However, in a fragmented political environment like 
that of Iraq, the chances are greater that anyone who comes to the power will seek to 
monopolise the economic and political resources. Where national integration or the 
initiative towards it is absent, the fragmented and antagonising groups would compete 
for political resources. It may be not impossible to say that the Iraqi Kurds could have 
taken advantage of the limited autonomy arrangements more than they did; that they 
could have settled for the less-than-satisfactory offer in exchange for peace. However, 
given the increasingly totalitarian nature of the government, the chances for full 
national integration based on equal partnership between the Kurds and the Arabs 
appeared to be slim. 
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4) Foreign Intervention and Nation-building 
As problems resulting from failed national integration became more common in 
recent decades, so did the opportunities for foreign intervention. Foreign intervention 
can affect nation-building through military and economic means - it can either boost, 
weaken, or topple the government as well as the minorities in question. The causes 
and consequences of intervention vary, but it is often political and is deemed that 
there is no such thing as a genuinely humanitarian intervention (p. 41), although 
political intervention accomplishes the humanitarian purpose sometimes more 
efficiently than the United Nations. 
On many occasions the Kurds have been heavily affected by foreign intervention 
because of their geopolitical instrumentality. In the 1920s, the Kurds constituted what 
was envisaged by the British an 'ethnic buffer' to counter the Islamism (p. 232). And 
in later decades, the Kurds were often pawns to weaken the Iraqi regimes; against 
Qassem, Aref, and the Baathists. 
One cannot blame, however, every defeat suffered by the Kurds entirely on the 
foreign powers. During the 1990s, it was the Kurdish leaders themselves who started 
internal wars by failing to reach an agreement despite the fact that the official control 
by Baghdad had practically ceased, and that the Kurds had the opportunities to run 
their own government through freely elected representatives (pp. 260-262). The main 
revenue from lucrative border trade had come to be monopolised by the KDP, as were 
the MPs in the KRG itself. The PUK struck an alliance with the PKK and Iran, while 
the KDP allied with Turkey and at times with the Iraqi security forces to \\in the 
intenlal fights. 
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Still, the impact of foreign intervention is unmistakably significant for the ethnic 
minorities for both good and bad reasons. As was shown in the case of Kurdistan after 
the Gulf War, the military intervention was vital to successful humanitarian 
operations in a rapidly developing crisis (pp. 249-250). The intervention had 
unmistakably internationalised the Kurdish case and brought the suffering of the 
refugees to worldwide attention. It was also symbolic that the UN, for the first time in 
its history, adopted a Security Council Resolution on behalf of the civilians under 
attack by state authorities whose sovereignty it recognises (pp. 250-253). While the 
swift repatriation of the two-million Kurdish refugees manifested the positive side of 
such intervention, the foreign states also appear to have taken advantage of 
intervening opportunities to add pressure to the Iraqi regime, in which the Kurds, once 
again, were pawns of great powers. The Kurds constituted key position in the western 
states' anti-Baath campaign. However, none of them dared to militarily assist the 
Kurdish nationalists for their own political reasons (pp. 266-270). This attitude 
crippled the Iraqi opposition and pushed the KDP further to Baghdad. 
As a whole, it appears that the long-term effect of foreign intervention on nation-
building will depend on whether it eventually helps to create a viable relation between 
the minority and the government. Depending on the way it is conducted, foreign 
intervention is potentially capable of improving a government-minority relation by 
physically protecting vulnerable groups. For a successful intervention, foreign powers 
must commit themselves until a workable government apparatus is established. The 
Allies, therefore, must at least continue the air patrol if they claim to care about 
protecting the Kurds from the current Iraqi regime and refrain from manipulating the 
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Kurds against Baghdad. The security of the Kurdish region must be guaranteed until a 
workable agreement between the Iraqi government and the Kurds is reached. And 
most essentially, the main Kurdish parties need to reach an agreement to stop the 
infighting, make the Kurdish parliament truly representative, remove armed borders 
between the rival factions, and make Kurdistan a safer and united place. 
5) Notes on Interviewees' Objectivity 
One technical problem that must be mentioned here is the lack of objectivity in the 
views of some of the interviewees. Namely, the comments taken from the 
representative of the KRG were largely pro-KDP, and to a lesser extent those from the 
Kurdish Human Rights Project were pro-PKK, and therefore some of them had to be 
omitted. To maintain the overall objectivity of the study, the comments from those 
with opposing or alternative views should have been taken as well, but only a limited 
number of interviews were taken due to time and financial constraints. 
To be fair, however, it appears that the very circumstances the Kurds are in, such as 
the lack of a territorial state, unending conflicts, political and cultural suppression and 
discrimination, etc., almost inevitably make the Kurds more political and therefore 
less objective than those who reside in 'normal' circumstances. In other words, their 
political and often physical environments do not allow the Kurds to 'sit back and talk 
objectively' over crucial issues in which they are voluntarily or involuntarily 
involved. To speak of a Kurdish state can be a crime depending on where slhe is; to 
not help fellow Kurds can be treachery depending on where s/he is; to support the 
Kurdish nationalists is just as legitimate a behaviour as to support the governments 
and vice versa. The famous saying 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom 
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fighter' appears to be the central issue here, and all that is possible is to present the 
diverse views. There are also the Kurds who do not fit into any of the above 
categories. Among those who were least political, a Kurdish woman said, 'the people 
who are fighting in the mountains for all their lives are not suited for running a 
democratic government. You need to have an objective mind to run a democratic 
government' . How much such a balanced view is shared by other Kurds remains to 
be a subject of future studies. 
6) From Revolution from Above to Prototypical National Integration 
This study has demonstrated that Revolution from Above has the potential to create 
the conditions of prototypical national integration, which is the creation of a 
community bound by intense communication beyond one's race, religion, or even a 
language. We have seen that nations are historical creations and that the peoples who 
belong to the same ethnic and language group have been split over their tribes, 
religious sects, and mere geography. We have also seen the state of Kurdish national 
rights being increasingly discussed among the non-Kurdish peoples, firstly by the 
Turkish workers who became concerned about the rights of their countrymen in the 
1950s and 1960s and in more recent decades by some of the Turkish political parties 
and the industrialists who are both eager to achieve a democratic framework in the 
country. We have also seen a brief period of Arab and Kurd partnership in Iraq in the 
late 1950s when the Iraqi constitution defined Kurds and Arabs as 'brothers in the 
same homeland' . 
But a successful outcome of nation-building through Revolution from Above is by no 
means inevitable. Iraq's initially promising start, acknowledging Kurdish identity, 
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was squandered by its resort to totalitarian state fonnation. On the other hand, 
Turkey's refusal to acknowledge Kurdish identity means it has not been able to use its 
pluralistic political institutions to effectively integrate the Kurds. Though less 
influential than in the past, the Turkish military still reserves the ultimate right to 
intervene into parliamentary activities. And also, the hard-core nationalist opinion is 
difficult to change overnight especially since terrorism generated the evil cycle of 
violence and counter-violence. On the other hand, the Iraqi case showed the sheer 
extent of control that a totalitarian state could have over its popUlation: the political 
ideology was indoctrinated through mass party organisations; the oil money allowed 
everything to be imported instead of manufactured on its own soil, including food and 
labourers; the domestic economy had been weakened through distributive policies; 
and 'rebellious' minorities had been suppressed through bribery and ethnic cleansing. 
There was no nation but a dictator and divided communities. It was, however, the 
western nations who continued to trade with Iraq in the 1980s and made sophisticated 
weapons available to the totalitarian regime. 
As for the impact of foreign intervention, it is rather idealistic to envisage that all 
interventions will contribute to improving government-minority relations. However, 
they may, at least be able to guarantee the security of vulnerable groups and 
humanitarian operations until a workable agreement is reached between conflicting 
parties. In this sense, the lifting of the UN sanctions towards Iraq - still unforeseeable 
at the time of writing - will be a crucial moment to test the quality of foreign 
intervention and how it can keep the Kurds secure after resumption of full Iraqi 
control. 
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So far, we have seen the United Nations and various international aid organisations 
whose staff and contributors have no ethnic connections to the Kurds continuing to 
provide aid to Kurdistan. And such activities are not limited to Kurdistan; with or 
without success, many nations contribute to dangerous peacekeeping missions, 
disaster relief, and development programmes. These activities are not free from 
criticisms such as political decision-making, bureaucratic inefficiency, and creating an 
aid-dependent economy. However, it appears these activities at least manifest the 
existence of a community - which may correctly be called the international 
community - bound by the bond of communication and humanity. 
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